Kornfeind, W. v. New Werner Holding Co.
241 A.3d 1212
Pa. Super. Ct.2020Background
- Plaintiff William Kornfeind was injured in Illinois in 2013 when a 1995 Werner extension ladder telescoped; he became quadriplegic.
- Ladder was manufactured by R.D. Werner Co. (Old Ladder Co.), which later entered bankruptcy; New Werner Holding Co., Inc. purchased certain assets in 2007 and had significant ties to Pennsylvania.
- Kornfeind sued in Philadelphia County (2015) asserting strict product‑liability and negligence claims against New Werner and Home Depot; Sears and Menards were dismissed.
- Kornfeind could not produce a receipt or corroborating proof that he purchased the ladder from Home Depot and testified he was only “almost positive.”
- The trial court denied defendants’ summary‑judgment motions; on interlocutory appeal the Superior Court reversed as to Home Depot (granting summary judgment) and affirmed as to New Werner.
- The Superior Court held Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute does not encompass other states’ statutes of repose, declined to apply Illinois’s repose at this stage, and found genuine fact disputes (e.g., where the ladder was designed, and successor liability) precluding summary judgment for New Werner.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether Kornfeind produced sufficient evidence that Home Depot sold the ladder so that summary judgment should be denied | Kornfeind relied on his testimony that he typically bought Werner ladders at Home Depot and was “almost positive” he bought this ladder there | Home Depot: testimony is equivocal, no receipt or corroboration; allowing claim to proceed would require impermissible speculation | Held: Reversed trial court; Home Depot entitled to summary judgment because proof of sale was speculative and insufficient |
| 2) Whether Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute requires applying Illinois’s statute of repose to bar the strict‑liability claim | Kornfeind: borrowing statute limited to statutes of limitation and does not encompass statutes of repose | New Werner: borrowing statute’s phrase “period of limitation” includes statutes of repose, so Illinois repose should be borrowed | Held: Borrowing statute applies to statutes of limitation (tied to accrual), not statutes of repose; court affirmed trial court’s refusal to borrow Illinois’s repose |
| 3) Whether Illinois law (including its repose) should apply via choice‑of‑law analysis | Kornfeind: Pennsylvania may have interest (esp. if design occurred in PA); choice‑of‑law must consider design location and other contacts | New Werner: injury, manufacture, purchase, and use occurred in Illinois; Illinois has the most significant relationship and its law should govern | Held: Choice‑of‑law analysis premature at summary judgment due to genuine dispute over where the ladder was designed; trial court did not err in denying summary judgment |
| 4) Whether New Werner is insulated from successor liability/negligence by the bankruptcy sale order | Kornfeind: bankruptcy sale does not necessarily preclude successor liability under state law; product‑line successor theories may apply under PA law | New Werner: the bankruptcy order transferred assets free and clear and disclaims successor liability; thus New Werner cannot be held for Old Ladder Co.’s negligence | Held: Trial court correctly denied summary judgment; New Werner failed to show federal bankruptcy order preempted state successor theories, material facts disputed, and some arguments waived on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Oberdick v. TrizecHahn Gateway, LLC, 160 A.3d 215 (Pa. Super. 2017) (summary‑judgment standard and view of record in favor of nonmovant)
- Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556 (Pa. Super. 2014) (jury may not decide claims based on mere speculation)
- Juliano v. Johns–Manville Corp., 611 A.2d 238 (Pa. Super. 1992) (plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment when recovery would rest on speculation)
- Dubose v. Quinlan, 173 A.3d 634 (Pa. 2017) (distinguishing statutes of limitations from statutes of repose; quoting CTS Corp.)
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2014) (explains differences in purpose and operation of statutes of limitations vs. repose)
- Graver v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 96 A.3d 383 (Pa. Super. 2014) (statutes of repose operate as substantive law extinguishing causes of action)
- Gwaltney v. Stone, 564 A.2d 498 (Pa. 1989) (purpose of Pennsylvania’s borrowing statute to prevent plaintiffs obtaining greater time by suing elsewhere)
- Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Structural Systems, Inc., 212 P.3d 1168 (Okla. 2009) (persuasive authority that a borrowing statute may be limited to statutes of limitation and not include repose)