Ken McMaster v. United States
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19523
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- McMaster owns the Oro Grande mining claim in the Trinity Alps Wilderness; surface rights were reserved to the United States when BLM issued the mineral patent in 2009.
- McMaster filed an August 1992 patent application under the General Mining Law of 1872; BLM granted a patent for the mineral estate only, reserving the surface to the United States.
- McMaster sued under the Quiet Title Act, APA, and DJA seeking fee-simple title to the surface and improvements; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim.
- The district court held QTA exclusive for title disputes, and McMaster had no valid existing right to a fee-simple patent at the filing of the patent application; McMaster failed to plead the improvements’ title with particularity.
- The court analyzed whether the Solicitor’s M-36994 Opinion should govern the interpretation of “valid existing rights” under the Wilderness Act and whether deference applied to that interpretation.
- The Wilderness Act and subsequent regulatory history limit patent scope in wilderness areas, influencing whether surface title can be conveyed with mineral patents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McMaster had a valid existing right to fee-simple title to surface and improvements | McMaster argues valid existing rights preserve surface rights for pre-wilderness claims. | United States contends valid existing rights do not entail fee-simple surface title for pre-1984 claims. | McMaster lacked a valid existing right to a fee-simple patent; surface title reserved to the United States. |
| Whether the Solicitor’s Opinion of M-36994 is entitled to Chevron/Skidmore deference in interpreting §1133(d)(3) | McMaster relies on Solicitor’s Opinion to support surface rights. | Government argues Solicitor’s Opinion is not entitled to Chevron deference and is persuasive but not controlling. | Solicitor’s Opinion is entitled to Skidmore deference and persuasive weight; it supports limiting surface rights. |
| Whether McMaster adequately pleaded ownership of the structures under QTA with particularity | McMaster asserts ownership of cabin, workshop, and outhouse as improvements. | McMaster failed to plead when/how title to the improvements passed; title could have passed to the United States if abandoned. | McMaster failed to plead with particularity; QTA claim properly dismissed. |
| Whether the APA and DJA claims were proper given QTA exclusivity for title disputes | McMaster’s APA/DJA claims challenge the patent decision and surface title. | QTA provides exclusive remedy for adverse title claims; APA/DJA claims are improper. | APA and DJA claims were properly dismissed as duplicative of or precluded by the QTA. |
Key Cases Cited
- Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (U.S. 1983) (QTA is the exclusive remedy for title disputes against the government)
- Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (S. Ct. 2012) (APA may apply when QTA is not addressing the grievance)
- Independence Min. Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1997) (mining rights and surface rights; patenting authority retained by government)
- Swanson v. Babbitt, 3 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1993) (government has broad authority over public lands before patent issuance)
- Alaska Miners v. Andrus, 662 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1981) (valid existing rights in ANCSA context; vesting considerations)
- Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986) (legitimate expectations may be valid existing rights in some contexts)
- Seldovia Native Ass’n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (legitimate expectations under Alaska land statutes nuanced by context)
- East Central Eureka Mining Co. v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 204 U.S. 266 (U.S. 1907) (rights under existing laws concept in mining patent context)
- United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (U.S. 1985) (federal government holds title; mining rights and surface rights distinctions)
- Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532 (U.S. 1923) (discussion of existing rights vs. vested rights in patenting context)
