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811 F.3d 148
4th Cir.
2016
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Background

  • MSHA inspected Knox Creek’s Tiller No. 1 Mine in Oct–Nov 2009 and issued 34 S&S citations; four are at issue: three "permissibility" citations for electrical enclosures with gaps > .004 inches, and one "accumulations" citation for 4–12" of coal dust on/near a conveyor.
  • Tiller Mine is a "gassy" mine (liberates >500,000 cu. ft. methane/24 hrs); inspectors found wiring insulated/bolted but with corrosion/wear suggesting possible future arcing; equipment was to be used next shift.
  • For the accumulations citation, pre-shift logs showed the accumulations were recorded and miners had been assigned to clean; at inspection (≈7:00 a.m.) no cleanup yet underway, miners arrived shortly thereafter and removed dust (~45 minutes).
  • ALJ applied the four‑part Mathies test and concluded permissibility citations failed Mathies prong 3 (no proof ignition/arcing likelihood) and accumulations citation was not S&S because abatement was imminent; ALJ thus found three non‑S&S and one non‑S&S.
  • The Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission granted discretionary review, reversed the ALJ on all four, holding the ALJ erred legally by (a) taking a "snapshot" view rather than considering normal operations and (b) treating intended-but-not-yet-begun abatement as mitigating.
  • Fourth Circuit held (1) the Commission corrected legal error (did not reweigh factual findings), (2) adopted the Secretary’s persuasive interpretation of Mathies prong 3 (assume the hazard when evaluating likelihood of serious injury), (3) accepted that intended but not-yet-begun abatement does not mitigate S&S, and denied Knox Creek’s petition for review.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Knox Creek) Defendant's Argument (Secretary) Held
Whether, under Mathies prong 3, Secretary must prove ignition/arcing was reasonably likely (i.e., prove likelihood of the hazard itself) Secretary must prove the violation itself was reasonably likely to cause injury, so likelihood of arcing/ignition is required Mathies prong 3 concerns the likelihood that the hazard (assumed to exist) will cause injury; the existence of the hazard may be assumed when assessing whether it would cause serious injury Court adopts Secretary’s persuasive interpretation: assume the hazard at prong 3; Commission’s S&S findings for permissibility citations supported by substantial evidence
Whether evidence of intended but not-yet-begun abatement can mitigate an S&S finding for accumulations Pending/soon-to-begin cleanup is relevant and can show injury unlikely, so should mitigate S&S Only active abatement (shutdown/ongoing repairs) should mitigate S&S; planned but not-yet-begun abatement is too speculative to negate risk Court accepts Secretary/Commission: intended but not-yet-begun abatement is not mitigating; accumulations citation properly S&S
Whether the Commission impermissibly reweighed ALJ’s factual findings Commission reweighed factual evidence and substituted its judgment for the ALJ Commission corrected legal errors and did not disturb ALJ factual findings; review is legal not factual Court finds Commission did not reweigh facts; it clarified legal standard and reversal was proper
Standard of deference owed to Secretary’s litigating positions interpreting Mathies/ Mine Act Secretary’s litigating positions should get Chevron deference Secretary’s litigating positions are entitled to deference under Skidmore (persuasive), not full Chevron, because they are litigation positions rather than APA rulemaking Court holds Chevron deference not warranted for litigating positions; applies Skidmore factors and finds Secretary’s interpretation persuasive

Key Cases Cited

  • Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 762 F.3d 611 (7th Cir.) (Mathies prong 3 treated as assuming hazard and assessing injury likelihood)
  • Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 717 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir.) (courts accept Secretary’s approach to Mathies; redundant safeguards irrelevant to S&S inquiry)
  • RAG Cumberland Res. LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 272 F.3d 590 (D.C. Cir.) (distinguishes legal-standard review from reweighing facts)
  • A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland, 472 F.3d 148 (4th Cir.) (discusses when Chevron deference applies and Mead considerations)
  • Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (agency interpretations afforded weight according to their persuasive power)
  • Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for statutory ambiguity and agency deference)
  • Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (distinguishes when Chevron applies vs. Skidmore)
  • Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (deference to Secretary’s litigating positions discussed)
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Case Details

Case Name: Knox Creek Coal Corporation v. Secretary of Labor
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Jan 21, 2016
Citations: 811 F.3d 148; 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1015; 2016 WL 241399; 14-2313
Docket Number: 14-2313
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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    Knox Creek Coal Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, 811 F.3d 148