Kevin O'Bryan v. Primal Vantage Company, Inc., 677 S.W.3d 228

Primal Vantage manufactured a tree-mounted two-person ladderstand that required five polypropylene straps to secure it to a tree; it was not designed to be freestanding.
In 2012 Kevin O’Bryan fell and was seriously injured when the straps securing the stand to a tree broke; he and his then-wife Santé sued Primal Vantage, Dick’s Sporting Goods (retailer), and the landowners (Dennis & Margaret Martin).
The Martins were dismissed pretrial under KRS 150.645(1) (landowner immunity); claims against Dick’s were dismissed by directed verdict at trial.
At trial the jury found Primal Vantage liable on failure-to-warn/failure-to-instruct theories, awarded damages to Kevin and loss of consortium to Santé, but allocated 50% fault to Kevin, reducing awards accordingly.
During trial plaintiffs introduced evidence of 78 other ladderstand incidents; the trial court initially allowed this evidence to be heard, then ruled it inadmissible near the end of trial and did not explicitly admonish the jury to disregard it.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held the trial court abused its gatekeeping role by permitting the other-incidents evidence, required a new trial on that basis, but affirmed the rulings on jury instructions, apportionment to the Martins, and the directed verdict on design-defect claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of other-incidents evidence	Other-incidents were substantially similar or any error was harmless; trial court could defer rulings	Trial court abused gatekeeper role by allowing volume of inadmissible other-incidents, then failing to admonish jury	Abuse of discretion; introduction was not harmless; new trial required (reversed)
Jury instructions on failure-to-warn	Instructions misstated Kentucky law / violated "bare-bones" rule	Instructions properly separated negligence and strict-liability theories and were accurate	Instructions were proper; affirmed
Apportionment of fault to Martins under KRS 150.645	Comparative-fault statute allows apportionment even if defendant immune	Landowners have statutory immunity; statute precludes apportionment to persons not within KRS 411.182 categories	Martins properly excluded from apportionment under KRS 150.645; affirmed
Directed verdict on design-defect claims	There was evidence of alternative safer designs (stronger steel, chains, Lockjawz)	No substantial evidence of a practicable, safer alternative available at the time	Directed verdict appropriate; insufficient proof of feasible safer design; affirmed
Loss-of-consortium offset & prejudicial references to China	Offset and China references were prejudicial/errors	Issues depend on retrial evidence; premature to decide now	Court declined to address these issues as moot or premature

Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984) (other-accidents evidence admissible only if substantially similar; trial judge has relevance gatekeeping role)
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64 (Ky. 2010) (manufacturer’s duty to warn of known or knowable dangers)
Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976) (strict liability focuses on product condition; warnings may be part of safe design)
Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980) (product "defective" includes inadequate warnings; industry compliance relevant)
Tipton v. Michelin Tire Co., 101 F.3d 1145 (6th Cir. 1996) (explains distinction and overlap between negligence and strict liability in failure-to-warn claims)
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430 (Ky. 2003) (jury presumed to follow admonition to disregard evidence)
Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2012) (prefers "bare-bones" jury instructions but requires correctness and completeness)