Klunder v. Brown University, 778 F.3d 24

In 2005 and 2007 Brown University received multiple complaints about student Joe Klunder for sexually inappropriate and threatening conduct; Brown initiated an internal disciplinary process and imposed an interim ban (Sept. 12, 2007) and later a three-semester suspension after a hearing.
Klunder attended the November 2007 non-academic disciplinary hearing, was provided an advisor and evidence packet, declined to call witnesses, and exhausted internal appeals; he later graduated after serving the suspension.
Klunder filed an eleven-count federal complaint on October 5, 2010, asserting § 1983 claims (alleging Brown acted under color of state law) and numerous state-law claims (e.g., civil conspiracy, false arrest/imprisonment, breach of contract, emotional distress, negligence).
The district court granted partial summary judgment holding Brown is not a state actor under § 1983 and allowed defendants to amend their answer to assert statute-of-limitations defenses; several claims were dismissed as time-barred or on the merits; other claims were deemed waived.
On appeal, Klunder challenged (1) the ruling that Brown is not a state actor under § 1983, (2) the district court’s allowance of defendants’ amendment to plead the statute of limitations, and (3) the district court’s conclusion that Rhode Island’s tolling statute (R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-18) did not save his claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Brown is a state actor for § 1983	Brown's colonial charter and status as a “body politic” mean it performs public functions and is state actor	Brown is a private educational institution; self-governance and internal discipline are not exclusively governmental functions	Brown is not a state actor; § 1983 claims against Brown fail
Whether district court abused discretion by allowing amendment to plead limitations defense	Amendment prejudiced Klunder’s discovery and strategy	Amendment was timely, discovery was ongoing, and Klunder showed no specific prejudice	No abuse of discretion; amendment permitted
Whether R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-18 tolled Klunder’s claims	Tolling applied because Klunder was (allegedly) a Rhode Island resident and defendants were not amenable to process at accrual	Tolling inapplicable: plaintiff bears burden to prove residency and non-amenability; record shows defendants were served	Tolling inapplicable; plaintiff failed to meet burden; claims time-barred
Whether remaining federal and certain state claims survived limitations/merits	Plaintiff contended claims meritorious and timely with tolling	Defendants argued key claims were untimely or waived; some claims lacked supporting proof	§ 1983, civil conspiracy, and confidentiality/loyalty claims dismissed as time-barred; other claims dismissed on merits or deemed waived

Foote v. Town of Bedford, 642 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2011) (standard for reviewing summary judgment)
Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2011) (§ 1983 requires action under color of state law plus deprivation of federal right)
Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan Capestrano, 412 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (tests for private party state action)
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (§ 1983 requires conduct "fairly attributable to the State")
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (state compulsion, nexus, and public function tests)
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (education not exclusively a state function for public-function test)
Krohn v. Harvard Law Sch., 552 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1977) (private university disciplinary proceedings not § 1983 state action)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (standards governing leave to amend pleadings)
Rouse v. Connelly, 444 A.2d 850 (R.I. 1982) (Rhode Island tolling statute inapplicable when defendant is amenable to process)