Kenneth Lowe v. Walbro LLC, 972 F.3d 827

Kenneth Lowe, age 60, worked at Walbro for ~41 years and was Area Manager responsible for facility maintenance at the Cass City plant.
Tom Davidson was hired as General Manager in June 2016; he removed key subordinates from reporting to Lowe and allegedly made repeated age-based remarks (e.g., calling Lowe an “old man,” saying he was “losing a step”).
At Lowe’s June 28, 2018 termination meeting, Lowe alleges Davidson replied to his question about why he was fired: “you’re kind of getting up there in years, you’re at retirement age, you go one way and the company’s going the other.”
HR manager Debby Rard recommended eliminating Lowe’s position and compiled complaints of inappropriate conduct; Walbro says the decision to eliminate the role was a group decision based on reduced need and performance concerns.
Lowe sued under Michigan’s Elliott‑Larsen Civil Rights Act (age discrimination); the district court granted summary judgment for Walbro. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding genuine disputes of material fact.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether supervisor’s statements are direct evidence of age discrimination	Davidson’s on-the-record, at-termination remark (and repeated age remarks) directly show age was a motivating reason	Remarks are attenuated, uncorroborated, and decision was made by a group, not just Davidson	Statement at firing is direct evidence; viewing facts for plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find age was a motivating factor
Whether Walbro would have made the same decision absent age animus (mixed-motives)	Lowe: Davidson stripped responsibilities to create a pretext and then used diminished role to justify firing	Walbro: position was redundant given plant’s focus on blow-molding/robotics and Lowe’s limited role; legitimate business reasons independently support termination	Walbro failed as a matter of law to show it would have terminated Lowe regardless; mixed‑motives issue is for the jury
Applicable causation standard under ELCRA	Lowe proceeded under Hazle/Sniecinski (discriminatory animus must be a substantial/motivating factor)	Walbro referenced other authorities but did not press a stricter but-for causation standard	Court applied Hazle/Sniecinski standard and noted Lowe would survive under a but-for standard too; genuine dispute exists

DeBrow v. Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc., 620 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. 2001) (supervisor’s age‑based remark at firing can be direct evidence of age discrimination)
Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 666 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 2003) (direct vs. circumstantial proof under ELCRA; mixed‑motives framework discussion)
Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 628 N.W.2d 515 (Mich. 2001) (definition of direct evidence and motivating-factor standard cited under ELCRA)
Downey v. Charlevoix Cnty. Bd. of Rd. Comm’rs, 576 N.W.2d 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (once direct evidence exists, defendant must show it would have made same decision; jury issues when provocation/excuse disputed)
Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 1999) (definition of direct evidence adopted by Michigan courts)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (U.S. 1989) (plurality decision on mixed‑motives burden shifting)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial evidence claims)
Hecht v. Nat’l Heritage Academies, Inc., 886 N.W.2d 135 (Mich. 2016) (discusses but‑for causation tension under ELCRA)