Geary v. United States Steel Corp.

her appointment because Mamana’s Anne Coleman he Jr., religion. Coleman, C. for Horace As husband’s How- resign if so desires. may as trustee, of course solely that it resignation belief on his based his ever, persuasion religious should compelled by his wife’s orphans’ It was court. enforced been not have error do so. religious partiality for the settlor’s

Considerations appropriate spouses bases are not of trustees’s belief eligibility determining of a do trustee, justify Settlor with determination. the court’s expressed greatest clarity definite exclusive public by general his charitable to benefit intention religious persuasion and not the That, contributions. spouses, was the mission of his trust. of the trustees’s on the Costs Foundation. Decree reversed. Jones concurs the result. Chief Justice Mr. Eagen dissents. Mr. Justice v. United Geary, Appellant, States Steel Corporation.

Argued September 1972. Before Jones, C. J., Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Nix Pomeroy, and Manber- JJ. INO, H. with him Titus,

Paul Bernard D. Marcus, and Harris, appellant. & Kaufman Paul A. him. R. Mamón, with Thomas Vin- Wright, cent L. L. Matera, William and. White, Jr., Reed, Smith, Shaw d McGlay, appellee.

Opinion by Mr. 1974: March Justice Pomeroy, This appeal comes to us from an the trial order of court sustaining appellee’s preliminary objections the nature of a demurrer and dismissing prejudice appellant’s amended complaint trespass. The Supe- rior Court affirmed per without curiam, opinion, we granted allocatur to consider and far- novel arguments reaching appellant advanced support of his alleged cause of action.1 George avers B. appellant, Geary, was continuously employed United by appellee, States Steel Corporation (hereinafter “company”), from 1953 until July when he 13, 1967, was dismissed from his position. Geary’s duties the sale involved tubular products to the oil and em- gas industry. His was at will. The ployment dismissal is said to have stemmed a disagreement concerning one the company’s a new tubular products, casing designed for high use under pressure. Geary alleges that he be- the product lieved had not been adequately tested and constituted a danger serious to anyone who used it; that he voiced his misgivings to his superiors and was ordered to “follow directions”, which agreed to that he nevertheless do; continued to express his reser- case taking his vations, vice-president in charge the product; sale of that as a result of his efforts reevaluated the was and product withdrawn from the opinion support dismissing in order No the judge Superior trial in accordance with filed was Court Rule post-argument Supreme statement In submitted under 46. Court appellant 34, has possibility admitted counsel Rule appeal required never notice of was served judge. on the trial lie at all times duties to market; performed Ms best Ms acted with the best ability always in interests of the and the company general public mind; that because of these events he was sum- without notice. asserts that marily discharged Geary conduct so company’s acting was “wrongful, malicious and to Ms repu- abusive,” resulting injury tation in the mental and direct finan- industry, anguish, cial for which he both seeks and com- harm, punitive pensatory damages.2 been case dismissed on a all having demurrer, taken pleaded facts are as admitted for the

properly purpose testing sufficiency complaint. v. Pa. A.2d Rowland, 447 Balsbaugh (1972); v. 439 Pa. Parkway 266 A.2d 685 Engel Co., (1970); Fawcett v. R. Monongahela 137 A.2d Co., 768 (1958).3

Appellant admits that he candidly us beckoning No territory. into uncharted court Common- recogmzed wealth has ever cause of non-statutory action for an employer’s termination of an em- at-will scant relationship. What ployment authority there is on other subject points way. Henry Lake& Erie Railroad Pittsburgh 139 Pa. Co., a railroad employee A. 157 be- (1891), suspended was his alleged irregularities department. cause Al- claim, 2 Following discharge Geary unemployment filed a Employment Security. Bureau with the benefits The Unem Compensation ployment Board of Review found that guilty company’s in the employ, of willful misconduct copy A of the the claim. Board’s decision allowed and order part made a to and herein. attached 3 company product in brief its denies that The new was Geary’s efforts, market as a result of from the withdrawn and has prove successfully that it has been marketed offered without years. This factual for several incident contention is irrelevant stage. objection preliminary at

175 he though was investigation, cleared subsequent alleging refused reinstatement. his employer, He sued without prob discharged “maliciously was the entry able cause”. 139 Pa. at Sustaining 290. said for Chief Justice compulsory non-suit, Paxson plaintiff] Court: “The [to a greater and could not well be without not, disputed, shock than employee to the relations of A disposed corporation, we to sanction. railroad or an discharge an with or individual, may without at unless restrained some by cause, pleasure, I see questions so do not contract; malice and cause have probable anything want do at case.” 139 Pa. 297. The principle recently case was a federal Henry recognized court as the law this Commonwealth. McKinney v. Armco Steel F. Corp., Supp. (W.D. 270 360 1967). Pennsylvania law accordance with the

weight authority elsewhere. Absent a or statutory to the provision contractual the law has contrary, taken power of either granted party to terminate an employment relationship or reason.4 any no This of termination power explicitly recognized Restatement Torts, §762, Privilege Per Selecting sons for Business Relations: “One who causes intended harm to another unintended merely refusing to relation enter with the into business other or to con- 4 Youngstown See, e.g., Co., v. Pearson Sheet & Tube 332 F.2d denied, (7th 1964), cert. 914; Hablas v. Cir. 379 U.S. Armour 439 (8th Co., 1959) Refining Odell ; v. Humble Oil & F.2d Cir. & 270 71 denied, (10th Co., cert. 1953), 941; May Cir. F.2d 123 U.S. Transportation Co., Santa Fe Trail v. 189 Kan. 370 P.2d 390 Pennsylvania Jorgensen Co., v. R. ; (1962) 25 N.J. 138 A.2d (1958) ; International A.L.R. 2d 1415 Harvester Comerford generally (1938). Co., See So. Ala. Am. Jur. 2d §§34, Servant & Master is timie a business relation terminable at Ms will (a) a breach liable for that harm if the is not refusal duty arising nature to the from the actor’s other legislative of enactment, the actor’s business or from a accomplishing illegal (b) or of an effect on means by part competition, (c) of a concerted refusal persons of a member.”5 combination of which is changed recogMze We that economic conditions have Henry Pittsburgh radically Lake & since the time of corporate supra. huge enter- Erie Railroad The Co., emerged century prises in have wield which employees. power their It has been awesome over “ aptly of em- remarked that have become nation [w]e ployees. dependent upon others for our means We people of com- and most of our have become livelihood, dependent upon wages. jobs they pletely their If lose supplied they every except for relief lose resource, depen- security. forms of social Such the various people upon of all dence of the others for mass something of their income is new the world. For generation, of life the substance another man’s our hands.”6 privilege (e) to this that “the section states stated Comment regardless refusing exists the actor’s motive for this Section though relations the other and even the sole to enter business with other”; (d) to harm the comment

motive is a desire makes it applies rule to refusals between . . . that “the clear belaboring employee. obvious, . .” At the risk . we note that exceptions applies appellant. “duty of .the enumerated none arising from the nature the actor’s the other business” in special governing public (a) rules to the refers utilities. See clause Torts, §763. None the American Law Restatement Institute’s (Second) directly of the Restatement drafts Torts deals tentative change appears, presently §762, no far as and so contem- plated in this section. Philosophy Tannenbaum, quoted (1951), A of Labor 9 F. Employment Limiting vs. Individual Blades, at Will Freedom: On Employer Power, Exercise 67 Colum. L. Abusive Rev. 1404 Against background changes, of these the broad question appellant to which attention invites our impose judicial whether the time has come to restric- employer’s power discharge. tions on an Appellant points long-established first to the tort unjustified prospective advantage. of interference with (1939) §766 See Restatement of and Restate- Torts, (Second) (Tentative ment of §§766Aand 766B Torts, argues expectancies 1969). Draft 14, No. He that the protects by which the law from interference outsiders protected against parties should to the rela- also tionship. The courts of Commonwealth have held this employers employees that both are entitled to free- meddling by parties, dom from third where the even employment Dorrington Manning, is at will. v. 135 Pa. Superior (1939) v. Ct. A.2d Padden Local ; Journeymen 90 United Ass’n 168 Pa. Su- Plumbers, of perior (1951). Ct. 82 A.2d do not think But we liability imposing strangers pro- that the cases on to the relationship apposite tected to the instant situation. predicate liability A in a such case is “the absence of privilege justification part or on the . the actor. . .” College, v. Park Glenn Point 441 Pa. 272 A.2d 474, 480, (1971). as in the Here, Glenn com- case, plaint negate privilege, does not the existence of a hither- regarded virtually insulating as absolute, com- pany’s Geary’s employment. termination Instead, impose privilege we are asked to limitations on this policy. involving The reasons of cases interference by parties, turning they presence third as do on the privileges absence of a different do not seem sort, particularly helpful evaluating proposal. in this principle operational restricting

As an an em- power discharge, appellant ployer’s suggests original deleted). (1967) (emphasis Comment, in See also Towards Property Right Employment, 22 Buffalo L. Rev. 1081 on the actor liability on imposing rationale of cases “on the theory his motive. While the basis of recognition it received frontier of the tort,”7 law Sommer date. early See, e.g., at an Pennsylvania Wheat process); v. R. (abuse S. & 19 Wilt, (1818) deprivation (1855) (dicta; ley Baugh, as tortious recognized The conduct water rights). an element of involves necessarily cases of this sort accomplish harm or ulterior specific intent to cause v. Fed Bank Co. & Trust purpose. Thus American eral Reserve 65 L.Ed. 983 (1921), 256 U.S. Bank, banks independent relied on were case appellant, a federal reserve held to have a cause of action against against bank checks drawn which accumulated join for the them to plaintiffs purpose forcing federal of a holder to system. right present reserve but the exer checks for was not payment questioned, manner for a cise of that particular particular impermissible. end was held to be By appel same the novel of which theory recovery token, specific lant advances must involve intent on surely harm part to achieve company some If a in the proscribed goal. general other intent, sense that an or should employer knew have known of his were all that consequences the probable act, in a need show order to make employee disgruntled out a of of action, privilege cause would some of harm effectively eradicated, degree is an foreseeable whenever normally dism not to seek a result so Appellant purports issed.8 -1 — i Torts, Harper James, The of §4.10 & Law 8 By degree token, harm, minimal, the same however some any employee generally voluntarily whenever foreseeable leaves theory recognized rights job. is, of malicious abuse of The litigants, including employers course, to all available as well as recognize employees. of action in we this Were area requirement specific intent, the strict include did it which drastic; that a merely argues recognize court should the abuse of in a privilege particular instance, grant To damages accordingly. appellant’s this extent, abuse cases the malicious proffered analogy involving of recognized rights The apt enough. difficulty seems is that not add Geary’s averments do complaint up to intent. specific

Here decision in again our the case Glenn Point Park offers We College, guidance. useful supra, there dealt with an of interference aby allegation third an party prospective relationship: business brokerage unconsummated real estate arrangement. Following tentative draft of of the Restate §766A ment held where the rela (Second) we that Torts, tionship interfered with rather allegedly prospective than part intent on existing, specific the de fendant harm cause to the plaintiff must be alleged to make out a cause of action. Glenn’s Examining we found it deficient complaint, respect. averred complaint on information that, relying sup plied plaintiff defendant had brokers, negotiated purchase direct real to the estate, representing vendor that no brokers were involved the transac alleged tion. It was this manner defendant had intentionally maliciously prevented plaintiffs into a entering brokerage arrangement with the them vendor, thereby of their depriving commissions. ruling fell short of charging harm intent to cause we made clear plaintiffs, it bare recitation that a had defendant acted “inten wrongfully, tionally, maliciously, deceit fraudulently, justification” without not did fully satisfy requirement. intent specific giving employers

might potent weapon result have ironic a key employees change jobs. to harass who which wish deficiency complaint in that We think it the Glenn clearer than was the instant case is even only alleged that there was case. The show facts Geary product; dispute that the merits new over expressed point vigorously in the mat his own view taking superiors by-passing his immediate ter, company vice-president, and that he ulti case was discharged. nothing mately from which There is here company Geary fired for the we could infer coercing specific purpose causing him him harm, compromise any himself. to break law9 or otherwise to already According Geary had his own averments, company.10 won battle within the The most his own natural inference from the chain of recited events complaint is that had made a nuisance of company discharged preserve him and the himself, hardly administrative order in its house. This own purpose”, amounts to an much less to “dis “ulterior in the those malevolence”, interested sense which by Mr. in the American are used Justice terms Holmes supra. theory, Bank & Trust Under his own Co. case, appellant upon has failed to state a claim therefore, granted.11 which relief can be 9 Appellant suggests in Ms brief that continued sale of the product might both defective have entailed criminal and lia civil bility. particularly speculation, product This is mere since allegedly from the market. withdrawn plaintiff’s insistence, “. . . result of As a re-evaluation at program Complaint, was withdrawn.” Par. 8. granted plaintiff case, opportunity In the derm we complaint. Here, however, to amend his we think it clear from Geary’s already complaint any the face of once-amended further unavailing. attempt be to amend would “Amendment of a freely allowed, ought jeopardized a claim should to be pleading by minor defects in or technical errors of counsel. But encompass liberality pleading duty does not in the courts to pleading amendments when the initial successive allow indicates asserted cannot be established.” the claim Behrend v. Yellow 105, 110, Co., 271 A.2d 241 Cab Appellant’s to consid- argument appeal final is an erations of asserts in Ms com- Geary policy. plaint he in that the best interests of acting well in general public employer opposing as as of his de- marketing of a which he to be product believed em- of an fective. for abuse Certainly, potential of dismissal ployer’s power particularly serious where must exercise expert judg- independent, ment in not matters of but does product safety,12 himself out employee. hold as this sort of So far as in he only was involved sale shows, of company products. There no suggestion expert possessed or that his duties any qualifications, in judgments extended to of making product matters that his safety. Geary argues conduct essence, be protected should because his were good. intentions employees No doubt most who dismissed from their posts can make the same claim. We doubt estab- lishing litigate every such case as it arises operate would either the best interest of the parties the public. of rapidity change corporate Given personnel the areas not employment covered labor agree like the one at bar ments, suits could well be expected on heavy judicial burden our place system in terms an increased case load both and the thorny problems inevitably which would proof presented. We agree however, these appellant, with considerations do justify in themselves denying a legal forum to a justiciable claim. See Niederman plaintiff 261 A.2d 84 Brodsky, Of greater impact of such possible is the concern suits on the employers interests of legitimate hiring retain personnel available. best ing ever-present well inhibit might suit making threat critical supra, Blades, at note 1408 note 22. See by employers qualific judgments concerning employee ations.13 in- extends beyond question

The problem for even an unusually gifted per- dividual competence, use if he cannot son no to his work may be analyzed in this Blades has of the difficulties Professor some equally present “Ordinarily, where both credible ver area: sides carry plaintiff facts, to his the will have failed burden. sions of the identify danger average jury However, the that the there is will possibility believe, employee. with, could and therefore the This fabricating by disgruntled employees give to rise vexatious lawsuits potential plausible of coercion. If the for vexatious tales by discharged employees great, employers too will be inhibited is suits exercising judgment employees as their best to which should Compromise employer’s power . . . retained. of the should be managerial judgments professional, about or other to make such especially employees higher high-ranking is undesirable. The ... important ranking employee, to the the more the success of the performance. Compounding potential is his effective the business employer’s judgment higher at inhibition for undue greater difficulty employment articulating is echelons Compared wage earner, at that level. to the for a basis generally against be can measured me routine duties whose likely standard, the value of a salaried is more chanical intangible qualities imagination, as in such initia be measured to employer’s personality. tive, drive, evaluation of the and usually highly ranking employee personalized, higher intuitive such, and, is more difficult translate judgment, to into concrete as juryman readily else—a someone understand reasons which —can protection Indeed, appreciate. if it even is conceded that and discharges employees by afforded rank and file from unwarranted might appropriate, argued agreements it still be no labor upon employer’s any subjective kind evaluation intrusion employees op. Blades, should be tolerated.” higher echelon cit. 1428-9. Professor Blades supra, at nevertheless favors note employees protect all to at levels from judicial abusive intervention hope partly . . discharge, that “. a lack of confidence lead, way, juries albeit in a could roundabout to the and courts might private of settlement means be the well creation way handling expeditious such cases.” Id. at effective most 1431. with

effectively employees. example, fellow Here, immedi- he his Geary’s complaint by-passed shows that ate on superiors his pressed higher officers, views his close contacts vice utilizing company presi- dent.14 The praiseworthiness Geary’s motives does not detract interest company’s legitimate normal preserving operational its from dis- procedures ruption.15 agree while we should sum, employees their to educated encouraged express views on of their quality employer’s we are not products, per- suaded that a new creating cause of non-statutory action the sort proposed appellant the best achieve this result. way to On whatever balance, imperatives can be discerned here seem mili- policy such a course.16 against tate program “. . . claimant was [T]he critical of the and ob superiors.

jected [He] . . . was ordered to follow directions agreed though opposed do that he would so even still problem program. president . . took [He] . the a vice of company the whom was close as contact and a result program Findings of the was re-evaluation withdrawn. . . .” Compensation Unemployment Board, Fact of attached to and made complaint part pursuing of the amended as Exhibit a “A”. In this any duty imposed course, exceeded on him under the rule Agency Duty (Second) of §381: the Restatement to Give Informa dissenting opinion. tion, in the do cited We not conceive that §381 any to case before us. bears relation the 15 inferring Geary’s discharge see no basis for We was a retaliatory gesture designed punish spiteful noticing to him for calling company’s product to the asserted attention defect in the particularly product true in view of the fact that This is the was that, It market. does not withdrawn follow because company’s good, Geary’s were discharging motives motives in scrutinizing complaint required him bad. we are not were parties put sense or common attribute to perversity our aside a alleged not warrant. do facts which 16Compare, v. Petermann International Brotherhood Team 184, (1959), App. 344 P.2d 25 2d sters, a by Cal. case 174 relied on non-statutory cause appellant, action employee in which in an 184 of an em- may

It there are areas granted be life in which his has no ployee’s employer legitimate An into one of these areas virtue by interest. intrusion employer’s power discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of where some action, particularly The public facet of threatened. recognized policy an em- process notion that substantive due elevates his em- discharging privilege hiring ployer’s long has an absolute constitutional right ployees require But case does not been discredited.17 since the perimeters define in fashion comprehensive us to only decline to do so. We hold of this we privilege, itself discloses plausible where the perjury recognized on refusal to commit was dismissed for his Supreme grounds. recently, public policy More Court of Indiana employee in the ease of an who was dis similar result reached a against charged filed a claim her under she because compensation Frampton v. Central statute. Indiana’s workmen’s (Ind. 1973). Co., 425 The California courts 297 N.E.2d Indiana Gas ,to application of there Petermann cases where limited the have legislature. policy explicit declaration has been an Inn, Inc., App. Code 192 Cal. 2d See, Golden v. Clearman’s Glenn Zamora, App. Rptr. (1961) and v. Montalvo 7 Cal. 13 Cal. Boring, Rptr. (1970), Mallard v. with which Cal. 3rd Rptr. (1960) App. 6 Cal. and Patterson 2d Cal. App. Rptr. (1967) Corp., 2d Cal. Cal. should Philco Supreme Frampton holding compared. Court’s Indiana be agree Appeals that, equally with the Court narrow: “We may ordinary employee circumstances, an at wiU be dis under discharged However, charged when an cause. without statutorily exercising exception solely conferred recognized.” general 297 N.E.2d at 428. rule must It necessary reject rationale of these decisions order reach here. In each result we case where a cause to defend public policy found, mandates were clear and of action instant compelling; cannot be said case. that 17 Labor Union v. Compare, Federal Northwestern Iron Lincoln (1949) 212 L.Ed. with Adair v. Co., United U.S. & Metal Coppage (1908) Kansas, L.Ed. and States, U.S. 1, L.Ed. 236 U.S. legitimate terminating and reason for an em- at-will ployment relationship and no clear mandate of policy thereby, employee is violated an at will has no right against employer wrongful of action his dis- charge.

Order affirmed.

Mr. Justice Nix dissents. Manderinq

Mr. Justice dissents. Dissenting by Opinion Mr. Justice Roberts: accept implicit majority’s I cannot view today’s jurisprudence lacking decision that is so vitality judicial process awareness and in- our capable affording responsible employee relief to a arbitrary retaliatory discharge for an and from em- ployment. I dissent. years appellant George Geary

For fourteen B. Corporation served the United States Steel as a sales- Abruptly, July man. summarily on he was 13, 1987, discharged majority without cause notice. The now plaus- holds “that where the itself discloses legitimate terminating ible reason for an at-will employment relationship pub- and no clear mandate of policy thereby, lic is violated an at will has against employer no action wrongful his discharge.” agree pre- I am unable to that this case plausible only legitimate “a sents reason for ter- employment minating” Geary’s or that “no clear man- public policy” has date been violated. particular appel-

In the circumstances of this case, arbitrary lant’s demonstrates the dismissal power by employer. managers exercisable corporation publicly-held George determined Geary should be dismissed B. because he called to the superiors pipe of his the steel attention manu- and which factured was re- dangerous quired product. a defective sell was 186 pipe suggestion that the unsafe steel be withdrawn

His protect danger from from the market to both the harmony liability complete employer and his from inwas Geary employer’s interest. his best Nevertheless, discharged. was Geary required in- to know

As a was salesman, timately selling. represented products He he was the expected Steel it that he United States and was would employer’s reputation. protect Like- be alert to his it natural that he to shield him- was would seek wise, employer consequences from the of a dan- self and his recognized correctly gerous product. When he causing potential pipe strong the steel had defective supe- injury damage, immediately he notified his loyalty was dismissal. course, riors. His reward Of superiors had informed his defective not discharged may product, been have for his well failure to do so.

Geary’s danger pipe assessment of of the steel corporation since after his notification, was correct, pipe market.1 from the On these removed the steel manifestly employer pleadings, it clear that lay Geary was and that interest realized its dangerous product. withdrawing from market Geary’s seeking corporate Despite candor within corporation’s family best advance interest, him. fired 1 well-pleaded A demurrer admits as true all reasonably them, inferences deducible from and all facts but any Wilbur, 551, 554, v. Pa. of law. Reardon 441 conclusions ; Rizzuto, (1971) 397, 400-01, Clevenstein Pa. A.2d ; (1970) Hospital, v. Misericordia A.2d 624-25 Hoffman (1970). Therefore, stage A.2d at 503-04 accept pleadings Geary’s bound this Court as true pipe aUegation the steel fact withdrawn from the by Steel. U. S. market

There no doubt that of this strong public policies Commonwealth dis- Geary’s have been offended charge. product by appellant asserted First, after his superiors, defective notified was, appellant withdrawn the market. manufacture distribution of defective and potentially dangerous em- products does serve or the either the public’s relief to ployer’s granted interest. Our have courts those Kassab injured by defective merchandise. E.g., v. Central A.2d (1968); Soya, v. Webb 422 Pa. 853 (1966). 220 A.2d See Zern, Restatement (1965). 402A The (Second) Torts § majority, fails to perceive prevention however, is a and injury objec- fundamental desirable highly tive of our society.

Second, appellant employee “subject as an to a duty to use reasonable efforts to his give [employer] information which to affairs entrusted to relevant and him, as has which, [employee] notice, [em- would desire be ployer] to have which can com- municated without violating superior duty to third person.” Restatement (Second) Agency 381 (1958). § Had Geary refrained from his notifying superiors the defective been product, could have discharged for this violating to come forward informa- duty No responsible tion. policy permits served which an to discharged his solely obeying legal to duty communicate to superiors. information Indeed, policy underlying to duty communicate is frustrated by denying Geary the to opportunity pre- sent his case to the court.

The it majority admits, as must, precedents cause of action for barring wrongful discharge are “scant” that “economic conditions have changed since the date of the radically” only Pennsylvania case Henry & point. Pittsburgh on L.E.R.R., 139 Pa. 289, majority, I believe tbe Unlike A. unorganized employees surely afford time has come arbitrary prove opportunity a claim for an court retaliatory discharge. relationship employment majority concedes The subject judicial proper it refuses Still, is a action. opportunity establish his claim to afford justifies discharge. majority wrongful re- The its recognize by assuming that a cause of act fusal to alleged “an unleash increased action on the facts will thorny problems proof,” and . case load and . . problems plague assuming will our further these nothing judicial majority’s thinking system. The mythological fear of the more than unarticulated only assumptions un- bos. Not both Pandora’s perceive majority the reali- but the fails to warranted, organization. century industrial ties of twentieth wrong- reality recognizing a of action for is that cause help to ful will check these circumstances society, arbitrary in our the dismissal serious menace power employers. of case-by- genius the of the is that common law analysis permits opening closing the

case and door from view of the fact that the “[I]n to the courtroom. signed present day Magna the Charta was to moment, of the the structure law have been made amendments to impossible increasing frequency, suppose it is they continue, will not and the be forced to that law partic- adapt society, itself conditions of and, to new employers ularly, new relations between and to the they Hardy, employes, Holden v. arise.” 169 as U.S. (1898). my judg- Ct. 383, S. 387, appellant that assertion should be denied the ment, represents opening wedge the his case relief because might produce theory litigation further which of a judicial inappropriate consideration. Niederman an is Brodsky, (1970). A.2d 412-13, It would, imply be however, misleading docket considerations alone for majority’s account the reticence. “Of the greater majority] concern [to the possible suits impact legitimate such on the interests of and the best employers hiring retaining personnel instant available.” The case itself illustrates fallacy this If the existence of the argument. tort of wrongful discharge (as- these circumstances suming, as we the truth of all facts must, alleged) will keep employees like on George Geary corporate pay- both the and the interest rolls, employer’s public’s will have been relief Affording arbitrary served. for in no retaliatory discharge way impinges upon for employer’s right cause. That difficult is of line-drawing may great involved no moment, since daily courts confronted with the task sep- from wheat chaff.2 arating argument support legitimate To its interests of employers hiring retaining personnel the best available compromised by granting appellant opportunity

would be wrongful prove discharge, majority quotes his elaim ex tensively Employment Blades, at vs. Individual Free Wills Limiting Employer Power, dom On : Abusive Exercise of Colum. L. Rev. It 1428-29 true that Professor speaks problems proof potential Blades unjustified wrongful discharge if suits a cause of action for recognized by However, unqualifiedly the courts. Professor Blades wrongful discharge. the idea a cause of endorses action Im following portion mediately quoted of his article majority majority (see opinion), note 13 of Professor Blades con argument judicial [that “But there no cludes. should be employer’s necessarily subjective higher- review an evaluation of against employees], strong when viewed echelon interest integrity protecting employees, freedom and of all has force sanctity right only discharge of the normal if the would be by seriously impaired unfounded claims of coercion. The proof insurmountable, problem is not there are a number of techniques evidentiary genuine available to courts which the reasonably might guaranteed claim of a serious in- ness 190 E. has noted,

As Lawrence Blades professor “[t]he abso an anacronism of the industrial made revolution ideal the classical discharge by destroying right lute it is based.” which upon freedom of contract complete Freedom: Will Individual vs. Employment at Blades, Power, Employer Abusive Exercise of On Limiting although Further, L. Rev. 1404, 1418 (1967). 67 Colum. case3 stated nineteenth-century a single Pennsylvania an or with can dismiss that an employer with this right follow that necessarily it does cause, out word right unrestrained. absolute and “[T]he it is easy so deceptive pitfalls; one the most un to an meaning premise from slip qualified are rights quali in the conclusion. Most one qualified Bank Trust v. Federal Reserve American & Co. fied.” 41 (1921) S. Ct. 500 350, 358, 256 U.S. Bank, (Holmes, J.). “right.” here policy qualifies

It is which public a seemingly- 41 S. Ct. at When at 501. id. See an relation- existing conditions of right absolute then a is obli- policy court contrary ship reality. of current right light gated qualify Franklin Insurance Pa. Co., Burne v. See Life the employment relationship, A.2d (1973). Here, view clashes Geary’s employer as the majority it, public’s keeping dangerous interest products and used. sold being Indiana has pro- Court of Supreme recently discharged employee opportunity prove vided wrongful retaliatory discharge. Framp- claima Indiana Gas Co., v. Central N.E. 2d 425 ton the plaintiff There, dismissed 1973).4 (Ind. employer’s fringement normal avoided.” supra Blades, at 1429. Pittsburgh L.E.R.R., Henry & 21 A. presented by analogous situation An recent accomodations right of landlords to evict tenants. near-absolute The United to the

191 compensation. after she a claim filed for workmen’s employers The Indiana court that observed “[i]f permitted penalize employees filing to for workmen’s compensation important public policy a most claims, will be undermined.” at A California 297 N.E.2d 427. similarly recognized wrong court for cause of action ful where the had been dismissed perjury. after he refused to Petermann v. Team commit App. (1959).5 sters Cal. 2d 344 P.2d 25 Union, 184, 174 principle underlying The these decisions should apply present majority’s Contrary to the case. to society’s protecting itself assertion, from interest dangerous products manifestly presents a mandate to recognize wrongful the court for to a cause of action discharge. loyal responsible employee That should summarily discharged be cause without or notice complying duty for with his to communicate relevant superiors provides justi- information further affording appellant opportunity pre- fication for appellant discharged sent his claim. That without Appeals for States Court of the District has Columbia held may any legal, “while landlord evict reason or for reason, hold, all, not, he is free to no at we evict retaliation report housing for his tenant’s code violations to authorities.” Habib, (D.C. 687, 1968). Edwards v. 397 F.2d 699 Cir. 5 attempts distinguish majority Petermann v. Teamsters App. 184, Union, (1959), 2d 174 Cal. 344 P.2d 25 and cases follow by asserting ing recovery it been has limited to instances explicit policy declaration in which an has been made legislature. proposition, majority For cites Montalvo App. Rptr. Zamora, (1970) ; 3d Cal. 7 Cal. 401 v. Patterson App. Corp., Rptr. ; (1967) Cal. Philco 2d 60 Cal. v. Inn, Inc., App. Golden Cock v. Clearman’s 192 Cal. 2d Glenn Rptr. (1961) ; Boring, App. Mallard Cal. 182 Cal. 2d Though Rptr. may this statement not Cal. factual way precludes inaccurate, noticing ly in no this Court it public policy upon Legislature acting whether dictates has yet acted. or has he do, had failed to doing which, cause amply to dismissal cause subject been would have refusal majority’s illogic demonstrates of action for a cause in these circumstances recognize wrongful discharge the ar apprehensive been

Our has society long and has sought power employers, dismissal bitrary To problem.6 remedy to through various solutions were unions dismissal power, employers’ countervail certain to sought safeguard has Congress created.7 disc capricious and from wrongful classes of employees that certain has decided Legislature our harges.8 And the abuses of guarded state must be employees arbitrary discharge.9 6 Employment generally Blades, at vs. Individual See Will Employer Power, Limiting On the Abusive Exercise

Freedom: (1967). L. Rev. 67 Colum. Tri-City Foundries v. Central Trades American Steel See single (1921). 72, Council, “A em U.S. S. Ct. helpless dealing employer. ployee with He de in was was ordinarily daily wage pendent for the on his maintenance him pay wages family. him If refused to and self thought employ fair, he nevertheless unable to leave the was arbitrary and unfair treatment Union essential and to resist was opportunity equality give to deal on their em to laborers ployer.” E.g., The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act 15 U.S.O. (1970). §§ 1221-25 August 27, 1963, 1-31, §§ P.L. 71 P.S. §§ Act of 741.3 See August amending (Supp. 1973), 5, 1941, Act of

to P.L. 752. .1005 regular provides employe that “[n]o Service Act The Civil except just service shall be removed in the classified cause.” (Supp. 1973). regular employee A § 71 P.S. 741.807 is one “who position appointed classified service in has been accord- completing probationary period.” act after his ance with Id. 741.3(h). positions service is defined to Classified include § all managerial-type employees (other than certain and unskilled labor- departments 741.3(c)) ers, in enumerated § id. the state. Id. 741.3(d)(1)-(15). § unorganized majority’s em- view, under

Yet, Geary’s discharge unprotected. ployees remain Here, prevent- directly contrary societal interest defectively-manufactured products. ing injury due to (1965). (Second) § Restatement 402A See Torts simply fulfilling dismissed for Moreover, duty notify superiors potentially his of a dan- gerous (Second) Agency Restatement situation. See majority, recog- § 381 refuses to however, particular nize cause of action these circumstances. my step this Court should take this first and view, protect Geary unorganized employees from arbi- trary discharges. retaliatory judiciary expand

“The been reluctant has not meaning provisions of constitutional order to protect governmental oppression. the individual from something paradox It is of a that the courts have so displayed far no similar bent for invention im- provisation protecting it comes to when individuals, particularly highly in their vulnerable status as em- private ployees, upon from the establishments which becoming they increasingly dependent. are Instead, acceptance employer’s there has been a blind of discharge. absolute This outmoded doctrine supported by principles lias been technical of contract Employment law.” at Will vs. Blades, Individual Free- Limiting Employer On dom: Abusive Exercise of L. Rev. 67 Colum. Power, duty-bound to fashion

Courts remedies for the changing reality. circumstances of economic and social day in the it far too late And this Court to in- fictionalizing dulge by that the itself doctrine of free- requires every Service Act further The Civil state em- by given “any ployee personnel the Act be notice of covered action respect him,” 741.950, provided id. § and that taken with he be appear appeal opportunity publicly to and before the Civil Id. § 741.951. Commission. Service dom of insulation of an justifies employer’s contract arbitrary power abusive exercise of his dis- charge.

The it tort as law is majority concedes, must, it cannot suited for action. uniquely judicial Further, a prevention injuries substantial, denied that of our See Re- objective society. clear, compelling cf. Re- (1965); statement Torts 402A (Second) § 381 (1958). statement (Second) Agency § fulfill societal my This Court its should, view, interest by and its responsibility role action for wrongful discharge cause of recognizing public policy.10 George the dismissal offends where such a case. just B. has presented and the Court Court Superior The orders of County my judg- Common Pleas of Allegheny should, be reversed. ment, recently Hampshire Supreme limited The Court of New power by recognizing arbitrary

employers’ a contractual dismissal employment breach of a contract of for a malicious cause of action (N.H. Co., 1974), Monge an Beebe Rubber A.2d at will. Monge filing ease, by Olga of this involved a suit nounced after employment employer against of an at-will contract. for breach her by Monge was caused her harassment of her claimed go hostility foreman, from her resulted refusal to out with whose Supreme jury in her favor and the found Court of New him. liability damages. doing Hampshire but remanded on on affirmed employment contracts, “In all whether at reasoned: will that court so employer’s term, running interest in his busi or for definite against fit must be balanced as he sees interest of the em ness maintaining employment, public’s and the ployee interest maintaining proper balance between the two.” 316 A.2d at 551. The Hampshire Supreme explicit. holding Court of the New “We by employ of a termination contract of that a hold is motivated bad faith or malice which ment at will based system the best interest of the is not economic retaliation on good employment a breach of the and constitutes con tract”

Case Details

Case Name: Geary v. United States Steel Corp.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Mar 25, 1974

Citation: 319 A.2d 174

Docket Number: Appeal, 3

Court Abbreviation: Pa.