Khalid Mohamed v. Eric Holder, Jr.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19898
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Khalid Mohamed, a Sudanese lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Virginia to sexual battery (2010) and was later convicted for failing to register as a sex offender (2011).
- DHS charged Mohamed removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) as having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT).
- Mohamed conceded sexual battery was a CIMT but argued that failing to register is a regulatory offense that does not involve moral turpitude.
- The BIA relied on its decision in Matter of Tobar-Lobo to conclude that failure-to-register statutes are CIMTs and ordered removal; Mohamed appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the Virginia failure-to-register statute (Va. Code § 18.2-472.1) is a CIMT and whether the BIA’s contrary interpretation merited deference.
- The Fourth Circuit held that failure to register is a regulatory, administrative offense that does not independently violate a moral norm and reversed the BIA, remanding to vacate the removal order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to register as a sex offender under Va. Code § 18.2-472.1 is a "crime involving moral turpitude" for § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) | Mohamed: statute is regulatory/administrative; a late or forgetful omission does not violate a moral norm, so it is not a CIMT | Government: sex-offender registration serves a serious public-safety purpose; BIA’s Tobar-Lobo reasonably found such failures "inherently base or vile" and thus turpitudinous | Held: Not a CIMT. The statute criminalizes administrative conduct, not conduct that independently violates a moral norm; Tobar-Lobo’s reliance on purpose (not elements) was unreasonable, so no Chevron deference |
| Whether the BIA’s interpretation in Tobar-Lobo is entitled to Chevron deference | Mohamed: Tobar-Lobo unreasonably interprets CIMT by focusing on statute purpose rather than the elements; therefore no deference | Government: BIA’s interpretation is permissible and entitled to deference because the statutory term is ambiguous | Held: The BIA’s interpretation was unreasonable here (it relied on statute purpose rather than the offense’s elements); the court declined to defer to Tobar-Lobo |
Key Cases Cited
- Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (elemental inquiry confines CIMT analysis to statutory elements)
- Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for CIMT classification)
- Yousefi v. U.S. INS, 260 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognized ambiguity in "crime involving moral turpitude")
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for agency deference)
- Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2001) (definition of moral turpitude as conduct shocking public conscience)
- Totimeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding similar registration statute is not a CIMT)
- Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting BIA's CIMT reading for a failure-to-register misdemeanor)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (observing difficulty of classifying crimes as CIMTs)