OPINION
Thе issues presented by this case are (1) whether a district court has jurisdiction to construe a contract that is incorporated into an agreed, final divorce decree even though the court is not the same court that rendered the divorce judgment and (2) whether the contract incident to divorce in this case is toо indefinite to enforce.
BACKGROUND
The Relationship
Appellant, Brenda T. McNeely Chavez (“Brenda”), and appellee, Joe D. McNeely 1 (“Joe”), were first married in 1969, and they have three children together. Joe and Brenda had a rocky relationship and were divorced and remarried twice. After their second remarriage in 2000, Joe was involvеd in a horseback riding accident that left him completely paralyzed. 2
The Agreed, Final Divorce Decree
In June 2001, Joe and Brenda divorced for a third time. The 311th District Court of Harris County, Texas, entered an “Agreed Final Decree of Divorce” on June 29, 2001. In the divorce decree, Joe and Brenda divided their properties. The divorce decree gave Joe a life estate in a 120-acre ranch in Waller County, with the remainder going to Brenda. Page 12 of the 14-page divorce decree contains the following paragraph:
Responsibility for Care of Joe D. McNeely: The parties stipulate that Joe D. McNeely’s sister, Patsy Brewer and her family will be responsible for the daily physical care of Joe D. McNeely. Brenda T. McNeely stipulates that she will provide as much toward the care and providing for the needs of Joe D. McNeely as possible, limited only by her personal financial situation. (Emphasis added).
The Subsequent Litigation
Joe brings restricted appeal in Hams County
Joe then filed a restricted appeal from the divorce decree, which was unsuccessful.
See McNeely v. McNeely,
No. 11-02-00036-CV,
Joe brings and, nonsuits contract claim in Hands County
In July 2003, Joe sued Brenda again in the 311th District Court, which had rendered the June 29, 2001 judgment in their *843 divоrce. Joe sought damages based on a breach of the contractual provisions contained in the divorce decree. Four years after filing suit in Harris County, Joe non-suited his case.
Joe refiles contract claim, in Waller County
The next day — April 10, 2007 — Joe refiled his suit in Waller County. Brenda moved to transfer the case to Harris County, but the Waller County court denied her motion. The case was tried to the bench in Waller County. Brenda took the position that (1) the case should be heard in Harris County, and (2) the provision of the divorce decree that served as the basis of Joe’s claim was too indefinite to be enforced as a contract. Brenda testified that she continued to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the ranch where Joe lived. She also testified that she had paid what she could for Joe’s care until her business began to fail in 2003. Joe, however, contended that Brenda’s personal spending habits did not reflect a decline in her financial ability to contribute toward his care.
Waller County District CоiLrt Renders Judgment for Joe on Contract Claim
The trial court rendered judgment for Joe on his breach of contract claim and awarded him $950,000 in damages, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
A contract existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, as set forth in the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce (Contract/Decree).
Defendant agreed to be obligated, by virtue of the contract/Decree to provide as much toward the care and providing for the needs of Joe D. McNeely (Plaintiff herein) as pоssible, limited only by her personal financial situation. Defendant failed to comply with her contractual obligations contained in the contract/Decree.
Defendant failed to comply with her agreement to provide as much toward the care and providing for the needs of Joe D. McNeely as possible, limited only by her, Brenda McNeely’sf,] personal financial situation. Such breach of her agreement mentioned above occurred continuously between April 10, 2003 and the date of trial, December 12, 2007. The contract between the parties, especially the paragraph headed “Responsibility for Care of Joe D. McNeely” contained on Page 12 of the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce, was not vague but was clear and unambiguous.
Plaintiff Joe D. McNeely’s needs have exceeded $500,000 per year since April 10, 2003.
Defendant’s personal financial situation since the entry of the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce has beеn such that she could have provided substantial care and provisions for the needs of Joe D. McNeely, in excess of $300,000 per year for the years 2003 through 2007.
Plaintiff Joe D. MeNeely’s damages directly resulting from Defendant’s breach of the contract/Decree and from Defendant’s failure to comply with her obligations set fоrth in the contract/Decree are $950,000.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Standards of Review
In two issues on appeal, Brenda contends (1) that the trial court in Waller County did not have jurisdiction over the case, and (2) that the contractual support provision in the agreed divorce decree is too indefinite to be enforced. Both issues
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on appeal — whether the trial court lacks jurisdiction and whether the contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable — are legal issues to be reviewed de novo by this Court.
See C.L. Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley,
Did the Waller County District Court Have Jurisdiction?
In her first issue on appeal, Brenda contends the district court in Waller County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, she claims that chapter 9 of the Texas Family Code provides exclusive jurisdiction in the court that rendered the divorce decree — in this case the 311th District Court оf Harris County.
Article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution provides that a district court’s jurisdiction “consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” Tex. Const, art. V, § 8. The legislature has provided that the district court possess “the jurisdiction provided by Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution,” and “may hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.008 (Vernon 2004). “Courts of general jurisdiction presumably have subject matter jurisdiction unless a contrary showing is made.”
Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.,
Brenda argues that sections 9.001 and 9.002 of the Family Code create exclusive jurisdiction over this suit in the 311th District Court of Harris County, the court that rendered the divorce decree. The relevant provision of section 9.001 provides that “[a] party affected by a divorce decree ... may request enforcement of that decree by filing a suit to enforce as provided by this chapter in the court that rendered the decreе.” Tex Fam. Code Ann. § 9.001 (Vernon 2006). Section 9.002 provides: “The court that rendered the decree of divorce or annulment retains the power to enforce the property division as provided in Chapter 7.” Id. at § 9.002.
We begin by noting that the language of section 9.001 — “a party affected by a divorce decree ...
may
request enforcеment of that decree ... ” — is permissive in nature, not mandatory. Unless the legislature clearly intended otherwise, words used in statutes should be given their ordinary, reasonable meaning.
See Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v.
Meier;
Secondly, had the Legislature intended that sections 9.001 and 9.002 provide exclusive jurisdiction, it could have done so by using clear statutory language, as it has done in other situations. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.101(a) (Vernon 2006) (“[T]he court that rendered a final decree *845 of divorce ... retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to render an enforceable qualified domestic relations order ....”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.002(a) (Vernon 2008) (“[A] court acquires continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the matter provided for by this title in connection with a child on the rendition of a final order.”).
Finally, we note that Joe’s suit is a breach of contrаct action based upon an agreement incorporated into a final divorce decree. A breach of contract action to recover money damages invokes the general jurisdiction of the district court.
See Adwan v. Adwan,
For these reasons, we conclude that the Waller County District Court had jurisdiction to hear Joe’s breach of contract action. Accordingly, we overrule Brenda’s first issue on appeal.
Does the Contract Fail for Indefiniteness?
In her second issue on appeal, Brenda contends that the clause requiring her to continue to pay “as much as possible” toward Joe’s “needs,” limited only by her “personal financial situation,” is too indefinite to be enforced. We agree.
A contract is legally binding only if its terms are sufficiently definite to enable a court to understand the parties’s obligations.
Fort Worth ISD v. City of Fort Worth,
A contrаct is sufficiently definite if a court is able to determine the respective legal obligations of the parties.
T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso,
In
Pine v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n,
In
T.O. Stanley Boot Co.,
the bank allegedly promised to lend the corporation $500,000. The supreme court held that the agreement was too indefinite to be enforced because, although it provided the amount of the loan, mаny terms, including the interest rate and repayment terms were missing.
T.O. Stanley Boot Co.,
In Playoff Corp. v. Blackwell, — S.W.3d - (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.), Blackwell sued Playoff for breach of an oral employment contract. Blackwell alleged that Playoff had agreed to employ him and, in exchange, he would not require Playoff to pay $600,000 in consulting fees it owed him. Id. at-. Blackwell аlso claimed that, if Playoff terminated his employment, he would be entitled to 25% of the “fair market value” of Playoff, after reducing the “fair market value” by $5 million on the last day of his employment. Id. The court of appeals held that the agreement was too indefinite to enforce because the evidence showed that the parties had not yet agreed on how to determine the “fair market value” of the business. Thus, the alleged contract was nothing more than an unenforceable agreement to agree. Id.
In
Ski River Dev., Inc. v. McCalla,
That, in the event Lessees [Bakers] shall purchase or otherwise obtain legal ownership of said Property from Lessor [Glazier] and later elect to sell, Lessees [Bakers] hereby grant Sub-Lessees [McCallas] the First Option to Purchase all, or a portion of said Property from Lessees [Bakers] at market value.
Id. at 133. (Emphasis added). The court of appeals held that the agreement was too indefinite to enforce becаuse it did not, among other things, (1) define “said property” or “portion of said property,” (2) state whether “elect to sell” included merely listing the property for sale, (3) state when the market value was to be determined, or (4) provide a method for determining market value. Id. at 134.
Brenda argues that this case presents a situation of indefiniteness “cubed” because there are three indefinite terms. First, the clause provides that Brenda will pay “as much as possible,” but it does not define that term, nor explain how the parties will reach an agreement as to what that term means. Second, the clause refers to paying for Joe’s “needs,” but again, it does not specify what those “needs” are. There is no way to determine whether “needs” refers to basic needs such as food, shelter, and clothing, or whether it includes medical or caregiving needs. Finally, the clause concludes that Brenda’s obligation is limited by her “personal financial situation,” but it does not explain how or when Brеnda’s “personal financial situation” would be impacted such that it would excuse or reduce any performance required by her.
Nevertheless, Joe argues that “Brenda’s performance, and Joe’s acceptance of it, provides a measuring stick by which the trial court could determine what the parties understood the provision in the Divorce Agreement to mean.”
See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34(2) cmt. c. (explaining that partial performance may remove uncertainty and give meaning to otherwise indefinite term). However, Brenda’s attempt to comply with the indef
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inite term for some time does nothing to clarify the сlause in question. There is simply no guidance in the clause to tell Brenda or the court how much she is required to pay each month or how and when her personal financial situation would be such that it would reduce or excuse her performance.
See Mooney v. Ingram,
Because we hold that the clause relied upon by Joe is too indefinite to be enforced as a contract, we sustain Brenda’s second issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We reversе the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that Joe take nothing on his breach of contract claim against Brenda.
Notes
. This Court has received notice that appellee, Joe D. McNeely is deceased. Because Mr. McNeely died after the trial court rendered judgment but before the case was finally disposеd of on appeal, we will proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if all parties were alive. See Tex. R. Arr. P. 7.1(a)(1).
. As a result of this accident, Joe filed a personal injury action against Brenda's company, Chavez Construction. Joe recovered a money judgment, which this Court affirmed. See Chavez Const., Inc. v. McNeely, 177 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. granted, judgm't rev'd). While pending at the Texas Supreme Court, the case settled, and Joe recovered $4 million gross or $1.9 million net.