Kendre Jones v. Vieanna Jones, 505 P.3d 224

Background

Kendre and Vieanna Jones mediated a property settlement during their 2018 divorce that awarded Vieanna $1,200/month “from the non-disability portion” of Kendre’s military retirement.
The signed order included an indemnity clause requiring Husband to "make payments... sufficient to neutralize" any reduction to Wife’s share caused by Husband’s "application for or award of disability compensation" or other actions affecting retired pay.
In 2019 Kendre began receiving 100% VA disability pay in lieu of retirement pay; thereafter the $1,200 payments to Vieanna stopped.
Vieanna moved to enforce the settlement; the court initially questioned enforceability under federal law and suggested Rule 60(b) relief, and Vieanna later moved under Rule 60(b).
In 2020 the superior court concluded the indemnity clause applied and was enforceable, ordered Kendre to pay $1,200/month going forward, and awarded arrears; Kendre appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Vieanna)	Defendant's Argument (Kendre)	Held
1) Interpretation of indemnity clause	Clause expressly covers an "award of disability compensation" and thus requires indemnity when Wife’s payments are reduced	Clause applies only if Husband "takes any action" to reduce payments; here the government independently awarded disability	Court: Clause unambiguous; an "award of disability compensation" triggers indemnity; Husband’s actions (medical exam) suffice as taking action
2) Federal law preemption (Mansell/Howell) — can state court enforce indemnity tied to disability pay?	Enforcement merely requires Husband to perform his contractual promise; Howell does not bar enforcing negotiated indemnity obligations or ordering resumed payments and arrearages	Howell/Mansell prohibit treating VA disability as divisible marital property and bar dollar-for-dollar replacement of retirement with disability	Court: Howell does not preclude enforcing a bargained indemnity term; state court may enforce the contract without dividing disability benefits
3) Law of the case — reopening prior denial of enforcement	Prior ruling was tentative/partial; later enforcement corrected an initial error and gave effect to the parties’ bargain	Earlier denial of enforcement should bind the court under law of the case	Court: Even if law-of-the-case applied, revisiting was warranted to avoid manifest injustice; enforcement appropriate
4) Unconscionability / capacity defense	Clause is a negotiated protection; no record showing Kendre lacked capacity or that clause was unreasonably one-sided	Kendre lacked capacity (head injury, disability) and did not appreciate clause; monthly payments now unaffordable	Court: No adequate record or timely challenge to undo agreement for incapacity; clause not unconscionable given mediation, opportunity for counsel, and its protective purpose
5) Laches / unpled legal theory	Vieanna delayed and filed elsewhere; Kendre relied on initial denial and stopped payments, so equitable defenses apply	Vieanna properly sought enforcement; superior court gave notice; Kendre failed to raise laches below	Court: Laches not raised below (waived); court did not decide on an unpled theory and parties had notice to litigate indemnity

Key Cases Cited

Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (U.S. 1989) (state courts may not divide VA disability benefits)
Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (U.S. 2017) (courts may not circumvent Mansell by ordering dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for disability benefits waived to obtain VA pay)
Gross v. Wilson, 424 P.3d 390 (Alaska 2018) (enforcement of a negotiated promise to pay notwithstanding Mansell/Howell where the obligation arises from settlement)
Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2015) (recognizing limits on awarding disability pay and that conversion to disability can present grounds for Rule 60(b) relief)
Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992) (disability benefits are not marital property and should not be treated as divisible upon divorce)