647 F.3d 265
5th Cir.2011Background
- Kinsel was convicted in Louisiana state court in 1997 for aggravated rape of A.M., his girlfriend's ten-year-old daughter, based mainly on A.M.'s trial testimony.
- A.M. recanted under oath in 2005, leading Kinsel to seek postconviction relief and a new trial in light of newly discovered evidence.
- The state trial court granted a new trial after an evidentiary hearing, but the Louisiana Fifth Circuit reversed, deeming the ruling an abuse of discretion.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief without opinion.
- Kinsel pursued federal habeas corpus relief under AEDPA, which the district court dismissed; this court granted leave to consider a successive petition.
- The central issues concern AEDPA's bar on successive petitions and whether recantation constitutes grounds for relief under federal due-process standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| AEDPA bar on successive petitions | Kinsel seeks relief via a second/ successive petition based on new evidence. | State court rulings on credibility and trial errors were reasonable and final. | Petition barred by AEDPA as successive unless actual innocence gateway shown. |
| Actual innocence gateway | Recantation creates a new factual predicate proving innocence. | Recantation credibility is presumed but not reweighed; no due process violation shown. | Recantation alone does not satisfy the gateway; no clear-and-convincing evidence of actual innocence. |
| Due process in state postconviction proceedings | Louisiana appellate court denied deference to trial court credibility and failed to allow jury consideration of recantation. | No federal review of state postconviction proceedings; no constitutional violation shown. | Federal review barred; no actionable due process violation shown in the postconviction proceedings. |
| Due-process implications of prosecutorial knowledge of false testimony | Prosecutors knew A.M. would perjure herself and used false testimony at trial. | Record shows prosecutors did not know she was lying; testimony not knowingly false. | No due-process violation under AEDPA review; state court reasonable on this point. |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testimony violates due process)
- Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1956) (perjured testimony in trial constitutes due process violation where proven by state knowingly or unknowingly)
- Pippin v. Dretke, 434 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 2005) (credibility determinations reviewed under AEDPA; state findings due deference)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (AEDPA deference; standard for 'unreasonable application' of clearly established law)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (AEDPA factual review; focus on reasonable factual determinations)