King v. Curtis, 1:14-cv-00403

Background

Plaintiffs sued Chad Curtis and Lakewood Public Schools (and related defendants) alleging sexual assaults by Curtis and Title IX/failure-to-train claims against the Lakewood Defendants. Curtis was criminally convicted of multiple sexual assault counts in 2013.
Lakewood Defendants filed a third-party claim seeking indemnification from Professional Contract Management, Inc. (PCMI) under a 2010 contract supplying substitute teachers and other staff.
The PCMI–Lakewood contract includes a broad indemnity clause requiring PCMI to indemnify the District for liabilities arising from negligence or wrongful acts of PCMI or persons for whom PCMI is responsible.
The same contract contains an express carve-out: the indemnity does not apply to liability resulting from the sole negligence, wrongful act, or breach by the District or its employees or agents.
Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims impose liability only for the recipient’s (Lakewood’s) deliberate indifference or failure to correct known discrimination — not vicarious liability for Curtis’s misconduct.
Magistrate Judge Carmody recommends granting PCMI’s motion for summary judgment because the alleged liability against Lakewood arises from the District’s own wrongful acts/omissions, which the contract expressly excludes from PCMI’s indemnity obligation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether PCMI must indemnify Lakewood for claims arising from Curtis’s conduct	Lakewood seeks indemnity for any judgment arising from Curtis’s conduct	PCMI contends the indemnity does not cover liability that results from Lakewood’s own wrongful acts or sole negligence	Indemnity not required because alleged Title IX/failure-to-train liability stems from Lakewood’s own conduct, excluded by contract
Whether Title IX liability here is vicarious (based on Curtis’s acts) or based on Lakewood’s response	Plaintiffs seek recovery tied to Curtis’s sexual misconduct	Defendants/PCMI argue Title IX liability requires deliberate indifference by school officials, not respondeat superior	Court treats Title IX liability as based on recipient’s deliberate indifference; liability is for Lakewood’s response, not Curtis’s acts
Whether the contract’s "sole negligence" exclusion bars indemnity for these claims	Lakewood argues indemnity applies broadly to liabilities related to PCMI employees	PCMI points to clause excluding indemnity for liability resulting from sole negligence/wrongful acts of the District or its agents	The exclusion applies; it defeats Lakewood’s claim for indemnity under the contract
Whether summary judgment is appropriate on the indemnity claim	Lakewood relies on contractual promise and seeks factual disputes for trial	PCMI moves showing no genuine issue of material fact that indemnity is excluded by contract terms	Summary judgment recommended for PCMI because Lakewood cannot show entitlement where contract exclusion governs

Key Cases Cited

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognized implied private right of action under Title IX)
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (sexual harassment actionable under Title IX; monetary damages available)
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Title IX damages require actual notice to an official with authority and deliberate indifference)
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (school liable only for its own failure to act; harassment itself does not automatically create recipient liability)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standard when movant shows absence of evidence)
Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2006) (nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial)
Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 2005) (summary judgment burdens where respondent lacks evidence)
Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. School Dist., 455 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 2006) (failure-to-train claims require showing injury caused by policy or custom)