Kevin Gills v. Mary Harris
11-15-00018-CV
| Tex. App. | Feb 2, 2017Background
- Kevin Gills and Mary Harris (a/k/a Mary Campbell) divorced in 2009; the divorce decree awarded the house to Gills but required him to pay and indemnify Harris for the mortgage.
- The decree stated Gills "shall use his best efforts to attempt to refinance the house solely in his name and if that fails will indemnify [Harris]..." but did not set specific deadlines or procedures.
- More than five years after the decree, Gills had not refinanced; Harris filed a Petition to Clarify & Enforce Property Division under Tex. Fam. Code § 9.008 seeking specific, enforceable terms and a compliance deadline.
- The trial court granted clarification: Gills was ordered to remove Harris’s liability on the mortgage within 90 days from October 21, 2014, and to make monthly payments by certified mail beginning November 1, 2014, until the loan was paid or further order.
- Gills appealed, arguing the "best efforts" clause was too indefinite to enforce and that the clarification improperly altered the property division by imposing new obligations (the 90-day refinance deadline and specified payment method/timing).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harris) | Defendant's Argument (Gills) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether the "best efforts" refinancing clause was too indefinite to be clarified/enforced | Clause is ambiguous and may be reformed/clarified to reflect parties' true intent; clarification proper under Fam. Code § 9.008 | "Best efforts" is too indefinite to fix legal obligations; not subject to clarification/enforcement | Court: "best efforts" clause may be clarified/reformed to correct mutual mistake; no abuse of discretion (affirmed) |
| 2. Whether imposing a 90-day refinance deadline exceeded the court's authority or altered property division | Clarification merely sets a reasonable, enforceable timeframe consistent with original obligation; does not change substance of division | Deadline could materially change Gills’s position (rate, terms, fees), thereby altering property division | Court: Deadline is an implementation detail to effect the original obligation and did not alter substantive division; no abuse of discretion (affirmed) |
| 3. Whether specifying monthly payment method/time (certified mail by 1st of month) imposed a new obligation not in the decree | Specifying time/manner merely clarifies how existing mortgage-payment obligation must be performed for enforcement | Specification imposes a new procedural obligation beyond the decree | Court: Setting time/manner for payment is an enforcement mechanism, not a substantive change; no abuse of discretion (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006) (abuse-of-discretion standard for post-divorce clarification/enforcement)
- Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1986) (property settlement in divorce treated as contract; may be reformed to correct mutual mistake)
- McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984) (same; contract principles govern incorporated property agreements)
- Chavez v. McNeely, 287 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (invalidating enforcement of provisions found too indefinite)
- Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 274 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (clarification that prescribes specific time/place for performance enforces existing obligation without altering division)