2019 Ohio 3260
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Kingston Mound Manor I filed an eviction against tenant Carolyn Keeton after she stopped paying rent; Keeton counterclaimed alleging sex-based housing discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Ohio Civil Rights Act (OCRC) based on a single alleged sexual assault by a maintenance worker, Chad Workman, who had a master key.
- Keeton alleged Workman groped and forced her to perform sexual acts while installing blinds and threatened her; she asserted the landlord knew or should have known of similar conduct and sought compensatory and punitive relief.
- The municipal-court eviction action was certified to Pickaway County Common Pleas; the landlord moved to dismiss Keeton’s counterclaims under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
- The trial court dismissed the counterclaims, construing them as vicarious-liability (respondeat superior) claims and concluding the employee’s sexual assault was outside the scope of employment and not calculated to facilitate the landlord’s business.
- Keeton appealed, arguing (1) vicarious liability under an aided-by-agency standard (as applied in HUD guidance and some federal decisions) should apply to FHA sexual-harassment claims, and (2) she adequately pled direct negligence claims (negligent hiring/supervision).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Keeton) | Defendant's Argument (Kingston Mound Manor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether aided-by-agency vicarious liability applies to FHA sexual-harassment claims | HUD guidance and some federal cases support aided-by-agency; court should apply that standard and deny dismissal | Aided-by-agency is not adopted by Ohio law; dismissal under traditional scope-of-employment was correct | Court rejected aided-by-agency; applied Ohio precedent requiring scope-of-employment; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the alleged sexual assault was within scope of employment (respondeat superior) | Alleged assault occurred while worker was performing maintenance and with access/authority | Assault was an intentional, personal act that did not facilitate employer’s business; outside scope of employment | Court held assault was outside scope and, even under scope analysis, dismissal proper |
| Whether the counterclaim adequately pleaded negligent hiring/supervision (direct liability) | Pleadings and requested relief gave notice of negligent-hiring/supervision claims under notice-pleading rules | Counterclaim primarily pleaded vicarious liability; did not allege the operative facts required for negligent-hiring/supervision | Court found the counterclaim did not adequately plead negligence claims and treated claims as vicarious only; dismissal proper |
| Whether punitive damages / relief pleaded implied direct negligence claim | Punitive damages request signaled more than vicarious liability (per Keeton) | Punitive damages are available under FHA and request mirrors statutory remedies; not dispositive of pleading a negligence theory | Court held punitive-damages request consistent with FHA relief and did not cure failure to plead negligent-hiring/supervision |
Key Cases Cited
- Groob v. KeyBank, 108 Ohio St.3d 348 (Ohio 2006) (Ohio Supreme Court rejected adoption of Restatement §219(2)(d) aided-by-agency; employer liability requires conduct within scope of employment)
- Auer v. Paliath, 140 Ohio St.3d 276 (Ohio 2014) (reaffirmed that agency position merely aiding tort is insufficient for respondeat superior)
- Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326 (Ohio 1992) (intentional torts like sexual assault generally outside scope of employment)
- Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56 (Ohio 1991) (negligent-hiring claims against religious institutions must plead operative facts with particularity)
- Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 (Ohio 2005) (agent primarily liable for torts; principal secondarily liable under respondeat superior when within scope of employment)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (agencies’ statutory-interpretation deference when Congress entrusted rulemaking)