In a reverse bifurcated trial, a jury awarded damages to Peter Juliano in the amount of two hundred thousand ($200,000.00) dollars for pulmonary and emotional injuries sustained as a result of expоsure to asbestos fibers. 1 Fibreboard Corporation was one of twelve manufacturers subsequently found responsible for Juliano’s injuries. Post-trial motions were denied, delay damagеs were assessed, and judgment was entered against Fibreboard in the amount of twenty-nine thousand, five hundred fifty-three and 34/100 ($29,553.34) dollars. Fibreboard appealed. It contends that the evidenсe was insufficient to show that Juliano had been exposed to asbestos products which it had manufactured and that the trial court inadequately instructed the jury on the standard of product identification necessary to establish causation. After careful review, we affirm the judgment entered in the trial court.
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence tо sustain the verdict,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, granting that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and determine only whether the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdict. Curran v. Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young,361 Pa.Super. 17 , 24,521 A.2d 451 , 454 (1987). See also: Laniecki v. Polish Army Veterans Assoc.,331 Pa.Super. 413 , 417,480 A.2d 1101 , 1103 (1984). *324 Cooper v. Burns,376 Pa.Super. 276 , 280-281,545 A.2d 935 , 937 (1988). See also: Lopa v. McGee,373 Pa.Super. 85 , 540 Á.2d 311 (1988); Elder v. Orluck,334 Pa.Super. 329 ,483 A.2d 474 (1984), affd,511 Pa. 402 ,515 A.2d 517 (1986).
Taylor v. Celotex Corp.,
Appellant has failed to provide us with a complete record of the proceedings in the trial court. Neverthеless, a review of the limited record furnished to us discloses sufficient evidence of Juliano’s exposure to asbestos products manufactured by appellant to support the jury’s verdict.
*325 Juliano was employed by Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (Sun Ship) from 1965 to 1973 as a chipper and tank tester. From 1973 to the time of trial, he was employed as a tank tester аnd pneumatic tool operator at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. By Fibreboard’s answers to interrogatories and testimony by Harry Hoopes, a retired Fibreboard employee, Juliano was able to show that prior to 1971 or 1972 Fibreboard had manufactured a variety of asbestos products. Some were marketed by Fibreboard or its predecessоr, PABCO. Between 1960 and 1972, Fibreboard had also sold asbestos products to Owens-Corning which had marketed the same under the trade name “Kaylo.”
In order to show exposure to these Fibrеboard products during his employment by Sun Ship, Juliano introduced testimony by Owen McPherson, a welder at Sun Ship from 1943 to 1976. McPherson testified that, although he had not known Juliano personally, he had worked on at least two of the same ships on which Juliano had worked, the Glomar Explorer and the Manhattan. McPherson testified that he recalled seeing PABCO and Owens-Corning products, with “asbestos” noted on the packaging, in use throughout the shipyard. These products, he said, had been used primarily for pipe insulation in the engine and boiler rooms of ships, the areas where Juliano had most frequently labored. Juliano testified that while working on the various ships he had regularly been exposed to dusty conditions created by the manipulation of asbestos insulation. Moreover, he specifically recalled using a paste form of “Kaylo.”
This evidence established that Fibreboard asbestos products, including “Kаylo”, had been in use at the time Juliano worked at Sun Ship and in the areas in which Juliano worked. He, personally, had observed the dusty conditions created by the manipulation of аsbestos insulation materials within the engine and boiler rooms of the ships on which he worked, and he recalled using a form of “Kaylo.” McPherson recalled the use of PABCO and Owens-Corning insulаtion throughout the ship yard and stated that these prod
*326
ucts had been used primarily in the areas where Juliano had worked. From this evidence reasonable persons could сonclude, as this jury did, that appellant’s asbestos products had been used in the areas on which Juliano had worked at Sun Ship. This was sufficient to establish a prima facie case against Fibreboard. See:
Taylor v. Celotex Corp., supra,
Plaintiff’s product identification evidence is not rendered insufficient by rebuttal evidence showing that the rooster logo on PABCO’s products, which McPherson had recalled seeing, had been discontinued in the еarly 1960’s before Juliano went to work at Sun Ship. The weight and credibility of Fibreboard’s evidence was for the jury to determine. Conflicts in the evidence were for the jury to resolve.
Morrissey v. Commw. Dept. of Highways,
Whether Juliano produced sufficient evidence of exposure to appellant’s asbestos products during his employment at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard is more problematic. Juliano did not start work at the Philadelphia Shipyard until sometime in 1973, after Fibreboard had ceased manufacturing asbestos products. In view of Juliano’s exposure to Fibreboard’s products while employed at Sun Ship, however, this fact does not render the jury’s verdict invalid.
In
Cooper v. Burns,
In reviewing a trial court’s instructions to the jury, it is well settled that we must view the court’s charge in its entirety to determine whether any prejudicial error has been committed. Riddle Memorial Hospital v. Dohan,504 Pa. 571 , 576,475 A.2d 1314 , 1316 (1984). “A trial court is not required to accept the precise language of points for charge submitted by counsel so long as the issues are defined accurately and the applicable law is correctly reviewed.” Spearing v. Starcher,367 Pa.Super. 22 , 29,532 A.2d 36 , 40 (1987). See also: Geyer v. Steinbronn,351 Pa.Super. 536 , 554,506 A.2d 901 , 911 (1986); Fish v. Gosnell,316 Pa.Super. 565 , 580,463 A.2d 1042 , 1050 (1983).
Id.,
A сareful review of the jury charge in the instant case discloses that there was neither error nor inadequacy on the issue of causation. The trial court instructed the jury on the еlements of strict liability and product identification as follows:
However, for a manufacturer to be held to [sic] strictly liable, three elements must be present. One, defendant’s *328 prоduct must be defective; two, plaintiff’s must have contact with the defective product; three, that contact must have caused plaintiff’s disease or injury.
For example, if plaintiffs worked only in Maine and Defendants sold their products only in Florida, defendants would not be liable to plaintiffs even if their products were clearly dangerous and carried no warning. Accordingly, plaintiffs must establish more than asbestos’ presence in the workplace generally. They must prove they worked where the product was used.
Later, the trial court added:
A particular product need not be the sole cause. Several factors may combine to cause an injury. It is plaintiff’s burden to prove the frequency and nature of these exposures tо defendant’s products. When plaintiff is exposed to several asbestos products you must determine whether each manufacturer’s products was [sic] a substantial contributing faсtor.
Finally, in summarizing its instructions on strict liability and in charging on the issue of negligence, the trial court twice again reiterated that plaintiff must prove actual exposure to a defеndant’s product in order to establish that the particular defendant caused injury.
We conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that the verdict was supported by competеnt evidence and that the jury was correctly instructed. The judgment entered on the verdict, therefore, must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The jury declined to award separate damages to Mrs. Juliano.