Kisela v. Hughes
138 S. Ct. 1148
| SCOTUS | 2018Background
- In May 2010 Tucson officers responded to a "check welfare" report of a woman seen hacking a tree with a kitchen knife; officers located Amy Hughes outside her home holding a large kitchen knife.
- Hughes stood about six feet from roommate Sharon Chadwick, holding the knife down at her side; she appeared calm and spoke with Chadwick.
- Officers drew guns and gave at least two quick commands to drop the knife; the record viewed for Hughes permits a finding she may not have heard or registered the commands.
- Officer Andrew Kisela dropped to the ground and fired four shots through a chain-link fence, wounding Hughes; less than a minute elapsed from officers first seeing Chadwick to the shooting.
- Hughes sued Kisela under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; the district court granted summary judgment for Kisela, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court assumed (without deciding) a Fourth Amendment violation but reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding Kisela entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of his conduct was not clearly established on these facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kisela's use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive force) | Hughes: shooting was objectively unreasonable — she posed no immediate threat, committed no crime, appeared calm, may not have heard commands; other officers did not shoot | Kisela: he reasonably believed Hughes posed an immediate threat to Chadwick given prior report, proximity, and refusal to drop the knife | Court: assumed without deciding there may have been a Fourth Amendment violation but did not resolve it definitively |
| Whether Kisela is entitled to qualified immunity | Hughes: existing precedent (including Ninth Circuit cases) put the unlawfulness beyond debate | Kisela: no controlling precedent clearly governing these specific facts; reasonable officer could believe shooting was lawful | Court: qualified immunity applies — right not clearly established given differences from existing precedent and analogous Ninth Circuit authority favoring Kisela |
| Whether Ninth Circuit precedent (e.g., Deorle, Glenn, Harris) clearly established unlawfulness | Hughes: Deorle and other cases put officers on notice that shooting a nonthreatening person with a knife is unreasonable | Kisela: Deorle, Glenn, Harris materially differ; Glenn postdates the shooting; Blanford is more analogous and supports Kisela | Court: Ninth Circuit erred — its relied-on decisions did not clearly establish unlawfulness; Blanford supports qualified immunity |
| Appropriate disposition (summary reversal vs. remand for trial) | Hughes: factual disputes require jury resolution; summary reversal is improper | Kisela: summary reversal justified to correct clear error in panel's qualified-immunity analysis | Court: granted certiorari, reversed Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion (summary reversal of that judgment) |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force permissible only if officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses threat of serious physical harm)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force analysis requires objective-reasonableness inquiry considering severity, immediate threat, and resistance/flight)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (qualified immunity focuses on whether officer had fair notice that conduct was unlawful)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (contours of right must be sufficiently clear that reasonable official would know conduct violates it)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (officials can be on notice that conduct is unconstitutional even in novel factual circumstances)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (use of force must be justified by a legitimate governmental interest)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (denial of qualified immunity where officers shot a nonserious-offense, disturbed person without warning and who posed no objective threat)
- Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (use of deadly force reasonable where suspect wielded a 2½-foot sword, made threatening noises, tried to enter a home)
- Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997) (deadly force unreasonable where armed person made no threatening movement)
- Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1991) (denial of qualified immunity where individual holding rifle did not point at officers and posed no immediate threat)