Kirk Thomas Morrow v. State, 11-13-00326-CR

Appellant Kirk Morrow was convicted by a jury of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to 25 years' confinement.
On the day of the offense Morrow had voluntarily ingested alcohol and drugs, became intoxicated, was attacked by friends, fled to what he believed was a friend’s house, entered (evidence indicated through a window), hid in the attic, kicked through the ceiling, and was found in a bedroom by the homeowner.
The State filed a notice to impeach Morrow with prior convictions; two residential burglary convictions from 1989 and 1991 were ruled admissible by the trial court under a probative-versus-prejudicial analysis.
Morrow testified and, on direct examination, disclosed those prior convictions himself; the State then cross‑examined him about them.
Morrow appealed, raising (1) erroneous admission of the prior convictions and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a necessity instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of prior convictions	Morrow: convictions were too remote and prejudicial.	State: convictions were admissible; but Morrow himself introduced them at trial.	Waived — Morrow preemptively introduced the convictions by testifying; he cannot complain on appeal.
Ineffective assistance for not requesting necessity instruction	Morrow: counsel was deficient for not requesting necessity instruction; jury could have acquitted.	State: Morrow voluntarily intoxicated himself and placed himself in the position requiring escape; he was not entitled to necessity.	No deficiency — counsel not ineffective for failing to seek an instruction to which defendant was not entitled.

Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (preemptive introduction of evidence waives appellate challenge)
Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (framework for balancing probative value and prejudicial effect of prior crimes evidence)
Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29 (recognition that a defendant who introduces prior-conviction evidence may not later complain)
Wootton v. State, 132 S.W.3d 80 (same principle applied at appellate level)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (prejudice prong and reasonable-probability standard under Strickland)
Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890 (failure on either Strickland prong is fatal)
Young v. State, 991 S.W.2d 835 (no deficiency for failing to request unavailable instruction)
Ray v. State, 419 S.W.3d 467 (defendant who places himself in position requiring escape is not entitled to necessity instruction)