345 F. Supp. 3d 855
N.D. Ohio2018Background
- In December 2012 Kesterson, a Kent State softball player, says she was raped by Tucker Linder (the coach Karen Linder’s son). She did not report the incident to university employees until an exit interview with Karen Linder in May 2014.
- During that exit interview Kesterson told Karen Linder about the assault; Kesterson says Linder told her not to tell others and did not report the disclosure to the university Title IX office. Linder admits she violated university mandatory-reporting policy.
- Kesterson alleges thereafter Linder retaliated and treated her differently (benching, position change, cold treatment, requiring attendance at events in Linder’s home). Kesterson did not report the assault to the Title IX office until August 24, 2015.
- Once the Title IX office learned of the 2012 assault in August 2015, Kent State promptly investigated: Linder was offered resignation or termination and resigned August 28, 2015; the university placed holds to prevent Tucker’s re-enrollment and provided survivor support; Kesterson and her sister retained scholarships though they did not play their senior year.
- Procedural posture: Kesterson sued under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (equal protection and First Amendment claims) against Kent State, Karen Linder (individual capacity), and Eric Oakley (official capacity). Defendants moved for summary judgment; Court grants summary judgment to Kent State and Oakley, grants in part and denies in part Linder’s motion, but grants Linder qualified immunity on remaining equal-protection claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title IX liability of Kent State (actual knowledge / deliberate indifference) | Kesterson argues Kent State had actual notice in 2014 because Linder (a coach, mandatory reporter) learned of the assault and then acted indifferently, causing continued harm. | Kent State argues Linder was not an “appropriate person” under Gebser (no authority to institute corrective measures for the university), so the university lacked actual notice until August 24, 2015; once it knew, it acted promptly and not deliberately indifferent. | Court: Linder was not an appropriate person for Title IX notice; actual knowledge occurred on Aug 24, 2015; Kent State’s post-notice response was not deliberately indifferent — summary judgment for Kent State. |
| Equal protection (deliberate indifference / class‑of‑one) against Linder individually | Kesterson contends Linder’s failure to report and subsequent adverse conduct toward her was deliberate indifference and disparate treatment compared to another teammate who was reported to university. | Linder contends she showed empathy, respected what she believed were Kesterson’s wishes, took some supportive steps, and any different treatment had rational bases (delay, refusal to press criminal charges, performance issues). | Court: material factual disputes about Linder’s motive and conduct preclude summary judgment on equal protection claims, but qualified immunity ultimately applies to bar damages for the equal‑protection claim (no clearly established individual‑official rule applying to these facts). |
| First Amendment — prior restraint and retaliation against Linder | Kesterson says Linder’s instruction not to tell anyone about the assault was an unconstitutional prior restraint and that Linder retaliated by reducing playing time and other adverse acts. | Linder argues the comment (if made) was not a governmental prior restraint (no licensing or prior approval regime) and the alleged adverse acts either were de minimis or motivated by legitimate reasons (performance). | Court: No prior restraint — insufficient to meet Supreme Court elements; retaliation claim fails because Kesterson cannot show causation for adverse actions (benching explained by performance) — summary judgment for Linder on First Amendment claims. |
| Official‑capacity § 1983 claims against Oakley (injunctive relief) | Kesterson seeks prospective injunctive/declaratory relief (e.g., acknowledgement/apology and alumni status reinstatement) against Oakley in his official capacity. | Oakley argues Eleventh Amendment bars money damages; requested relief is not a proper form of prospective injunctive relief (apology/acknowledgment not cognizable), and alleged ongoing injury (omitted from an email) is insubstantial or explained. | Court: Eleventh Amendment bars damages; requested remedies (apology/acknowledgment) are not prospective injunctive relief; no evidence of ongoing systemic harm — summary judgment for Oakley. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (private right of action where recipient has actual knowledge and is deliberately indifferent to student‑on‑student harassment that is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (funding recipient liable only where an appropriate official had actual notice and was deliberately indifferent)
- Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999) (rape constitutes severe, pervasive harassment under Davis)
- Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (elements and special scrutiny for prior restraints on speech)
- Thaddeus‑X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (elements for First Amendment retaliation claim)
- Ross v. University of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) (mandatory‑reporter status alone does not make person an "appropriate person" for Title IX notice)