964 F.3d 990
11th Cir.2020Background
- John Trichell (Alabama) and Keith Cooper (Georgia) received debt-collection letters from Midland entities offering large discounts and repayment plans for long-delinquent, time-barred credit-card debts. Each letter contained a disclaimer stating Midland would not sue or report the debt due to its age.
- Both plaintiffs sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging the letters were false, deceptive, or unfair; district courts dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim and did not address Article III standing.
- The Eleventh Circuit raised Article III standing sua sponte, directed briefing/argument on standing, and considered whether receipt of misleading-but-not-misleading-to-these-plaintiffs letters can supply injury in fact.
- The majority (Katsas, J.) held neither plaintiff alleged a concrete, particularized injury: no reliance, no payments, no out-of-pocket loss, and any risk had dissipated by the time of suit; informational injury theories likewise failed.
- The court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing.
- Judge Martin concurred in part/dissented in part: he agreed Trichell lacked particularized injury but would find Cooper alleged a concrete, particularized risk of harm (payment that could restart a limitations period) and thus had standing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing — injury in fact for FDCPA claims | Trichell/Cooper: receipt of misleading/unfair collection letters is a concrete injury (risk of being misled, informational injury). | Midland: plaintiffs suffered no concrete, particularized injury — no reliance, no payment, no damages; any risk dissipated. | Held: No Article III injury; plaintiffs lack standing. |
| Risk-of-harm standing (statutory violation creates increased risk) | Plaintiffs: letters created a real risk unsophisticated consumers (including them) would pay time-barred debt. | Midland: plaintiffs do not plausibly allege they personally faced a substantial/material risk; risk, if any, had dissipated before suit. | Held: Risk-to-others insufficient; no particularized risk to plaintiffs and any risk had dissipated. |
| Informational-injury theory (denial/receipt of truthful info) | Plaintiffs: FDCPA confers right to truthful communications; receiving misleading info is an informational injury. | Midland: FDCPA does not create a public-disclosure regime like Akins/Public Citizen; plaintiffs identify no downstream harms from the information. | Held: Informational-injury theory fails absent concrete downstream consequences. |
| Role of history and Congress (Spokeo test) | Plaintiffs: FDCPA protects concrete interests similar to historical torts (misrepresentation/abuse of process); Congress intended to remedy these harms. | Midland: Common-law analogues (fraud/negligent misrepresentation) required reliance and actual damages; Congress’s findings do not automatically create Article III injury. | Held: Historical/common-law analogues do not support standing here; Congress’s judgment does not override Article III concreteness requirement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (Article III concreteness test: history and Congress inform whether statutory harms are concrete)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (three elements of standing; burden to plead injury)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1998) (jurisdictional threshold—standing before merits)
- Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615 (U.S. 2020) (standing requires increased risk to plaintiff personally)
- Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2013) (imminence and substantial-risk standards for injury)
- Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (U.S. 1989) (informational-injury standing where statute compels public disclosure and plaintiff suffers concrete informational harm)
- Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1998) (denial of statutorily required information can be a concrete injury when plaintiff alleges concrete downstream informational harms)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (U.S. 1982) (tester standing under Fair Housing Act for false statements to tester)
- Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017) (statutory privacy claim analogous to intrusion upon seclusion satisfies concreteness)
- Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., 868 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2017) (FCRA inaccuracy claim analogous to defamation suffices for concreteness)
- Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2019) (unwanted calls under TCPA can be concrete harms)
- Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 839 F.3d 998 (11th Cir. 2016) (no standing where risk dissipated before suit)
- Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc., 926 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) (FDCPA procedural violation that posed no risk to plaintiff lacked Article III injury)
- Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2018) (FDCPA violation creating a material risk to congressionally protected interests can give standing)
- Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., 897 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2018) (FDCPA misleading-communication violation can confer standing based on risk to plaintiff)