KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN OF McALESTER v. SNELL
2014 OK 35
| Okla. | 2014Background
- Claimant Ben Snell alleged a work-related slip-and-fall on Jan. 9, 2012 while employed by Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester and was awarded temporary total disability and medical treatment by the Workers' Compensation Court; other issues were reserved.
- Employer appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), which affirmed the trial court but applied the "any competent evidence" standard of review based on COCA precedent (Westoak v. DeLeon) holding the statutory "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard unconstitutional as a separation-of-powers violation.
- The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 85 O.S. 2011 § 340(D)(4) (providing an appellate standard that an order was reviewable if it was "against the clear weight of the evidence") violated the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. IV, § 1 (separation of powers).
- The Supreme Court analyzed prior decisions (including Yocum and Fallin) that struck down statutes which inappropriately shifted adjudicative factfinding or burden-of-proof authority from the judiciary to the legislature.
- The Court concluded the statute did not invade the judiciary’s exclusive role of making adjudicative fact determinations and that the Legislature may prescribe an appellate standard of review for the workers’ compensation system created by statute.
- The Supreme Court vacated COCA’s opinion, overruled Westoak and Harvey to the extent they conflicted, denied claimant’s motion for frivolous-appeal attorney fees, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 85 O.S. 2011 §340(D)(4) ("against the clear weight of the evidence") violates the Oklahoma Constitution's separation of powers | Snell: statute improperly intrudes on judiciary's exclusive fact-finding power and is therefore unconstitutional | Employer: Legislature may set appellate standards for statutory tribunal; statute does not usurp trial court factfinding | The statute does not violate Art. IV, §1; Legislature may adopt that appellate standard for workers' comp appeals |
| Whether COCA erred in applying "any competent evidence" standard based on Westoak precedent | Snell: COCA correctly followed Westoak holding statute unconstitutional | Employer: Westoak is wrong; COCA should apply the statutory "clear weight" standard | COCA erred; Westoak and Harvey are overruled and COCA opinion vacated |
| Whether Yocum/Fallin principles prohibit any legislative change to evidentiary weight or burdens | Snell: prior cases limit legislature from elevating certain evidence or changing burdens | Employer: Those cases forbid legislatively elevating one form of evidence at trial but do not bar setting appellate review standards | Court distinguishes those precedents: statutes that shift trial-level burdens or give determinative effect to specific evidence are unconstitutional, but setting an appellate standard is permissible |
| Whether claimant is entitled to attorney fees for a frivolous appeal | Snell: motion for fees under 20 O.S. §15.1 | Employer: appeal not frivolous given conflicting COCA precedent | Motion denied by Supreme Court |
Key Cases Cited
- Yocum v. Greenbriar Nursing Home, 130 P.3d 213 (Okla. 2005) (legislative attempt to attribute elevated effect to IME reports unlawfully intruded on judicial factfinding)
- Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 684 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1984) (established traditional "any competent evidence" deference to Workers' Compensation Court fact findings)
- Westoak Indus., Inc. v. DeLeon, 299 P.3d 878 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (COCA decision holding §340(D)(4) unconstitutional under separation of powers — overruled)
- Oklahoma State Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Ass'n v. Fallin, 290 P.3d 1 (Okla. 2011) (statutes changing trial-level burdens for IME reports violated separation of powers)
- Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day School, 163 P.3d 557 (Okla. 2007) (statute giving determinative effect to certain medical opinions violated separation of powers)
- Williams Cos., Inc. v. Dunkelgod, 295 P.3d 1107 (Okla. 2012) (standard of review on appeal is determined by law in effect on date of injury; retroactivity limits)
- Zeier v. Zimmer, 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2006) (courts should interpret statutes to preserve constitutionality when reasonably possible)