Krolczyk, G. v. Goddard Systems, Inc.
164 A.3d 521
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs G. Michelle Krolczyk and Lydia DiCola were co-teachers in a Goddard preschool classroom; they recorded repeated serious disruptive and aggressive conduct by a four‑year‑old student, A.G., including threats, biting that broke skin, repeated soiling, and physical assaults.
- Plaintiffs, as mandated reporters under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6311, came to suspect A.G. was abused or neglected and contacted the Department of Education for guidance about reporting.
- On February 14, 2008, after telling owner/manager Nicole Wishard they intended to file a formal child‑abuse report, Plaintiffs were fired; Wishard sent parents a letter saying Plaintiffs were terminated "for various reasons" to protect children/parents/school.
- Defendants defended the terminations as for violating school policy by restraining A.G. during an episode on February 7, 2008; other staff who restrained children (including one who participated in the February 7 incident) were not discharged.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants on both wrongful discharge and defamation claims; the Superior Court reversed as to wrongful discharge (public‑policy wrongful termination claim) and affirmed as to defamation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment on wrongful discharge was proper | Krolczyk & DiCola: their termination was motivated by their intent to report suspected child abuse (protected conduct), shown by temporal proximity and Wishard's statement | Goddard/Wishard: they were fired for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason—violating policy by restraining a child | Reversed: material facts exist; plaintiff testimony and circumstantial evidence create a jury question whether termination punished protected reporting activity |
| Whether trial court violated Nanty‑Glo by crediting defendant testimony at summary judgment | Plaintiffs: court improperly accepted Wishard’s deposition to decide motive instead of leaving credibility to jury | Defendants: evidence (the journal) independently proves restraint as reason, so Nanty‑Glo not implicated | Reversed: court impermissibly credited Wishard’s testimonial explanation and ignored admissible contrary evidence; Nanty‑Glo bars resolving credibility at summary judgment |
| Whether plaintiffs stated a public‑policy wrongful termination claim | Plaintiffs: mandated reporters firing for intending to report would chill statutory duty and violate public policy | Defendants: firing for restraint (non‑statutory reason) defeats public‑policy claim | Reversed: reporting suspected child abuse advances public policy; plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to proceed to trial on wrongful discharge |
| Whether dismissal of defamation claim on summary judgment was proper | Plaintiffs: letter implying termination "for the good of the children" carried innuendo damaging professional reputation (defamation per se) | Defendants: letter merely announced termination for unspecified reasons and protection of school/children; not defamatory per se and plaintiffs concede no special harm | Affirmed: letter not capable of defamatory meaning per se as to professional fitness; no special harm proved, so summary judgment proper for defamation |
Key Cases Cited
- Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Modern Gas, 143 A.3d 412 (Pa. Super. 2016) (summary‑judgment standard; view evidence in nonmovant’s favor)
- Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, 812 A.2d 1218 (Pa. 2002) (summary judgment appropriate only where no genuine issue of material fact)
- Wakeley v. M.J. Brunner, Inc., 147 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2016) (at‑will employment presumption and termination principles)
- Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974) (recognition of wrongful discharge tort where termination violates public policy)
- Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998) (public‑policy exception where employee exercised statutory right—workers’ compensation)
- Rothrock v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., 883 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2005) (public policy protections related to workers’ compensation claims)
- Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, 660 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. 1995) (wrongful discharge after filing unemployment claim)
- Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. 1978) (wrongful discharge for jury duty enforcement)
- Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. 1989) (termination for performing a statutory duty states a wrongful discharge claim)
- Nanty‑Glo v. American Surety Co., 163 A. 523 (Pa. 1932) (factfinder must resolve testimonial credibility; court cannot accept moving party’s testimony to deny trial)
- Stimmler v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145 (Pa. 2009) (summary judgment cannot substitute for trial by deposition/testimonial affidavits)
- Kurowski v. Burroughs, 994 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. 2010) (court decides as a matter of law whether publication is capable of defamatory meaning)
- Baker v. Lafayette College, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987) (trial court must first determine if statement can be construed as defamatory)
- Walker v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc., 634 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. 1993) (defamation per se actionable without special damages)
- Livingston v. Murray, 612 A.2d 443 (Pa. Super. 1992) (statements that injure business/professional reputation may be defamatory)
- ToDay's Housing v. Times Shamrock Communications, 21 A.3d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2011) (actionability of innuendo is a question of law)