Kenneth Jackson v. State of Tennessee, E2016-01218-CCA-R3-PC

Kenneth Jackson pled guilty on April 1, 2015 to two counts of selling <0.5 g cocaine (drug-free zone), one count possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count failure to appear; sentencing later produced an effective 10-year term with specified concurrency/ consecutivity and mandatory service percentages per statute.
The trial was set to begin April 1, 2015. On March 31, counsel told the court she had ceased trial preparations because Jackson had accepted a plea, but Jackson then said he wanted to go to trial; counsel said she might not be ready but later worked to prepare when Jackson changed his mind again and agreed to plead.
On April 1 Jackson entered blind pleas; the court conducted a plea colloquy in which Jackson acknowledged understanding rights and said he was satisfied with counsel’s representation.
At the subsequent sentencing hearing the plea-based negotiated sentences were announced and imposed on May 8, 2015.
Jackson filed a pro se post-conviction petition asserting his pleas were involuntary because counsel stated on March 31 she was not prepared for trial; an amended petition was litigated and an evidentiary hearing held April 29, 2016.
The post-conviction court credited trial counsel’s testimony (that she had prepared, would work overnight, that Jackson knowingly accepted the plea) and denied relief; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Jackson's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Were Jackson’s guilty pleas involuntary due to counsel’s statement she was unprepared?	Statement and events coerced or pressured Jackson into pleading; he would have gone to trial otherwise.	Jackson failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that counsel’s comment rendered the plea involuntary or that he would have insisted on trial.	Affirmed denial of post-conviction relief: plea voluntary; court credited counsel and found no prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice inquiry for guilty-plea cases: reasonable probability petitioner would have gone to trial)
Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282 (Tenn. 2009) (post-conviction burden: petitioner must prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence)
Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2001) (appellate review: factual findings by post-conviction court are binding unless preponderance of evidence shows otherwise)
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (prejudice concept in ineffective assistance analysis)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (failure to prove either Strickland prong suffices to deny relief)
State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1989) (application of Strickland under Tennessee Constitution)
Walton v. State, 966 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (guilty-plea ineffective assistance standard as applied in Tennessee)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (Counsel-related Sixth Amendment principles)