Kelly Wayne Lamon v. State
06-14-00241-CR
| Tex. Crim. App. | Mar 11, 2015Background
- Defendant Kelley Wayne Lamon was convicted by a jury of assaulting a public servant and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.
- After the jury was empaneled and sworn, a seated juror (Juror Yaross) stated he had a "bad problem with any man attacking a woman" and expressed uncertainty he could be fair, particularly about sentencing.
- The trial court, sua sponte, excused that juror during trial and the parties discussed proceeding with an eleven-person jury; defense counsel objected and later moved for a mistrial, which was denied.
- Appellant preserved the complaint about juror removal and contends the excusal was improper because the juror's stated bias amounted to prejudice, not a mental or physical disability under article 36.29.
- Appellant argues the removal was fundamental or, at minimum, harmful error because it resulted in trial by eleven jurors rather than twelve and no alternate was seated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a juror's statement that he has a strong problem with "any man attacking a woman" justified excusal under the statute permitting removal of a juror who is "disabled" (physically or mentally) so as to hinder performance of juror duties | State: juror's expressed inability to predict his reactions and possible unwillingness to consider minimum punishment showed he could not perform impartially, supporting excusal | Lamon: juror expressed bias/prejudice, which is challengeable for cause during voir dire, but does not amount to a mental impairment under art. 36.29; removal after empanelment was an abuse and produced harmful/fundamental error (11-person jury) | Trial court excused the juror; defense objection and mistrial motion were denied. Appellant argues on appeal that excusal was improper and harmful/fundamental error (appellate decision not included in brief) |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (disability under art. 36.29 requires impairment that hinders performance of juror duties)
- Landrum v. State, 788 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (bias does not equal disability under art. 36.29)
- Ex Parte Hernandez, 906 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (prejudice or bias is not a statutory "disability" warranting removal after empanelment)
- Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (discussing preservation and types of rights related to appellate review)
- Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (erroneous grant of challenge for cause in criminal trial is generally harmful error)
- Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (appellate court's role in assessing harm under Rule 44.2(b))
