Ransom v. State
920 S.W.2d 288
Tex. Crim. App.
1996
Check Treatment

Sandra PETERSON, Petitioner, v. Juan Villegas REYNA and Howard Shadrock, individually and d/b/a Shadrock Trucking Company, Respondents.

No. 95-1123

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 12, 1996

920 S.W.2d 288

rules do provide that a timely filed motion to modify judgment extends the trial court‘s plenary power, separate and apart from a motion for new trial.

The court of appeals held that the trial court‘s plenary power can be extended only once. Otherwise, a party could create indefinite delay through the carefully timed filing of subsequent motions to modify. However, an indefinite delay is not possible under the rules.

Only timely filed motions extend the trial court‘s plenary jurisdiction. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e), (g). A party must file a motion to modify judgment and motion for new trial within thirty days from the date the trial court signed the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(b), (g). The trial court‘s plenary jurisdiction cannot extend beyond 105 days after the trial court signs the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c) (seventy-five days) and TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e) (30 days); See also TEX. R. CIV. P. 5 (trial court may not enlarge the period for taking any action under the rules relating to new trials except as stated in the rules).

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court possessed plenary power to modify the judgment in this case. Under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 170, without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and renders judgment reinstating the trial court judgment, as modified.

Daniel J.T. Sciano, Ronald J. Salazar, San Antonio, for Petitioner.

W. Wendell Hall, Rene A. Forinash, Edward T. Hecker, Terrence J. Martin, San Antonio, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This is a personal injury action. Petitioner, Sandra Peterson, appeals from the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court‘s judgment in her favor. We grant writ of error and modify the court of appeals’ judgment to delete the assessment of costs against petitioner. Because the petitioner satisfied the requirements set out in TEX. R. APP. P. 40(a)(3) to prosecute the appeal as an indigent, all parties agree that the court of appeals erred in its assessment of costs against her. As to the remainder of the court of appeals’ judgment, for which there is no opinion of the court because each justice on the panel submitted a separate opinion, there is “no error which requires reversal, or which is of such importance to the jurisprudence of the State as to require correction.” TEX. R. APP. P. 133(a).