Kimberlie Michelle Durham v. Rural/Metro Corporation
955 F.3d 1279
11th Cir.2020Background
- Kimberlie Durham worked as an EMT for Rural/Metro and the job required frequent lifting of ~100 pounds.
- After becoming pregnant, Durham’s physician limited her lifting to 50 pounds; she requested temporary light-duty or a dispatcher assignment.
- Rural’s formal Light-duty Policy provided temporary modified work only for employees with on-the-job injuries; Rural had previously accommodated four on-the-job-injured EMTs with severe lifting limits.
- Rural told Durham no light-duty was available to non–work-related conditions and said no dispatcher openings existed (though a manager later said one could be created); HR directed Durham to take unpaid personal leave as the only option.
- Durham filed an EEOC charge and then suit under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA); the district court granted summary judgment for Rural, finding Durham failed to show comparators “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
- The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded: it held Durham met the Young prima facie test (including similarity), and sent the case back for the district court to evaluate Rural’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons and whether they are pretextual.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Durham made a prima facie PDA claim by showing others "similar in their ability or inability to work" were accommodated | Durham: her 50-lb restriction is equivalent to other EMTs’ 10–20-lb restrictions because none could meet the 100-lb job requirement | Rural: comparators (injured on the job) are not sufficiently similar because Rural’s policy treats on-the-job injuries differently | Held: Durham satisfied the Young prima facie fourth prong—both groups were unable to perform the lifting requirement and thus are similar in ability/inability to work |
| Whether Rural’s proffered reasons (Light-duty Policy limited to on-the-job injuries; no dispatcher openings) are legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons or pretext | Durham: Rural’s policies and its practice of accommodating injured-on-the-job employees impose a significant burden on pregnant workers and give rise to an inference of discrimination | Rural: limiting light duty to on-the-job injuries and lack of open dispatcher slots justify its denial of accommodation | Held: Court did not decide—case remanded for the district court to evaluate Rural’s legitimate reasons and whether they are pretextual under Young |
| Scope of remand / remedy on summary judgment | Durham: sufficient record exists to create a genuine dispute on pretext; district court should consider full record and additional evidence if needed | Rural: summary judgment was proper because Durham failed prima facie | Held: Vacated summary judgment; remanded to district court to decide post-prima-facie issues (legitimate reasons and pretext) in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015) (announces modified burden‑shifting test under the PDA; prima facie elements and how to assess legitimate reasons and pretext)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discriminatory‑intent claims)
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (pre‑PDA decision that prompted Congress to enact the PDA)
- Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (explains PDA comparator analysis post‑Young within Eleventh Circuit)
- Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2019) (summary judgment standard and view of evidence in favor of nonmoving party)
- Legg v. Ulster Cty., 820 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2016) (applies Young to light‑duty accommodation and recognizes prima facie case)
- Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (older Eleventh Circuit comparator approach abrogated by Young)
- Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008) (remand guidance where pretext and fact issues remain)