Key v. Tyler
246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2019Background
- Three sisters (Key, Tyler, Potz) were beneficiaries of a family trust; Tyler was trustee and procured a 2007 Amendment that substantially reallocated assets to her, effectively disinheriting Key.
- Key sued in 2011 seeking to invalidate the 2007 Amendment for undue influence; the probate court granted the petition and this court affirmed in a prior unpublished opinion.
- After remand Key filed a No Contest Petition to enforce the Trust’s no contest clause against Tyler and sought attorney fees for defending Tyler’s appeal of the Invalidity ruling.
- Tyler moved to strike Key’s petition under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16), arguing her courtroom defense was protected petitioning activity and that Key could not show likely success; she also opposed fees.
- The probate court granted Tyler’s anti‑SLAPP motion (finding Key failed to show a probability of success) and denied Key’s fees motion; the Court of Appeal reversed both rulings and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Key) | Defendant's Argument (Tyler) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the anti‑SLAPP statute apply to a probate petition to enforce a no contest clause? | Anti‑SLAPP should not apply because it undermines the streamlined probate no‑contest regime. | Anti‑SLAPP applies; the No Contest Petition arises from protected judicial petitioning. | Court: Anti‑SLAPP applies to no contest enforcement petitions. |
| Under anti‑SLAPP step two, did Key show probability of success that Tyler’s judicial defense was a "direct contest" and brought without probable cause? | The probate court’s findings of undue influence and this court’s affirmance supply prima facie evidence that Tyler’s defense was a direct contest pursued without probable cause. | Tyler argued her defense was not a direct contest (it was a defense to Key’s suit), she acted only as trustee, and litigation privilege bars enforcement. | Court: Tyler’s defense qualified as a direct contest by a beneficiary (not shielded by trustee label); litigation privilege does not bar enforcement; Key showed a probability of success because prior findings support lack of probable cause. |
| Does collateral estoppel/issue preclusion permit Key to rely on prior probate findings to oppose anti‑SLAPP? | Prior probate judgment and appellate affirmance are binding on issues actually litigated and necessarily decided, supporting Key’s showing. | Tyler contended prior findings cannot be taken as truth for this proceeding and were not pleaded below as collateral estoppel. | Court: Collateral estoppel principles permit using the Statement of Decision and appellate opinion to show a prima facie case on issues actually litigated, so Key met step two. |
| Is Key entitled to attorney fees for defending Tyler’s appeal under the Trust’s Article 14? | Article 14 provides that "expenses to resist any contest or attack" shall be paid from the Trust estate; that includes Key’s appellate fees. | Tyler argued Key did not preserve a contractual fee claim and the action is a trust matter not subject to contract fee rules. | Court: Article 14 is a contractual provision authorizing reimbursement of litigation expenses; remand to determine reasonable fees and whether they should come from Tyler’s share. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (setting the two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework)
- Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal.4th 180 (anti‑SLAPP second step is summary‑judgment‑like)
- Donkin v. Donkin, 58 Cal.4th 412 (background on no contest clause policy and statutory scheme)
- Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. La Marche, 31 Cal.4th 728 (anti‑SLAPP applies even where claim arises from underlying litigation)
- Gonzalez v. Estate of Gonzalez, 102 Cal.App.4th 1296 (judicial effort to enforce a later instrument obtained by undue influence can be a contest against the earlier instrument)