Kevin Charles Isom v. State of Indiana
2015 Ind. LEXIS 431
Ind.2015Background
- On August 6, 2007 Kevin Charles Isom was found in his apartment after police entered a standoff; three family members (wife Cassandra, stepdaughter Ci’Andria, stepson Michael) were dead from multiple gunshot wounds and multiple weapons were recovered; blood from victims was on Isom’s clothing.
- Isom gave a post-Miranda statement to police describing his movements and the victims’ positions; he sometimes expressed disbelief about killing his family.
- The State charged Isom with three counts of murder (seeking death based on the statutory multiple-murder aggravator) and multiple attempted-murder/criminal recklessness counts related to shots fired at police.
- A jury convicted Isom of the murders, found the (b)(8) multiple-murder aggravator proved, rejected mitigation, and recommended death for each murder; the trial court imposed three consecutive death sentences and shorter terms for lesser offenses.
- On direct appeal Isom raised challenges to (1) denial of for-cause juror strikes, (2) denial of mistrial motions, (3) several jury-instruction rulings, (4) refusal to allow a witness to answer a juror question in penalty phase, (5) alleged prosecutorial misconduct in penalty-phase closing, (6) appropriateness of death sentences, and (7) legality of consecutive death sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court erred by denying for-cause challenges to prospective jurors | Jurors should have been struck for inability to consider mitigation, inability to consider all three penalties, or not understanding legal concepts | Trial court’s extended voir dire cured doubts; jurors affirmed they could follow instructions and be impartial | Denial not an abuse of discretion; trial court credibility findings affirmed |
| Denial of mistrial after hearsay/extrajudicial statements admitted through witnesses (Eddie Green; Officer Pawlak) | Stricken hearsay and identification testimony prejudiced Isom and required mistrial | Court gave admonition for Green’s stricken statements; Pawlak’s testimony was nontestimonial (ongoing emergency) and admissible under present-sense/excited-utterance rationale | No abuse re: Green (admonition cured); Pawlak testimony did not violate Confrontation Clause (nontestimonial) |
| Trial court refused voluntary-manslaughter lesser-included instruction | Knife at scene and evidence of anger/sudden heat created serious evidentiary dispute warranting instruction | No evidence of sudden heat/sufficient provocation; anger alone insufficient; defendant’s statement denied any prior argument | Denial proper—no serious evidentiary dispute on sudden heat |
| Jury instruction on weighing aggravating/mitigating factors required beyond a reasonable doubt | Instruction should require weighing outcome be found beyond a reasonable doubt | Statute and controlling precedent do not require reasonable-doubt standard for weighing; only existence of statutory aggravator must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt | Instruction proper; no reasonable-doubt requirement for weighing the balance |
| Refusal to allow witness to answer juror question whether family forgave Isom (penalty phase) | Family forgiveness is a potential mitigator; juror question should have been answered | No evidence victims forgave Isom; surviving family members’ views do not establish forgiveness by deceased victims or a proper mitigator here; answer would be speculative | No reversible error; trial court properly excluded the answer |
| Prosecutorial comments in penalty-phase rebuttal improperly urged death based on defendant’s character/role-failures | Prosecutor improperly invited jury to consider character/relationships rather than statutory aggravators, constituting misconduct | Remarks were focused on the multiple-murder aggravator and recapitulation of evidence; any overstep was isolated | Some remarks crossed the line (invited character consideration) but were not so prejudicial to constitute fundamental error given the record |
| Legality of imposing three consecutive death sentences | Imposing consecutive death sentences is improper because death is not a "term of imprisonment" | State argued no prejudice and upheld sentencing choice | Trial court exceeded statutory authority in ordering consecutive death sentences; remand to issue corrected sentencing order |
Key Cases Cited
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (trial court’s broad discretion in evaluating juror impartiality)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements and Confrontation Clause framework)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (ongoing emergency test for nontestimonial statements)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (primary-purpose test for testimonial statements)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (jury must find, beyond reasonable doubt, any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (Sixth Amendment requires jury finding of aggravating circumstance for death penalty eligibility)
- Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (impartial jury requirement)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer must be able to consider any relevant mitigating factor)
- Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004) (Indiana precedent on reasonable-doubt requirement for weighing aggravators/mitigators)
- Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190 (Ind. 2014) (affirming no reasonable-doubt standard for weighing under Indiana statute)
- Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. 2012) (appellate review of denial of for-cause challenge when defendant exhausted peremptory strikes)