Kondjoua v. Barr, 961 F.3d 83

Kondjoua, a Cameroonian national and lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in 2015 to Connecticut third‑degree sexual assault (CGS § 53a‑72a(a)(1)) and received a five‑year sentence.
DHS charged him as removable for an aggravated felony “crime of violence” (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)) and as having committed a crime involving moral turpitude.
The IJ found the conviction was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and therefore an aggravated felony, and denied asylum/withholding as the conviction was a particularly serious crime; the BIA affirmed.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya invalidated § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague, undermining the agency’s original basis for removal.
The Second Circuit declined to remand to the BIA, treated the issue as a question of law to be decided de novo, and held that the Connecticut statute categorically satisfies the alternative definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).

Issue	Kondjoua's Argument	Barr's Argument	Held
Whether the court should remand to the BIA to assess § 16(a) after Dimaya	Remand for agency to decide § 16(a) application	Court can decide de novo; remand unnecessary	No remand; court decides de novo
Whether CT § 53a‑72a(a)(1) categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)	Statute can be satisfied by non‑violent compulsion; thus not categorically a § 16(a) crime	Statute necessarily requires use or threatened use of violent physical force	Statute categorically satisfies § 16(a)
Whether Connecticut definitions ("dangerous instrument," "use of actual physical force," "superior physical strength") meet § 16(a)’s "violent force" requirement	These phrases can encompass non‑violent or minimal force	Each term, as defined by CT law and case law, entails force capable of causing physical pain or injury	All three formulations meet § 16(a)’s violent‑force requirement

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (§ 16(b) void for vagueness)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (force to overcome resistance is violent)
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (use of a substance can constitute physical force because of its impact on the victim)
Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (Connecticut "dangerous instrument" use constitutes violent force)
United States v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2012) (categorical approach to defining predicate offenses)