Keith Stansell v. Samark Jose Lopez Bello, 40 F.4th 1308

In 2010 four plaintiffs sued the FARC under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) for crimes in Colombia; they obtained a default judgment in the Middle District of Florida.
The district court awarded $106 million in compensatory damages, which the court trebled under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to a total of $318 million; the clerk’s final judgment described the full $318 million as “compensatory damages.”
Plaintiffs later pursued garnishment of third‑party assets (Samark López and related LLCs), alleging those parties were FARC instrumentalities under TRIA § 201(a).
López moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) to correct the judgment, arguing the clerk clerically mischaracterized the trebled portion as compensatory and that execution under TRIA § 201(a) therefore should be limited to the $106 million of actual compensatory damages.
The district court denied relief, concluding the court intended the trebled amount to be compensatory and that the requested change would alter substantial rights rather than fix a clerical error.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Rule 60(a) did not authorize the requested substantive alteration and deferring to the district court’s reasonable interpretation of its prior orders.

Issue	López's Argument	Plaintiffs' Argument	Held
Whether Rule 60(a) allows correcting the judgment to remove the label "compensatory" from trebled damages	The clerk mischaracterized the trebling as compensatory; the label is a clerical error fixable under Rule 60(a)	The court intended the trebling to be compensatory; the label reflects substantive intent	Denied: Rule 60(a) cannot be used to make a material substantive change affecting substantial rights; correction not clerical
Whether treble damages under the ATA are compensatory or punitive for TRIA attachment limits	Characterize trebled amounts as non‑compensatory so execution limited to $106M	Characterize trebled amounts as compensatory and subject to attachment	Court declined to decide the statutory characterization; held classification issue irrelevant to Rule 60(a) analysis
Whether the district court’s subsequent orders showing the judgment as "solely compensatory" control the characterization	The clerk’s label was wrong despite later filings	The district court’s subsequent writs and orders show intent that the full judgment be compensatory	Court afforded deference to the district court’s reasonable interpretation and found no abuse of discretion

Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 771 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2014) (interpreting TRIA §201(a) limits on execution)
Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., 647 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for whether Rule 60(a) authorizes a correction)
Alea London Ltd. v. Am. Home Servs., Inc., 638 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2011) (treble damages can be compensatory or punitive depending on context)
Mullins v. Nickel Plate Mining Co., 691 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1982) (errors affecting substantial rights are beyond Rule 60(a))
Cave v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1996) (deference to a district court’s interpretation of its own prior orders when reasonable)
Estate of West v. Smith, 9 F.4th 1361 (11th Cir. 2021) (Rule 60(a) does not permit correction of an error of law)
Warner v. City of Bay St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1976) (same)