592 F.Supp.3d 651
M.D. Tenn.2022Background
- Montgomery County Commissioner Jason Knight livestreamed County Commission meetings on his Facebook page; others (Plaintiffs) watched or assisted (Wikholm) and relied on those livestreams (Webb could not attend in person).
- On August 12, 2019 the Commission adopted Resolution 19-8-3, §7: “No live broadcast from within the Commission Chambers…is allowed,” while the County maintains a slightly delayed YouTube broadcast and preserves recordings.
- The Chambers have fixed County-operated cameras, a single guarded public entrance with metal detectors, and a designated area where private photography/recording is allowed to limit security risks.
- County security (Sheriff Fuson and deputies) testified that real‑time livestreaming could reveal officer positions and other tactical information, creating potential safety risks; a private security assessment did not identify livestreaming as a threat but was described as a broad overview.
- Plaintiffs sued claiming the Resolution violated the First Amendment and Article I, §19 of the Tennessee Constitution; the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the court granted County summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether livestreaming is protected speech | Livestreaming is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment | Defendant did not dispute for purposes of its motion; focused on constitutionality of the ban | Court assumed arguendo that livestreaming is speech for Plaintiffs’ benefit but did not decide the novel question definitively; proceeded to apply the First Amendment test |
| Nature of the forum for speech at Commission meetings | Meetings are public forums that merit protection | County and Plaintiffs agreed meetings are a limited/designated public forum | Court held the Commission meetings are a designated and limited public forum |
| Whether Resolution is a permissible time, place, and manner restriction (content‑neutrality; narrow tailoring to significant gov’t interest; ample alternatives) | Resolution is not narrowly tailored; YouTube delay and moderator control make alternatives inadequate; livestreaming poses no meaningful security risk given guarded entrance and other measures | Resolution is content‑neutral, serves significant interest in safety/security, is narrowly tailored because it prohibits live (real‑time) broadcasts while allowing delayed posting and designated recording, and leaves ample alternatives (YouTube delay, post‑meeting uploads, commenting) | Court held the Resolution is content‑neutral, narrowly tailored to the County’s safety interest, leaves ample alternative channels, and is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction; summary judgment for County on First Amendment claim |
| Applicability of Tennessee Constitution (Art. I, §19) | Tennessee Constitution may afford broader protection and invalidate the Resolution | State‑level analysis tracks federal First Amendment principles; no reason to depart here | Court applied federal analysis to the state claim and held Resolution does not violate Article I, §19; summary judgment for County |
Key Cases Cited
- Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015) (framework for analyzing speech and forum issues)
- Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (U.S. 1985) (forum analysis and access doctrine)
- Clark v. Community for Creative Non–Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1984) (time, place, manner restrictions test)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (U.S. 2014) (narrow tailoring and alternative channels in TPM analysis)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (U.S. 1989) (narrow tailoring standard for content‑neutral regulations)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (U.S. 2000) (TPM restrictions need not be least restrictive means)
- Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights, 934 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2019) (city/council meetings as designated and limited forums)
- Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (U.S. 2006) (expressive conduct can constitute speech)
- Stevens v. United States, 559 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2010) (overbreadth doctrine requires substantial unconstitutional applications)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard)