KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN OF McALESTER v. SNELL
2014 OK 35
| Okla. | 2014Background
- Claimant Ben Snell alleged a work-related slip-and-fall on January 9, 2012 while employed by Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester and was awarded temporary total disability and medical treatment; other issues were reserved.
- Employer appealed; Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division IV, affirmed under its view that the proper appellate standard was "any competent evidence," relying on Westoak Industries v. DeLeon.
- Westoak had held 85 O.S. 2011 §340(D)(4) — which prescribed an "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard for WCC appeals — violated the Oklahoma Constitution's separation of powers, so COCA applied the older "any competent evidence" standard.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Legislature constitutionally may prescribe the "against the clear weight" standard in §340(D)(4).
- The Supreme Court held the statute does not violate Article IV, §1 (separation of powers), vacated COCA's opinion, overruled Westoak and Harvey as inconsistent, denied claimant's motion for frivolous-appeal attorney fees, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §340(D)(4)'s adoption of an "against the clear weight of the evidence" appellate standard violates the constitutional separation of powers | Snell: Legislature cannot prescribe an appellate standard that infringes judicial fact-finding authority; statute impermissibly intrudes on judiciary | Employer: Legislature may set rules governing the statutory workers' compensation scheme, including appellate standard of review | The Court held §340(D)(4) does not violate Art. IV, §1; Legislature may adopt the "against the clear weight" standard for WCC appeals |
| Whether the statute usurps trial-court factfinding or alters adjudicative facts | Snell: Statute elevates or constrains judicial fact-finding | Employer: Statute does not prevent trial court from determining adjudicative facts; it only prescribes appellate review | The Court: statute does not invade the judiciary's fact-finding prerogative; appellate courts remain free to apply the specified standard after facts are determined |
| Whether claimant is entitled to attorney fees for a frivolous appeal | Snell: sought fees under 20 O.S. §15.1 | Employer: appeal not frivolous given unsettled COCA precedent | The Court denied the motion for attorney fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Yocum v. Greenbriar Nursing Home, 130 P.3d 213 (Okla. 2005) (legislature may not inferentially assign elevated weight to one form of proof so as to usurp judicial fact-finding)
- Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 684 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1984) (traditional "any competent evidence" standard for appellate review of WCC factual findings)
- Oklahoma State Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Ass'n v. Fallin, 290 P.3d 1 (Okla. 2011) (statutory changes to trial-level burden of proof for IME reports violated separation of powers)
- Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day School, 163 P.3d 557 (Okla. 2007) (statute giving determinative effect to certain medical opinions invaded judicial factfinding)
- Puckett v. Cook, 586 P.2d 721 (Okla. 1978) (statute impermissibly transferring judicial discretion to parties violated separation of powers)
- Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod, 295 P.3d 1107 (Okla. 2012) (standard of appellate review in WCC appeals is determined by law in effect on date of injury)
- Zeier v. Zimmer, 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2006) (judiciary's role is to interpret statutes to preserve constitutionality when possible)