Koller v. Brown
224 F. Supp. 3d 871
N.D. Cal.2016Background
- Vincenz J. Koller, a California Democratic presidential elector, sought a declaratory judgment and injunction to prevent California from enforcing Elections Code §§ 6906 and 18002, which require electors to vote for their party’s nominees and prescribe criminal penalties for willful violations.
- Koller stated he wished to exercise independent judgment (naming possible alternative candidates) and cited concerns about foreign interference discovered after the general election.
- He filed for a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunction to avoid potential criminal prosecution if he did not cast his vote for Clinton and Kaine at the December 19, 2016 Electoral College meeting.
- Defendants (Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State) and proposed intervenors (California Republican Party, Trump campaign, Trump) opposed the motion, arguing state authority to appoint electors and enforce state election laws.
- The court considered constitutional text, Federalist No. 68, and controlling precedent (notably Ray v. Blair and McPherson v. Blacker) in assessing whether the statutes are consistent with Article II and the Twelfth Amendment.
- The court denied the TRO and preliminary injunction primarily because Koller failed to make the required clear showing of likely irreparable harm, though it found he raised a serious question on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CA may criminally compel electors to vote for party nominees (Article II/Twelfth Amendment) | CA statutes unconstitutionally strip electors’ independence; electors intended to deliberate | States have plenary, exclusive power to appoint electors and may condition appointment/manner | Court: Serious question exists but not resolved on TRO; competing precedents create plausible views |
| Whether plaintiff showed likelihood of irreparable harm to obtain TRO | Criminal penalties (fine/imprisonment/felony collateral consequences) make harm imminent and irreparable | No evidence of any threatened or past prosecution; risk speculative | Held: Insufficient — plaintiff failed to show non‑speculative, imminent irreparable injury |
| Whether sliding‑scale standard supports injunction (likelihood of success vs. balance of hardships) | If hardships tip sharply, less robust showing on merits is needed | Defendants stress lack of imminent harm and strong state interests | Held: Court applied standard but denied because irreparable harm threshold not met despite serious questions on merits |
| Viability of other constitutional claims (Equal Protection, First Amendment, federal bribery/penalty statutes) | CA statutes violate other federal constitutional protections and possibly federal criminal law | Defendants: those claims lack supporting authority or are foreclosed by precedent | Held: Court found these arguments unpersuasive for the TRO application (left unresolved on merits) |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (plaintiff must show likelihood of irreparable harm for injunctive relief)
- Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (state may require pledges for electors; states appoint electors in manner they direct)
- McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (states’ appointment power over electors is plenary)
- Benda v. Grand Lodge of the Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978) (sliding scale for preliminary injunction tied to balance of hardships)
- Leiva‑Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) (preliminary injunction standards and discussion that injunctive relief requires irreparable harm)
- Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (clear demonstration of irreparable harm required for injunction)