Kevin F. Strong v. Rebecca M. Brakeley
137 A.3d 1007
Me.2016Background
- Kevin Strong, a physician, applied for staff privileges at St. Mary’s Regional Medical Center; St. Mary’s contracted Synernet to collect and verify physician credentialing information.
- Rebecca Brakeley and Jonathan Bausman, both physicians, completed and returned professional reference questionnaires about Strong to Synernet, which forwarded them to St. Mary’s.
- Strong sued Brakeley and Bausman for defamation and tortious interference, alleging their negative questionnaire responses caused denial of privileges and sought punitive damages.
- Defendants moved to dismiss based on absolute immunity under 24 M.R.S. § 2511; the motion to dismiss was denied but discovery was limited to immunity issues.
- After limited discovery, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for Brakeley and Bausman, holding they were immune under § 2511(3); Strong appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2511(3) grants absolute immunity for reports to credentialing contractors | Strong: Statements to Synernet are not covered because Synernet is not a “board, authority or committee” | Brakeley/Bausman: Synernet is a professional competence committee (contractor) under §2502 and fits §2511(3) | Held: Yes—Synernet qualifies as a professional competence committee and defendants are immune under §2511(3) |
| Whether “assisting” requires membership on the board/committee | Strong: “Assisting” should be limited to persons who are members/staff of the committee | Defs: “Assisting” includes providing information to or aiding the committee; statute’s plain text imposes no membership requirement | Held: “Assisting” includes providing information; no membership requirement in §2511(3) |
| Whether immunity is conditioned on the reporter acting without malice | Strong: Immunity should be limited when report is false or motivated by ill will | Defs: The statutory “acting without malice” clause applies only to persons not otherwise listed; physicians listed separately are not subject to that requirement | Held: No malice requirement applies to physicians under §2511; defendants are not subject to the “acting without malice” limitation |
| Whether immunity requires mandatory reporting duty | Strong: Immunity should be limited to statutorily mandated reports | Defs: “Provided by law” modifies the committee’s duties, not voluntariness of assistance; immunity applies whether report was mandatory or voluntary | Held: §2511(3) does not require that reporting be mandatory; immunity applies when assisting a committee performing its statutory role |
Key Cases Cited
- Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 974 A.2d 276 (summary-judgment standard and viewing facts in plaintiff’s favor)
- MaineToday Media, Inc. v. State, 82 A.3d 104 (statutory interpretation de novo; plain-language first step)
- Searle v. Town of Bucksport, 3 A.3d 390 (statutory interpretation guidance)
- Fernald v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 946 A.2d 395 (avoidance of absurd statutory interpretations)
- DiPietro v. Boynton, 628 A.2d 1019 (definition of malice)
- Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169 (policy decisions reserved to Legislature)
- McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Service of Southern Maine, Inc., 691 A.2d 1201 (prior application of predecessor immunity statute)
- Curtis v. Porter, 784 A.2d 18 (summary judgment not an extreme remedy)
- Guardianship of Jo Ann L., 847 A.2d 415 (encouragement of summary judgment for judicial economy)