Case Information
‐ (L) et al. Ulster County et al. In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
________ August Term, 2015 No. No. ‐ No. ‐ A NN M ARIE L EGG ,
Plaintiff Appellant , and
P ATRICIA W ATSON , Plaintiff Cross Appellee, v.
U LSTER C OUNTY P AUL J. V AN B LARCUM his official capacity as
Sheriff County Ulster individually, Defendants Appellees Cross Appellants. [1] ________
Appeals United States District Court Northern District New York. No. Civ. (FJS) ― Frederick J. Scullin, Judge . ________
Argued: October 2015 Decided: April ________
‐ ‐ ‐ Before: P ARKER L YNCH , and C ARNEY , Circuit Judges .
________
Appeals judgment and post ‐ judgment orders of United States District Court for Northern District New York (Scullin, J. ). At close direct case, court dismissed plaintiff ‐ appellant Ann Marie Legg’s claim for pregnancy discrimination. court denied for want jurisdiction ‐ appellees ‐ cross ‐ appellants Ulster County and Paul VanBlarcum’s post ‐ trial motions pursuant Rule 50(b) and 59(b) on plaintiff appellee Patricia Watson’s claim hostile work environment. We conclude United Parcel Service, Inc. S. (2015), decided after this appeal filed, Legg presented sufficient support pregnancy and therefore VACATE judgment part and REMAND with instructions conduct new trial. also conclude court erred denying defendants’ post trial motions want jurisdiction accordingly VACATE post judgment orders REMAND further proceedings consistent opinion.
________
S TEPHEN B ERGSTEIN Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, Chester, New York; Brendan Klaproth, Klaproth Law PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Joseph Ranni, Ranni Law Offices, Florida, New York, Plaintiff Appellant Plaintiff Cross Appellee. M ATTHEW J. K ELLY (Amanda Davis Twinam, on brief ), Roemer Wallens Gold & Mineaux LLP, Albany, New York, Defendants Appellees Cross ‐ Appellants.
________
B ARRINGTON D. P ARKER Circuit Judge :
Ann Marie Legg, corrections officer Ulster County Jail, appeals from judgment of United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J. ) dismissing her claim against Ulster County former Sheriff Paul VanBlarcum for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of Civil Rights Act U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. as amended Pregnancy Discrimination Act of U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“PDA”). Legg claims County unlawfully discriminated against her on basis of pregnancy when it denied her request for an accommodation under light policy, pursuant only injured on job were eligible duty assignments. The district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment matter law close of Legg’s direct case, reasoning policy could be discriminatory it was facially neutral with respect pregnancy.
While appeal pending, Supreme Court decided Young United Parcel Service, Inc. S. (2015). Young held an employer’s facially neutral accommodation gives rise inference pregnancy discrimination imposes a significant justified employer’s discriminatory explanation . conclude Legg presented sufficient support pregnancy claim therefore vacate judgment part remand instructions conduct new trial.
The defendants appeal post judgment orders denying their motions judgment matter law or, alternatively, new trial Patricia Watson’s sex based hostile work environment. court, without objection, initially granted extension time file post trial motions. However, after motions filed, court denied them want jurisdiction, believing lacked authority under ‐ ‐ Federal Rule Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) grant extension and time limitations are jurisdictional. conclude court erred denying motions for want jurisdiction and that, although lacked authority under Rule 6(b)(2) grant an extension, had discretion consider whether plaintiffs waived compliance with rule or whether equitable exception applied. Accordingly, vacate post judgment orders and remand further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
Legg began working as corrections officer for Ulster County Jail 1996. At time, County maintained policy injured job were eligible light duty assignments, defined clerical and duties would aggravate employee’s condition. Under Sheriff VanBlarcum’s implementation, did apply condition did result line duty injury. Consequently, pregnant employees’ options continue working full duty, use accrued sick, vacation, or personal time, or take Family and Medical Leave Act or disability leave.
After number pregnancy related complications, Legg became 2008. Because pregnancy high risk, her doctor recommended she work light duty provided note, July stating she “able work time but shouldn’t have direct contact inmates.” Joint App’x VanBlarcum directed Undersheriff Frank Faluotico deny her request accommodate doctor’s recommendation. On July 10, Faluotico informed “[e]mployees are afforded duty assignments Sheriff’s discretion work related injuries/illnesses only,” she therefore “the option being re evaluated [her] attending physician returning work full capacity Correction Officer [to] utilize accrued time (sick, vacation, personal) file [New York State] Disability benefits.” Id. at 925. Faluotico requested that Legg notify him of her response as soon as possible.
Later that day, Legg received a call Lieutenant Jon Becker, who said that he would take care of her assigning her to light duty positions she obtained revised doctor’s note stating she was able work. Legg submitted new note day indicating she was “able work no restrictions.” Id. at 924.
For time, Legg was assigned light duty tasks as promised. By August, however, she gradually required work with inmates again. While working in cell block in November, then approximately seven months pregnant, Legg came upon two inmates fighting in bathroom and bumped one ran past her. As result of this incident, she left work did return until after she gave birth.
After returned work, she brought action against County several of officials, including VanBlarcum, alleging denial request accommodation amounted pregnancy violation Title VII. Legg, Watson, two other female corrections officers also asserted claims for, among things, sex based hostile work environment violation Title VII U.S.C. § 1983.
The suit proceeded trial and, close Legg’s direct case, moved judgment matter law pursuant Rule ground all who had “outside line duty disabilities” treated same the policy. Joint App’x The court granted motion, explaining requiring injury arise when employee duty, policy “applied across board to everyone,” “[a]nd when applies across board everybody, there’s no discrimination.” 675–76. remaining claims were submitted the jury, returned verdict in Watson’s favor on her hostile work environment but the defendants’ favor otherwise.
After the jury excused, the defendants indicated they intended file post trial motions and the district court, without objection from the plaintiffs, set deadline of two weeks from the date the defendants received the transcript. On August 20, the court entered final judgment, and November less than two weeks after receiving the transcript, the defendants filed their post trial motions for judgment as matter law under Rule 50(b) and, alternatively, for new trial under Rule 59(b). The next day, the district court denied the motions untimely, concluding that although defendants been granted extension, they were nonetheless required file their Rule 50(b) Rule 59(b) motions no later than days after entry judgment, Rule 6(b)(2) these deadlines jurisdictional. The same day, court denied defendants’ Rule motion reconsideration essentially same reason. timely appealed judgment. cross appealed appealed from district court’s November orders denying post trial motions.
DISCUSSION
I. We begin dismissal Legg’s pregnancy claim. Rule allows district court grant a motion judgment matter law favor defendant if, close plaintiff’s case, reasonable jury would have legally sufficient basis find plaintiff issue essential claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)(B). review court’s decision de novo drawing all reasonable inferences ‐ movant’s favor disregarding any favorable movant required believe is 14 3636 14 ‐ 3638 14 ‐ 4635 contradicted or impeached. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
A.
Title VII prohibits discrimination respect terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of person’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a)(1). In 1978, Congress passed PDA, which expressly overruled Supreme Court’s holding General Electric Co. v. Gilbert , 429 U.S. 125 (1976), pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. The PDA accomplished by adding following Title VII’s definitional section: terms “because sex” or “on basis sex” include, but
are limited to, or basis pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated same all employment related purposes . . . other persons so affected but similar ability or inability work.
Pub. L. 555, Stat. (1978) (codified U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C. , U.S. 670–71 & n.1 (1983). This provision ”makes clear is discriminatory treat pregnancy related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions.” Newport News , U.S. 684.
Like Title VII discrimination claims, pregnancy may be proven disparate treatment or disparate impact theory liability. , S. To establish disparate treatment, plaintiff must show defendant’s actions motivated by discriminatory intent, either through direct intent or utilizing three part shifting framework set forth McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green U.S. (1973). See, e.g. Quaratino Tiffany & Co. F.3d (2d Cir. 1995). Alternatively, plaintiff may proceed disparate impact theory showing even practice ‐ ‐ facially neutral or not motivated by discriminatory intent, it discriminatory effect. Ricci v. DeStefano U.S. 577–78 (2009).
During pendency this appeal, Supreme Court decided Young United Parcel Service, Inc. resolve how PDA’s “same treatment” clause applies pregnancy claims brought disparate treatment theory liability. The circumstances Young are similar those presented here. Young, UPS mail carrier responsible for delivering packages weighing up seventy pounds, became pregnant told by her doctor that she should lift more than twenty pounds. UPS refused accommodate her, however, even though it provided accommodations employees who injured on job, had lost their Department Transportation certification, or suffered from disability covered Americans Disabilities Act, U.S.C. § et seq. S. at 1344.
Young sued pregnancy discrimination, claiming UPS “light injury” excluded while covering numerous “other persons” who were similar their ability or inability work. Id. 1347. The District Court granted UPS summary judgment Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning “different from those ‘injured job because, quite simply, inability work did arise an job injury.’” Id. 1347–48 (quoting F.3d 450–51 (4th Cir. 2013)). Supreme Court reversed. Writing majority, Justice
Breyer held employer violates PDA when treats “less favorably” than pregnant employees similar ability inability work such extent is more likely than disparity motivated intentional discrimination. To facilitate inquiry, Court established modified McDonnell Douglas analysis focuses on “whether the nature the employer’s policy and the way in which it burdens women shows the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.” Id.
First, with any claim, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case “showing actions taken by the employer one can infer, such actions remain unexplained, is more likely than such actions were based discriminatory criterion illegal Title VII.” Id. at (internal quotation marks omitted). This burden “not onerous” requires the plaintiff show (i) “that she belongs the protected class,” (ii) “that she sought accommodation,” (iii) “that employer did accommodate her,” (iv) “that the employer did accommodate others ‘similar their ability or inability work.’”
If plaintiff satisfies initial burden, presumption of discriminatory intent arises shifts employer articulate legitimate, non discriminatory reason for or action. See id. ; Quaratino , F.3d But “consistent the Act’s basic objective, reason normally cannot consist simply more expensive or less convenient add women category those (‘similar ability inability work’) whom employer accommodates.” Young S. at 1354; see Ariz. Governing Comm. Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans Norris U.S. n.14 (1983) (Marshall, J. concurring judgment) (recognizing that Congress’s passage PDA indicates greater cost providing benefits protected class cannot justify differential treatment based upon protected trait).
If employer puts forth legitimate, discriminatory justification, presumption drops out analysis plaintiff must establish, preponderance evidence, employer’s justification pretext discrimination. See , S. plaintiff may rebut justification through circumstantial proof of discriminatory intent. In pregnancy discrimination context particular, Young recognized that a plaintiff can make showing by presenting “sufficient evidence that employer’s policies impose significant burden workers, employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are not sufficiently strong justify burden, but rather – when considered alongside burden imposed – give rise an inference intentional discrimination.” Id. (emphases added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Young went explain a plaintiff may create genuine issue fact existence a significant by showing “that employer accommodates large percentage nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate large percentage pregnant workers.” Id. Young, instance, could do so demonstrating UPS accommodated most non pregnant lifting limitations “while categorically failing accommodate pregnant with lifting limitations.” Id. To establish UPS’s reasons not sufficiently strong, she could point fact UPS multiple policies accommodate pregnant employees. Id. 1354–55. “That is, why, when employer accommodated so many, could it accommodate women well?” 1355.
B.
Legg argues us she presented sufficient evidence support either ’s disparate treatment framework disparate impact analysis. agree that Legg has adduced sufficient evidence have considered whether County’s motivated discriminatory intent. Consequently, we do reach disparate impact arguments.
As initial matter, do believe presented direct discriminatory intent. Although she contends that County’s policy is itself direct evidence because it excluded pregnant women, policy did so on a facially neutral basis – the source one’s inability work – making impossible to conclude, without inferring, distinction was based upon intent to discriminate against pregnant employees. See Tyler Bethlehem Steel Corp. F.2d 1183–85 (2d Cir. 1992); see Young , S. Ct. (direct evidence “a workplace policy, practice, or decision [that] relies expressly on a protected characteristic”). This conclusion apparent us Young . Were Legg correct, the shifting framework would have been unnecessary because UPS’s policy would have amounted direct UPS’s alleged discriminatory intent. has, however, established a prima facie case Young . She sought a light duty
accommodation while pregnant. The County did not accommodate her. And, a matter policy, County provided light duty accommodations other employees who were similar their ability inability work, namely, those who unable to perform non tasks result injuries incurred on duty. These facts are enough, left unexplained, for reasonable conclude more likely than policy motivated discriminatory intent. they legitimate, non ‐ discriminatory reason for distinction New York General Municipal Law § 207–c(1) requires municipalities continue pay corrections officers injured job but does require same who become unable work for reasons. We agree compliance state workers’ compensation scheme is neutral reason providing benefits injured job but employees. UPS offered same justification see S. (Alito, J. concurring) (citing Md. Lab. & Empl. Code Ann. § 9–614 (2008)), majority implicitly determined legitimate, ‐ discriminatory reason for distinction, remanding consideration whether Young raised a genuine issue material fact to pretext, see id. at 1355–56. So too, here, once County represented that was based upon workers’ compensation scheme, production shifted back Legg to show preponderance that this justification was pretext intentional discrimination. For several reasons, believe that reasonable could find that Legg carried her burden.
First, even before plaintiff could establish pretext and intentional pointing out significant inconsistencies in employer’s justification. See, e.g. Zann Kwan Andalex Grp. LLC F.3d (2d Cir. 2013). At trial, defendants presented several different justifications declining to extend light duty accommodations denying Legg’s request. While VanBlarcum testified that he limited light duty accommodations injured on job he wanted “encourage everybody build up sick time” did not “believe” in providing light duty accommodations employees who injured off job, Joint App’x Faluotico testified VanBlarcum made determination “for her safety, only but her unborn child, facility,” id. 349. VanBlarcum conceded on cross examination would be more costly provide duty accommodations employees. And although now policy was based upon compliance state law, testimony record this point VanBlarcum’s explanation meaning abbreviations listed minutes sergeant’s meeting, and he simply noted “207 c section law allows people get hurt be out still receive pay.” Neither VanBlarcum, nor anyone else, ever testified his 4635 reason denying accommodations to pregnant employees. Under these circumstances, reasonable jury drawing all reasonable inferences in Legg’s favor could find that defendants’ current explanation – compliance state law – pretextual, real reason distinction was unlawful discrimination.
Second, Legg offered sufficient proceed trial under framework articulated in Young . A reasonable jury could conclude that defendants imposed significant burden on pregnant employees because, like UPS, County categorically denied light accommodations pregnant women. Indeed, defendants represent that corrections officers during VanBlarcum’s tenure, just one – – pregnant, she was denied accommodation. Defs.’ Opp’n Br. at 27. VanBlarcum also testified another employee came him “stating she wanted get pregnant wanted know [he] would allow duty employment.” Joint App’x at 528. He advised employee that she would be accommodated. Although unclear from record whether County accommodated large percentage of pregnant employees practice, they least were eligible. By contrast, one would expect, County failed accommodate 100% pregnant employees. This disparity counsels favor finding imposed significant pregnant employees. See Young S. 1354. defendants perplexingly suggest these figures show pregnant were significantly burdened because
“only one COs were affected this policy.” Defs.’ Opp’n Br. But focus how many were denied accommodations relation total number pregnant employees, how many denied accommodations relation to all employees, pregnant or not. The reason is simple enough; comparison better reveals whether or there is burden pregnant employees. If an employer has fifty pregnant employees and only five are adversely affected by its policy, it will be more difficult to draw an inference of significant burden because many pregnant employees are able to have taken advantage of accommodation, providing less reason to believe policy motivated animus against pregnant employees. On hand, employer has just one pregnant employee and she been adversely affected, then it has undoubtedly imposed significant burden its pregnant employees – has burdened one has. Contrary defendants’ implication, employer cannot justify pregnancy by relying upon fact pregnant employees constitute an insignificant part workforce. argue Legg did suffer a
significant she able perform her ordinary job duties and simply “decided stop working until after she gave birth.” While one view evidence, reasonable jury drawing all reasonable inferences Legg’s favor could reach a very different result: Faced prospect going without pay during her pregnancy, having been informally promised an accommodation Becker, sought revised doctor’s note allowing her work full duty, reflected her need work rather than her ability do so. She then gradually required return full work, she acquiesced until she suffered a serious health scare decided take leave from job. These circumstances would permit jury reasonably conclude that pregnant suffered significant burden. Moreover, regardless Legg’s particular circumstances, think when an accommodation excludes coverage thereby places them risk violent confrontations, a reasonable could find denial itself significant burden.
The defendants finally contend that Legg did not suffer a significant burden employees who received a light duty accommodation were also burdened in that they were subject to “strict rules,” including an inability to leave their homes during their shifts random home visits ensure compliance. We do not doubt that a comparison burdens imposed upon employees who receive an accommodation those who do not may, appropriate circumstances, undermine inference that pregnant employees are subjected a significant burden. think obvious, however, that a reasonable jury could conclude that “burdens” imposed upon accommodated employees case do show that burden imposed upon corrections officers was insignificant.
A reasonable jury could conclude defendants’ reasons “sufficiently strong,” when considered alongside imposed, justify denial accommodation to pregnant employees. The defendants maintained duty policy employees injured on but did extend benefit to pregnant employees, who, during VanBlarcum’s tenure, amounted single corrections officer – Legg. As result, she was required continue working with inmates. defendants rationalize this arrangement basis G.M.L. § c applies to employees injured duty. But course nothing statute prevented them offering same accommodations pregnant employees. Under these circumstances, believe reasonable could find compliance with state law requiring accommodation certain insufficient reason denying accommodation pregnant employees.
Moreover, although defendants they were motivated solely compliance state law, reasonable jury could find cost factor, lacked same financial incentive continue employ in some capacity countervailing incentive replace them. VanBlarcum admitted much at trial, stating that would be more costly to provide benefits to pregnant employees the County would have to “find somebody else to fill [the full duty] position” “pay them well.” Joint App’x at 521. The all but concede the same on appeal, admitting “[i]f there is element cost associated with distinction, a result New York State law policy.” Defs.’ Opp’n Br. at 30. Young expressly cautioned, however, cost alone generally a legitimate basis refusing to accommodate pregnant employees same basis as other similar their ability inability to work. S. at 1354. To extent defendants’ motivated cost, a reasonable jury could conclude purported justification denying duty accommodations – compliance state law – pretextual.
Finally, we emphasize a jury would have necessarily been compelled reach these conclusions could have returned verdict defendants’ favor. As Supreme Court made clear PDA does “grant[] pregnant workers ‘most ‐ favored nation’ status” requiring employers who grant any accommodation any employee “provide similar accommodations all pregnant workers (with comparable physical limitations),” regardless considerations. Id. 1349–50 (emphasis removed). Indeed, Court declined endorse an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline that construed PDA entirely prohibit policies “provid[e] light workers injured job.” Id. legality of such policies depends, rather, upon careful analysis facts given case.
As previously noted, may infer discriminatory intent where employer “accommodates large percentage nonpregnant workers while failing accommodate large percentage [here, 100%] workers.” (emphasis added). But if, example, showed County 14 3636 14 3638 14 4635 accommodated very few injured workers the light policy and that many workers among those denied accommodation, the might reasonably refuse infer a discriminatory intent. And while the cost of adding workers otherwise expansive program of accommodation cannot justify their exclusion, policy is not necessarily doomed by the fact was partially motivated by cost. After all, cost were factor, employers would have little reason accommodate everyone, the cost of adopting such policy is presumably always factor limiting accommodations those injured on the job. A requires nearly all workers use sick leave when injured or ill rather than be accommodated on the job duty unreasonable one. Whether appropriate infer a discriminatory intent pattern of exceptions particular workplace will depend on inferences can be drawn from pattern credibility of employer’s purported reasons adopting them. We simply hold case, based presented, was entitled have these issues decided jury.
II.
We now consider district court’s denial of defendants’ Rule 50(b) 59(b) motions, well as denial of their motion reconsideration pursuant Rule Our review of denial of a Rule 50(b) motion is, noted, de novo . review denial of Rule 59(b) Rule motion abuse of discretion. Stevens v. Miller , F.3d 62, (2d Cir. 2012); Arnold v. Cty. of Nassau F.3d 599, (2d Cir. 2001). [3] 14 3636 14 3638 14 4635 This case presents somewhat peculiar circumstances. The district court initially granted the extension time to file their motions but later denied the motions as untimely the ground it lacked authority grant extension Rule 6(b)(2) renders the day time limitations Rules 50(b) and 59(b) jurisdictional. court denied the defendants’ motion reconsideration the same basis. cannot agree. Federal Rule Civil Procedure 6(b)(2)
provides district court may, good cause, extend time to file motion but “must extend time act under” Rules or While many years we described time limitations the Federal Rules “jurisdictional,” see, e.g. , Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc. , F.3d 224, (2d Cir. 2000), Supreme Court has since clarified difference between jurisdictional rules ‐ jurisdictional, processing rules, see In re Indu Craft, Inc. , 749 F.3d 107, (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(1)). A time limitation jurisdictional it prescribed statute. By contrast, procedural rules have no statutory analogue, although “mandatory” sense party may insist upon enforcement, do affect power courts are subject waiver equitable exception. Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc. , F.3d 307, (2d Cir. 2015). This distinction follows fundamental principle Congress alone authority to determine lower federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Kontrick v. Ryan U.S. 452–56 (2004).
Although we have yet address whether Rule 6(b)(2) is jurisdictional, have little difficulty concluding – like every circuit consider question – not. See, e.g. Mobley C.I.A. F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2015); Blue v. Int’l Brotherhood Cir. 2010) (holding even though appellant’s post trial motions untimely, when “appealed district court’s order denying motions within days court’s entry order . . . appeal timely” provided “jurisdiction review court’s . . . order [the appellant’s] post trial motions”). 14 3636 14 3638 14 4635 Elec. Workers Local Union 159 , 676 F.3d 579, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2012); Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc. , 615 F.3d 1352, 1359 n.15 (11th Cir. 2010); Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm’t Inc. , 581 F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2009); Dill v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. , 525 F.3d 612, 618–19 (8th Cir. 2008); Nat’l Ecological Found. v. Alexander , 496 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2007). Because the Federal Rules Civil Procedure are promulgated amended by Supreme Court pursuant to Rules Enabling Act, U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077, an individual rule is jurisdictional it is codified statute in language clearly reflects Congress’s intent to treat it as jurisdictional. See Indu Craft , F.3d at 114. Rule 6(b)(2) has no such statutory codification. Its language virtually identical Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 45(b) Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), Supreme Court held are ‐ jurisdictional. See Eberhart United States , U.S. (2005); Kontrick , U.S. at 455–56 & n.10 (observing Rules 45(b) and are “modeled Federal Rule Civil Procedure 6(b)”).
Accordingly, even though district court without authority grant extension Rule 6(b)(2), retained power consider whether plaintiffs waived compliance with rule whether equitable exception applied. See Weitzner F.3d plaintiffs never objected extension prejudiced delay. Any objection timeliness grounds may therefore have been waived. Compare Advanced Bodycare F.3d n.15 (“[S]ince Rule 6(b) claims processing rule, [defendant appellee], failing object district court’s violation rule (by extending time filing post trial motions) forfeited objection time extension.”), Dill F.3d (no waiver where party failed oppose request extension but subsequently raised objection response Rule 50(b) motion). see no reason, however, resolve issue now.
Although plaintiffs never objected court, not clear whether they effective opportunity do so given district court’s quick denial motion and reconsideration. Under circumstances, we prefer leave district court to consider first instance whether plaintiffs waived objection court’s improper grant extension time whether an equitable exception prohibition such extensions applied on facts this case. Accordingly, we vacate court’s post judgment orders denying defendants’ motions lack jurisdiction remand further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, VACATE judgment Legg’s pregnancy REMAND with instructions conduct new trial, VACATE orders denying defendants’ post trial motions REMAND further proceedings consistent opinion.
[1] Clerk Court directed amend caption set forth above.
[2] doubt this testimony would permit reasonable conclude, without speculating, defendants even offered G.M.L. § c neutral justification denying accommodations employees. However, clearly offered justifications, assume arguendo testimony adequate.
[3] appeal district court’s decision post trial motions. Because notice appeal denial of those motions filed within time prescribed Federal Rule Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) 26(a)(1), December 8, notice appeal timely appeal court’s denial those motions lack jurisdiction, issue decide based on notice appeal. See Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc. F.3d n.6 (2d Cir. 2015); see Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC Thione Int’l, Inc. F.3d n.15 (11th