Kentucky Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission v. Estill County Fiscal Court
2016 Ky. LEXIS 559
Ky.2016Background
- Mary Smith, a part-time 911 dispatcher for Estill County Fiscal Court, wrote her employer on July 19, 2010 requesting a ban on smoking in the dispatch room due to a smoke allergy and related surgery.
- After the letter, Smith was removed from the dispatcher schedule; she filed a discrimination complaint with the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission) alleging unlawful discharge for making a “complaint.”
- The Secretary of the Labor Cabinet issued citations under KRS 338.121(3)(b); a hearing officer and the Commission found Smith’s employee-to-employer letter constituted a protected “complaint” and ordered reinstatement and back pay.
- Franklin Circuit Court affirmed the Commission’s Final Order; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Commission exceeded its authority by defining “complaint” (a role the Court of Appeals said belongs only to the Board via regulation).
- The Supreme Court granted review to resolve deference to agency statutory interpretations and whether the Commission reasonably construed the undefined term “complaint” in KOSHA.
- After the Court’s decision, the Board amended 803 KAR 2:250(3) to explicitly define "complaint" to include employee-to-employer communications; the decision therefore governs claims preserved before that amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith’s letter to her employer is a protected “complaint” under KRS 338.121(3)(a) | Smith: her letter was an expression of workplace safety/health concern and thus a protected complaint | Fiscal Court: KOSHA and its regulations did not define "complaint;" Commission unlawfully made policy by expanding the term | Court: Commission permissibly and reasonably interpreted undefined statutory term via formal adjudication; Smith’s letter was a protected complaint |
| Whether the Commission exceeded authority by defining statutory terms (vs. sole authority of the Board) | Commission: adjudicative authority includes interpreting ambiguous statute language under Chevron/Mead | Fiscal Court: only the Board may make such interpretive rules; Commission crossed into rulemaking | Court: both Board (rulemaking) and Commission (adjudication) may interpret ambiguous statutory terms; Chevron deference can apply to adjudication |
| Proper standard of review for agency statutory interpretation | Smith: ambiguity permits deference to agency’s reasonable interpretation | Fiscal Court: Commission interpretation was arbitrary and should be set aside | Court: apply Chevron two-step; here statutory language ambiguous and Commission’s interpretation was reasonable and consistent with KOSHA purpose |
| Reliance on federal OSHA materials for interpretation | Smith: federal OSHA and decisions are persuasive because KOSHA patterned on federal law | Fiscal Court: Kentucky lacked a matching regulation, so federal regs/cases cannot fill the gap | Court: federal regulations and cases are persuasive guidance; Commission reasonably relied on them and Kentucky precedent (Terminix) |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference two-step)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (Chevron deference can follow agency adjudication)
- Metzinger v. Ky. Ret. Sys., 299 S.W.3d 541 (Ky. adoption of Chevron framework)
- Kentucky Labor Cabinet v. Graham, 43 S.W.3d 247 (KOSHA to be interpreted in accord with Fed. OSHA)
- Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 92 S.W.3d 743 (Ky. Ct. App. persuasive authority treating certain communications as complaints)
- Bd. of Educ. v. Hurley-Richards, 396 S.W.3d 879 (discussion of deference and precedent in Ky. administrative law)