202 A.3d 573
N.H.2019Background
- Kenneth Hart was charged with multiple felonies (including aggravated felonious sexual assault) in 1998, dismissed several appointed attorneys, and sought to proceed pro se at trial.
- Trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation; Dr. Albert Drukteinis found Hart competent to stand trial but expressed concerns about his ability to effectively self-represent.
- After a thorough colloquy, the trial court found Hart knowingly and intelligently waived counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se; standby counsel was appointed.
- Hart was convicted after an eight-day jury trial and sentenced; he failed to perfect a direct appeal and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire later deemed his appeal waived.
- In 2017 Hart (now released from prison and involuntarily committed to a hospital) filed a pro se habeas petition alleging he was incompetent to waive counsel; the superior court denied relief and Hart appealed.
- The Supreme Court construed the petition as one for coram nobis (because Hart was no longer in custody for the sentence) and affirmed denial, holding no constitutional or state-law error in allowing him to self-represent or in the court’s waiver colloquy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Edwards requires a higher federal competency standard for self-representation | Hart: Edwards mandates a higher federal competency floor for defendants who wish to proceed pro se | State: Edwards permits, but does not require, states to impose counsel on severely mentally ill defendants; no mandatory higher federal standard exists | Court: Edwards is permissive; federal law does not compel a higher competency standard than Dusky/Due Process |
| Whether New Hampshire Constitution demands a heightened competency standard for self-representation | Hart: N.H. Const. pt I, art. 15 and state interests in dignity/autonomy require a higher standard than Dusky | State: Part I, Article 15 protects waiver but existing Dusky standard plus procedural safeguards suffice | Court: N.H. Constitution does not mandate a heightened standard; Dusky and waiver-colloquy framework adequate |
| Whether Hart’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary | Hart: His mental illness prevented understanding consequences; trial conduct shows misunderstanding of standby counsel’s role | State: Trial court conducted lengthy colloquy advising of risks; Hart acknowledged understanding; waiver was valid | Court: Record supports that Hart knowingly and intelligently waived counsel; waiver upheld |
| Availability of coram nobis and procedural-bar/mootness issues | Hart: Coram nobis is appropriate because he’s no longer in custody and collateral consequences persist; sound reasons for delay exist | State: Claims unpreserved and moot because sentence served; no adequate excuse for delay | Court: Coram nobis available here; claims not moot (collateral consequences exist) and Hart’s lack of counsel earlier is a sound reason for delay; addressed merits and denied relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (U.S. 2008) (States may require representation for defendants with severe mental illness even if competent to stand trial)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (criminal defendant has right to represent himself and to waive counsel)
- Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (U.S. 1960) (competency to stand trial standard requiring rational and factual understanding and ability to consult with counsel)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1993) (finding Dusky standard adequate for competency to waive counsel and to plead guilty)
- State v. Champagne, 127 N.H. 266 (N.H. 1985) (applying Dusky competency test in New Hampshire)
- State v. Santamaria, 169 N.H. 722 (N.H. 2017) (coram nobis available as extraordinary writ when no longer in custody; must show sound reasons for delay)
- State v. Widi, 170 N.H. 163 (N.H. 2017) (denial of coram nobis where petitioner failed to show sound reasons for not seeking earlier relief)
- United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing coram nobis as rare, extraordinary remedy)
- United States v. Manjarrez, 306 F.3d 1175 (1st Cir. 2002) (once defendant knowingly waives counsel, he cannot later complain the quality of his defense denied effective assistance of counsel)
- State v. Almodovar, 158 N.H. 548 (N.H. 2009) (sentence completion does not necessarily render collateral attack moot when collateral consequences persist)