117 F. Supp. 3d 657
E.D. Pa.2015Background
- On Feb. 9, 2014 Eric Kingsmill was assaulted by Joseph Brown, who was armed with a steel pipe; Officer Christopher Szewczak observed from his patrol car less than 20 feet away.
- Szewczak ordered Kingsmill to "get over here;" Kingsmill complied, stood within ~3 feet of the officer with his back toward Brown, and while the officer watched Brown struck Kingsmill in the face with the pipe.
- After the attack Szewczak refused to call an ambulance, declined to take a report, told Brown to leave, and did not arrest Brown; Brown was later criminally convicted for the assault.
- Kingsmill sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting (Count I) a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due‑process violation under a state‑created danger (and alternatively special‑relationship) theory against Szewczak, and (Count II) a Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia.
- The City and Szewczak moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court accepted Kingsmill’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a "special relationship" arose | Kingsmill: Szewczak’s command to approach amounted to a seizure that restrained him and created a duty to protect | Szewczak: Calling him over was not custody like incarceration/commitment and thus no special‑relationship duty | Court: No — allegations do not show the comprehensive, involuntary custody required for a special relationship (claim fails on that theory) |
| Whether facts state a state‑created danger (affirmative act + foreseeability) | Kingsmill: Officer’s hail was an affirmative exercise of authority that rendered him more vulnerable and the resulting harm was foreseeable | Szewczak: His conduct was inaction (failure to warn) and mere words cannot create liability; no affirmative act that increased danger | Court: Yes — alleging command to approach, observed approach by armed assailant, and watching the attack suffices to plead an affirmative act that made plaintiff more vulnerable and foreseeable harm |
| Whether officer’s conduct "shocks the conscience" (culpability) | Kingsmill: Officer had time to deliberate, consciously disregarded a great risk (or acted with malevolence), and post‑attack statements indicate intent | Szewczak: At most a failure to warn; not conscience‑shocking under controlling standards | Court: Yes — under the deliberate‑indifference/ conscious‑disregard standard (given some time to deliberate), the allegations plausibly meet the shocks‑the‑conscience requirement |
| Qualified immunity (clearly established right) | Kingsmill: Any reasonable officer would know duty not to place a person at greater risk by hailing him away and then failing to protect | Szewczak: No controlling precedent clearly establishes that calling a person over and failing to warn violated due process | Court: No qualified immunity — the state‑created danger doctrine and the facts gave fair warning that such conduct could violate due process; officer not entitled to immunity at pleading stage |
| Municipal (Monell) liability for inadequate supervision/training | Kingsmill: City tolerated Szewczak’s prior misconduct and failed to investigate, showing a custom/policy of deliberate indifference | City: Allegations are bare legal conclusions without factual support of a policy, custom, or causation | Court: Dismissed Monell claim without prejudice — allegations were conclusory and insufficient to plead a policy/custom and proximate causation |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard; courts need not accept legal conclusions)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no general duty to protect from private violence absent state restraint)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (duty to provide medical care to prisoners)
- Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (state obligations to involuntarily committed persons)
- Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996) (state‑created danger and special‑relationship framework)
- Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006) (four‑element test for state‑created danger)
- Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (special relationship custodial requirement)
- Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006) (shocks‑the‑conscience culpability standards vary with time to deliberate)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity two‑step analysis)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity—Saucier sequence discretionary)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (clearly established right standard)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (existing precedent must place constitutional question beyond debate for loss of immunity)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure‑to‑train standard requires deliberate indifference)
- Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (state that puts a person in danger then fails to protect is active tortfeasor)