Kenneth Mark Dorrough v. John Murray Faircloth and Helen Bowen
443 S.W.3d 278
Tex. App.2014Background
- Dorrough, a commissioned deputy game warden, entered the Faircloths’ lakefront property to investigate a complaint about fishing access, questioned Helen Bowen and then John Faircloth, and left after a heated exchange.
- The Faircloths sued Dorrough for trespass to real property, threat of bodily injury, intrusion on seclusion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sought a temporary injunction.
- Dorrough moved for summary judgment based on immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s election of remedies; the trial court denied, and an interlocutory appeal followed.
- Dorrough later invoked common-law official immunity (citing Filarsky) after the trial court’s denial, and the appellate court analyzed subject-matter jurisdiction and the immunity defense.
- The appellate court ultimately held that official immunity extends to deputy game wardens, Dorrough proved immunity, the Faircloths failed to raise a genuine dispute, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction, reversing and dismissing the case with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal | Dorrough asserted jurisdiction under 51.014(a)(5) (immunity-based appeal). | Faircloths argued lack of timely notice and jurisdiction. | The court had jurisdiction; notice was timely and §51.014(a)(5) applicable. |
| Whether common-law official immunity extends to a deputy game warden | Dorrough (as deputy game warden) is protected by official immunity. | Faircloths contend immunity does not apply to Dorrough’s conduct. | Yes, official immunity extends to deputy game wardens. |
| Whether Dorrough acted within the scope of authority | Dorrough investigated a complaint and questioned occupants within his official role. | Faircloths argued misidentification and scope flaws. | Dorrough acted within the scope of authority. |
| Whether Dorrough performed a discretionary function in investigating the complaint | Investigating complaints is discretionary; Dorrough acted within discretion. | Investigation was mandatory or improper. | Yes, the investigation was discretionary. |
| Whether Dorrough acted in good faith to satisfy official-immunity requirements | Dorrough’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances. | Faircloths show no reasonable deputy would have acted as Dorrough did. | Dorrough demonstrated good faith; Faircloths failed to show no reasonable deputy would act similarly. |
Key Cases Cited
- Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (Supreme Court 2012) (expanded official-immunity protections for public- and law-enforcement-like duties)
- Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2004) (defined purposes and scope of official immunity; good-faith standard)
- Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. 2002) (standard for good faith and immunity elements)
- Chambers v. Starr, 883 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1993) (standard of good faith and discretionary function context)
- Green v. Alford, 274 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (extension of official immunity to public-entity-like roles (volunteer firefighter))
