969 F.3d 397
D.C. Cir.2020Background
- Congress, responding to large IDEA fee awards against D.C., enacted repeated appropriations riders capping the District’s payment of attorneys’ fees per IDEA proceeding, culminating in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act which bars use of appropriated funds to pay more than $4,000 per proceeding for IDEA attorney fees (applying to proceedings initiated before enactment).
- Hundreds of parents obtained fee awards in IDEA proceedings initiated before 2009; many awards exceeded $4,000 and remained unpaid by the District.
- Plaintiffs sought to compel the District to pay the unpaid balances with interest; the magistrate calculated amounts due under the cap and separately computed interest on full awards but recommended payment only of below-cap amounts without interest.
- The district court ordered the District to pay outstanding fees up to the $4,000 cap and also ordered interest on the entire amount of all unpaid awards (including amounts Congress barred the District from paying).
- On appeal the District contended it cannot be compelled to pay interest on fee amounts that Congress has prohibited it from paying; plaintiffs cross-appealed arguing the 2009 cap does not apply to many awards and raised separation-of-powers and takings challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.C. must pay interest on fee amounts that exceed the $4,000 cap | Interest statute (28 U.S.C. §1961) requires interest on any district-court money judgment, so interest is due on full awards | 2009 appropriations rider forbids payment of amounts above $4,000, so D.C. cannot be compelled to pay interest on amounts it is legally barred from paying | Held for D.C.: background common-law rule precludes interest where principal payment is prohibited; D.C. need not pay interest on above-cap amounts |
| Whether the 2009 Act applies to proceedings initiated before enactment (retroactivity) | Presumption against retroactivity should bar applying the cap to many awards | Text of the 2009 Act expressly covers proceedings initiated prior to enactment | Held for D.C.: statute speaks clearly to temporal scope and applies to those proceedings |
| Whether the fee cap violates separation of powers (Plaut) by reopening final judgments or binding future Congresses | Cap unlawfully commands courts to reopen or nullify final judgments; it improperly binds future Congresses | Rider limits use of appropriated funds but does not nullify judgments or prevent future Congresses from changing law | Held for D.C.: no Plaut violation; the rider limits payment but does not reverse judgments or bind future Congresses from legislating |
| Whether the cap effects a Fifth Amendment taking | Bar on payment takes private property without just compensation | No per se taking; no appropriation or physical invasion; economic impact limited and awards entered when caps already in place | Held for D.C.: no taking under either per se or Penn Central regulatory-taking frameworks |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoare v. Allen, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 102 (1789) (early rule: where law prevents payment of principal, interest during prohibition is not owed)
- Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177 (1872) (reaffirming that interest is not demandable when payment of principal is interdicted)
- Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron Co., 110 U.S. 174 (1884) (describing interest as damages for delay in payment)
- Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (interest is included in "any money judgment")
- Whatley v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (construing prior appropriations riders as applying to current and future appropriations)
- Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing D.C.’s longstanding IDEA compliance problems and rider effects)
- Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (limits on Congress’s ability to retroactively reopen final judgments)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (regulatory takings multi-factor test)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (distinguishing per se takings from regulatory takings)
- Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (courts may apply background common-law principles unless statute speaks directly to contrary effect)