Kendric Johnson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 602

Appellant Kendric Johnson was convicted by jury of bail jumping and failure to appear, with a 16-year prison sentence.
Johnson was released on an instanter bond after an aggravated robbery arrest and later failed to appear on December 8, 2010.
An order appointing counsel on November 5, 2010 and a December 8, 2010 court date were in evidence; Johnson had previously appeared while unrepresented.
The State relied on the instanter bond and the signed order appointing counsel to prove notice and Johnson’s intentional/knowingly failed to appear.
The defense argued there was no proof Johnson received notice of the December 8 date; the State argued the bond and appointment order satisfied notice.
The trial court charged the jury with definitions of intentional and knowing that included broad language about nature-of-conduct, and the State later argued instanter bond constituted prima facie proof of notice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to prove notice	Johnson lacked notice, so mens rea could not be shown.	Instanter bond and related documents establish notice.	Sufficiency upheld; rational jury could find intentional/knowingly failed to appear.
Charge error regarding intentional and knowing definitions	Overbroad nature-of-conduct language lowers the State’s burden.	Language improperly included but adequately limited by the application paragraph.	Harmless error; preserved for intent issue and ultimately harmless.
Charge error regarding knowing definition	Expanded language again misstates conduct type.	Any error was not preserved; at most harmless.	Harmless error; no reversal for knowing definition.
Improper jury argument regarding prima facie proof	State improperly argued instanter bond alone proved notice beyond reasonable doubt.	Arguments were outside the record; objection waived by failure to timely object.	Waived for appellate review; trial court did not err in this respect.

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (legal sufficiency standard for evidence)
Graham v. State, 643 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (nonresearch; evidentiary sufficiency framework)
Banks v. State, 158 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) (reliability of sufficiency review)
Euziere v. State, 648 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (instanter bond sufficiency to prove notice)
Solomon v. State, 999 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) (instanter bond prima facie notice principle)
Richardson v. State, 699 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985) (notice on instanter bond sufficient absent contrary evidence)
Burns v. State, 958 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997) (instanter bond proves notice absent countervailing evidence)
Walker v. State, 291 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009) (notice and post-release communications to defendant)
Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (review of 6.03 definitions in charge; harm analysis)
Herrera v. State, 915 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (harm analysis framework for charge errors)
Coleman v. State, 279 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (application paragraph and culpable mental states alignment)
Delgado v. State, 944 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (limitations on culpable mental state definitions)