Kevin Everson v. Simon Leis, 412 F. App'x 771

Everson experienced an epileptic seizure at Northgate Mall and was restrained, arrested, and later charged with assault and disorderly conduct; charges were dismissed after his disability was documented.
Everson sued under Title II of the ADA, alleging intentional discrimination in the way responders handled his seizure.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, assuming for summary judgment that Everson’s actions were involuntary and caused by epilepsy, but finding no intentional discrimination.
The case centers on Wittich, a deputy sheriff, and Leis, the County Sheriff, with Everson proceeding against Wittich in his official capacity; discovery and a prior on-appeal interlocutory ruling affected the proceedings.
The court assumed Title II could apply to arrests for purposes of deciding the case and held there was no genuine issue of material fact showing intentional discrimination; Everson also challenged training and policies but the court addressed only the individual officer.
The majority affirmed; a concurrent dissent argued genuine issues of material fact remained, particularly whether Wittich knew Everson’s conduct was related to his disability and whether wrongful-arrest-based proof could support a Title II claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Everson proved intentional discrimination under Title II	Everson could prove discrimination by proving Wittich knew his seizures caused his conduct and arrested him despite disability	Wittich acted to restrain and arrest Everson to secure safety; no evidence shows discriminatory intent tied to disability	No genuine issue of material fact; no intentional discrimination shown on arrest or charging conduct
Whether Title II applies to arrests in this circuit	Title II applies to disability-based discrimination in public services, including arrests	Open question; Court assumes applicability for disposition without addressing it	Assumed for purposes of decision; not essential to the result
Whether Wittich’s arrest and charging Everson violated Title II	Wittich knew actions were related to disability and discriminated by arrest/charges	No evidence Wittich knew actions were caused by disability or acted because of disability	No; insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent
Whether Everson can rely on a wrongful-arrest theory to prove intent under Title II	Wrongful-arrest theory supports proving intent	Not applicable or not supported by facts; on-scene decisions involve safety concerns	Not adopted as sufficient basis for Title II discrimination in this context
Whether the district court erred by not addressing Leis’s liability			Everson waivedLeis claim; no challenge on appeal to Leis ruling

Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.2005) (elements for Title II intentional discrimination; standard of review)
Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir.2008) (requires showing intentional discrimination in context of public services)
Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474 (6th Cir.2003) (discusses basis for Title II discrimination standard; sole-motivation issue later questioned)
Thompson v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn., 219 F.3d 555 (6th Cir.2000) (police use of force in response to threat; disability not sole basis)
Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484 (6th Cir.2009) (prior panel holding on Everson’s seizure context and state of mind)
Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F.Supp. 175 (D.Ind.1997) (wrongful-arrest theory discussed in other circuits)
Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir.1999) (disability-related misperception of conduct; potential framework for proof)
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (probable cause standard for arrest, distinct from discriminatory intent)
Hagan v. Warner/Elektra/Atlantic Corp., 92 Fed.Appx. 264 (6th Cir.2004) (evidence proper for consideration in summary judgment)