918 N.W.2d 785
Mich.2018Background
- Two consolidated cases: Denishio Johnson (2011) and Keyon Harrison (2012) were stopped by Grand Rapids police and had photographs and fingerprints taken (P&P) during field interrogations; neither was charged.
- GRPD practiced P&Ps as an investigative tactic; officers carried cameras and fingerprint kits and training materials showed P&Ps in model reports and hypotheticals where probable cause to arrest did not exist.
- The City admitted (in a request for admission and at oral argument) that taking photos and prints is a longstanding GRPD custom, performed when an officer deems it appropriate.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourth Amendment violations and municipal liability; trial court granted summary disposition for the City and officers; Court of Appeals affirmed as to municipal liability.
- Michigan Supreme Court granted review to decide whether alleged Fourth Amendment violations were caused by a City policy or custom; assumed for purposes of the appeal that the P&Ps violated Fourth Amendment and focused on municipal-liability causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a municipal policy or custom existed authorizing P&Ps during stops | City had an established custom/policy authorizing P&Ps without probable cause; training and practice show official policy | City contended no actionable policy that caused violations; argued officers exercised discretion and no policy compelled unlawful conduct | City conceded a P&P custom; Court held record (admissions, manual, training, testimony) raised genuine fact issues that custom had become an official policy |
| Whether a permissive/authorizing (non-mandatory) policy can give rise to municipal liability | Authorizing a tactic that an officer follows is sufficient to attribute the officer’s act to the municipality | City argued municipal liability requires a policy that specifically directed or required the unconstitutional act | Court held a policy that authorizes (but does not require) specific conduct can be the moving force for §1983 municipal liability when employees act pursuant to that authorization |
| Causation: whether the policy/custom was the "moving force" behind alleged Fourth Amendment violations | P&Ps were authorized and trained; but-for and proximate causation met because officers acted pursuant to that policy | City argued officers’ independent discretion severs causal link; conceding P&Ps occurred does not mean policy caused constitutional injury | Court applied tort causation (but-for and proximate); held reasonable minds could differ that the P&P policy/custom was cause in fact and foreseeable proximate cause of the alleged violations |
| Whether deliberate-indifference standard must apply when policy is facially lawful but unlawfully executed | Plaintiffs disavowed failure-to-train theory and did not rely on deliberate-indifference | City/concurring justices argued that when a facially lawful policy is executed unlawfully, plaintiff must prove municipal deliberate indifference | Majority: unnecessary to decide here; distinguished claims where municipal action itself authorizes violation from claims premised on municipal inaction; concurrence urged that if claim rests on facially lawful policy, plaintiffs must prove deliberate indifference |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under §1983 requires a policy or custom that causes the constitutional violation)
- Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (a single decision by a municipal policymaker can constitute official policy; liability attaches when municipality makes a deliberate choice among alternatives)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officers may conduct brief investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure-to-train claims may support §1983 liability only where the failure amounts to deliberate indifference)
- Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (distinguishes claims where municipal action itself violates federal law from claims that require proof of deliberate indifference)