979 F.3d 1156
7th Cir.2020Background
- Off-duty City of Chicago communications operator Keli Calderone followed and confronted another motorist, was pushed to the ground, and shot the motorist with a lawfully carried handgun; the victim suffered serious injuries.
- Calderone was arrested and indicted for attempted murder; the City administratively charged her under personnel rules for discharging a firearm and related misconduct and then terminated her employment.
- At a subsequent Illinois bench trial Calderone asserted self-defense and was acquitted; the City later reinstated her and an arbitrator addressed back pay.
- Calderone sued the City and two supervisors in federal court, alleging termination in retaliation for exercising her Second Amendment right to armed self-defense, a procedural due process violation, and Monell liability for City policies.
- The district court dismissed all claims, concluding (1) individual supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity because the right to discharge a firearm in self-defense was not clearly established, (2) Calderone failed to plead Monell liability, and (3) her due-process claim failed because adequate post-deprivation remedies (grievance/arbitration) existed.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the sole grounds that the supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity and that Calderone failed to state a Monell or procedural-due-process claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Calderone was terminated in retaliation for exercising a Second Amendment right to discharge a firearm in self-defense | Calderone: Moore and Heller establish a Second Amendment right to armed self-defense that prohibits termination for using a gun in self-defense | City: Even if a Second Amendment possession right exists, there is no clearly established right to discharge a firearm in these circumstances; termination enforced valid personnel rules | Court: Did not decide the constitutional question; affirmed on qualified immunity grounds — right to discharge a firearm in these facts was not clearly established |
| Whether supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity for terminating Calderone | Calderone: Moore clearly established right to use a gun in self-defense, so supervisors should be liable | Defendants: No precedent clearly defines when discharge of a firearm is protected; this is a matter of first impression | Held: Qualified immunity applies because the scope of any Second Amendment protection for gun use was not clearly established |
| Whether the City is liable under Monell for applying personnel rules to terminate Calderone | Calderone: City policies/subsections were applied to punish exercise of Second Amendment rights; City acted with deliberate indifference | City: Personnel rules are facially constitutional and Calderone points to only a single adverse application, not a pattern | Held: Monell claim dismissed — Calderone failed to show an unconstitutional policy or a series of similar violations to establish municipal liability |
| Whether Calderone's termination violated procedural due process | Calderone: Process was infected by bias and was inadequate; arbitration/grievance scheme excluded direct employee access | City: Calderone had meaningful post-deprivation remedies (union grievance/arbitration) that restored her employment; union represented her | Held: Due-process claim dismissed — available grievance/arbitration procedures are adequate post-deprivation remedies and Calderone offers no evidence they were meaningless or that the union breached its duty |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess and carry weapons for confrontation)
- Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (invalidating near-total ban on public handgun possession for self-defense)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity framework protects officials from suit unless rights were clearly established)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may decide qualified immunity by addressing either prong first)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (a clearly established right must be defined with sufficient particularity that reasonable officials would know they violate it)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires an unconstitutional policy, deliberate indifference, and causation)
- Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (Monell culpability and causation standards)
- City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (single incident insufficient for Monell liability absent an unconstitutional policy)
