Calloway v. District of Columbia

CALLOWAY, al., et Brandon

Appellants/Cross-

Appellees COLUMBIA, al., et OF

DISTRICT

Appellees/Cross-Appellants

Nos. 99-5216 Appeals,

United States Court of

District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov.

Decided June argued L. Leifer cause

Steven With him appellants/cross-appellees. Henry, Lois McKenna briefs were Frank, Levy, Beth Good- B. Paul Joshua Kohn,and man, Margaret Bogin, Mathew Dalton. Paul Schwab, Corpora- E. Assistant Edward Counsel, Corporation Office of Counsel, appel- the cause for argued Columbia, lees/cross-appellants District were Robert al. him on the brief et With Counsel, Corporation Rigsby, R. Interim Reischel, Corpora- Deputy L. and Charles Murasky, M. Assis- tion Counsel. Donna Counsel, ap- Corporation entered an tant pearance. Mollin, Attorney, Depart- U.S.

Alfred Justice, ap- argued the cause for ment of pellee/cross-appellant United States him on the brief were America. With Ogden, Acting David Assistant Attor- W. General, Jay Singer, Attor- ney Michael Lewis, Attorney. A. ney, and Wilma GINSBURG, TATEL and Before: GARLAND, Judges. Circuit filed Opinion for Court Circuit Judge TATEL. filed

Separate dissenting part opinion Judge GINSBURG. by Circuit TATEL, Judge: Circuit Ap- A rider to the District of Columbia imposes Act limits on propriations may pay under the Individuals Act, as Education with Disabilities known represent prevail- who attorneys against the D.C. parties actions In this suit disabled Public Schools. parents, the district and their students challenges cap, to the fee gard to the in controversy. amount -it finding preempted 1415(f)(2). neither nor IDEA U.S.C. contrary to the Due Process Clause of the 1415(i)(3)(B) Section of IDEA gives Fifth Amendment. The district court also courts authority to “award reasonable at

held that the rider restricts the Dis- torneys’ part fees as of the costs to the trict’s authority pay attorneys’ fees, to parents of a child with a disability who is to award pursuant to the prevailing party.” Prevailing parents error, Finding IDEA. no we affirm in all may also recover fees incurred during ad respects. ministrative proceedings. See Moore v. Columbia, District 907 F.2d 165 of I (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc). The amount of The Individuals with Disabilities Edu- fees awarded “shall be based on pre rates Act cation seeks to “ensure that all chil- vailing the community in which the ac dren with have disabilities available tion or proceeding arose for the kind and a appropriate public them free education quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. that emphasizes special education and re- 1415(f)(3)(C). § services designed lated to meet of District Columbia Public Schools unique needs and prepare them for em- (DCPS) has failed to meet its obligations ployment independent living.” 20 under a fact no disputes. one 1400(d)(1)(A). § U.S.C. As a condition of brief, its the United States describes receiving Act, funds under the re- IDEA DCPS’s way: situation this quires school to adopt procedures districts appropriate ensure educational place- By of Columbia School ment disabled students. See 20 System’s ... U.S.C. failure to fulfill its obli- § In addition, school gations districts must under IDEA pro- reached crisis develop comprehensive plans portions. for meeting The District had virtually special educational needs of disabled ceased to conduct timely hearings re- 1414(d)(2)(A). students. See 20 quested by parents U.S.C. IDEA under and to Known as “individualized pro- education issue final decisions the required within grams,” IEPs, plans these must include timelines. Other of obligations “a present statement of the child’s IDEA levels of were also not being met to a performance, educational ... a significant statement extent. of measurable goals, annual a [and] state- See also Blackman v. Colum- District special

ment of the education and related bia, (D.D.C.1999) 185 F.R.D. (finding services provided to the noncompliance DCPS’s with IDEA 1414(d)(1)(A). child....” 20NS.C. has in “significant delays resulted both in guarantees

IDEA parents of placement disabled of children in appropriate children an opportunity to participate in settings educational and in provision identification, evaluation, and place- services, crucial medical delays that have process. 1414(f), ment §§ See 20 potential U.S.C. harm permanently 1415(b)(1). object Parents who to their physical and emotional many health of “identification, evaluation, child’s children.”). or edu- young a public At June 1997 placement” cational are entitled to an “im- hearing, DCPS identified several factors partial process due hearing,” responsible U.S.C. noncompliance, for its includ- 1415(b)(6), (f)(1), §§ at which they ing have “inadequate management[,].... poor “right accompanied to be advised management systems, information lack of 1415(h)(1). counsel.” 20 U.S.C. Parents staff training, inappropriate staff allocation “aggrieved by” a hearing officer’s findings and lack appropriate programs.” No- and decision bring a civil action tice Written Findings and Decision and either state or federal court without re- Compliance Agreement, Fed.Reg. 105-670, at 50 Rep. H.R. later, Secretary fees.” A'year 41370, 41373. adopted that, “working The after Committee stated of Education that, years to in order to allow DCPS a number of rider over with DCPS teaching failure to and learn- ongoing clearly more its serious “focus address [IDEA],”' expensive requirements litigation than on comply with the rather compliance fees,”-limited pay- that immediate the District’s fee he determined legal Id. at 41371. Eventually “not feasible.” Id. be- was under IDEA. ments entered" into Com-' and DCPS Secretary Appro- of the 1999 D.C. coming section 130 mandating DCPS pliance Agreement Act, imposed caps on the rider priations require- compliance with in full “be total amount of hourly rate and both the than three no later in] of [IDEA ments law- pay could compensation the District Id. at years.” in IDEA ac- parents prevail who yers of of special edu- Section 130 proceedings. the and See failure to meet tions DCPS’s Emergency students has of its disabled the Consolidated cation needs Omnibus large number of exceedingly Act of Supplemental Appropriations in an resulted (October shows The record complaints. parental 112 Stat. 2681 Pub.L. 130). served less although 1998) DCPS (hereinafter, Spe- that in section percent one of of than two-thousandths that 1999 provided cifically, section students, forty-five over disabled nation’s pay attorneys’ funds could not be used process hear- for due percent requests the amount at which fees in excess of in made D.C. nationwide were ings attorneys compensation of D.C.Code fixes defendants represent indigent who award of Because IDEA authorizes per misdemeanors: hour charged with $50 fees, complaints have parental n ’ 130; $1,300 overall. See section year fiscal for In costly been DCPS. ll-2604(a); Ann. D.C.Code D.C.Code paid over example, the school district 2604(b)(1). allowed the Section 130 year, That same attorneys. million to 11— $10 not the maxi- payment, maximum total but legal reported Washington Post rate, for “ex- hourly mum to be waived stu- special education representation of complex representation.” or See niche,” tended dents, had devel- “an obscure once ll~2604(c). 130; Ann.§ section D.C.Code industry.” lucrative “booming, into a oped Strauss, fol- entirety, section-130-reads as Special and Valerie Doug Struck Business; Attor- lows: Big Ed Students’ Law Is Receiving Millions in neys Collectively contained this Act None of the funds 20,1998,

Fees, at B7. July Post, The Wash. may pay made available to the fees be cases as special education Describing represents party a who attorney who win,” that “when “easy the Post stated [to] action, an ad- prevails including in an crying for mon- city’s system school brought against proceeding, ministrative adequate special try ey to build of Columbia Public Schools the District thereby begin to system education —and with under the Individuals Disabilities challenges legal lessen the flood of —these (20 seq.) § 1400 et Education Act U.S.C. who attorney officials fees rankle school if— spent on chil- say the be money should (1) compensation of hourly rate of dren.” Id. [$50]; or attorney exceeds expressed Responding to the concerns compen- article, maximum amount of the Post the House Committee attorney exceeds considering the Dis- sation Appropriations, while [$1,300],except compensation year trict’s fiscal re- max- in excess of such legal reimbursement quest, growth acted to stem “the for extended approved imum expenses usurping of re- in accor- complex representation pay attorney sources from education to ll-2604(e), dance section District District of Columbia for unfavorable treat- ment, of Columbia Code. Due section violates Process .the Clause of the Fifth Finally, Amendment. rider in Congress included similar sought the families a declaratory ruling year District’s fiscal that section 130 does not affect district impact Fearful of the rider’s on dis- bill. court’s to award reasonable at- children, abled President Clinton vetoed torneys’ fees under IDEA. Pursuant to 28 run,” long the bill. “In the President’s 2403(a), U.S.C. the United States inter- explained, provision message veto “this vened to defend section 130’s-constitution- likely would limit the access the Dis- Columbia, ality. District of which poor quality legal repre- families trict’s joined the United States’ defense of the sentation, process impairing thus due statute, argued that section amended protections by ... IDEA.” provided barring thus courts D.C. from Act, Columbia awarding in excess amount Message 2000—Veto The President District is authorized to pay. (H. 106-135), The United Doc. States No. H8941, 145 Cong. (Sept. Rec. H8942 Rejecting plaintiffs’ challenges 1999). Persisting, Congress included the 130, the court granted district summary (with fee minor cap revisions relevant judgment in favor of the District. The FY litigation) to this a reenacted 2000 court also interpre- District’s appropriations bill. This time the Presi- 130, tation of ruling section that the rider 129, signed. dent See Section District of nothing had to “done affect the district 2000, Columbia Pub.L. Appropriations, No. court’s ability under to base [IDEA] (November 113 1517 Stat. determination of reasonable 29,1999). prevailing community.” [on] rates FY Before enactment of the .the appeal, The families now and the Dis- bill, seven disabled children cross-appeals. trict of Although Columbia parents against and their filed suit the United States defends section 130’s District the United District States it constitutionality, position takes on no Court for the District of chal Columbia proper interpretation of the section. Our lenging Appro 130 of section the FY 1999 of all de review issues is novo. See Tao v. priations allege Act. The families Freeh, (D.C.Cir.1994) 27 F.3d cap prevents retaining qual fee them from (“Our of the of grant summary review legal contingency ified counsel on a basis. novo, judgment applying is de the same plaintiff One unable to counsel find de court.”); standards as the district United spoke clared: “I with ... of the one attor Williams-Davis, States v. 90 F.3d neys specializes who in education law ... (D.C.Cir.1996) (applying de novo review to that, who informed me due the passage to construction). question statutory of Section of D.C. Act, longer her firm no to accept was able II. special on a contingency education cases that basis. She indicated she was not Beginning appeal, with the families’ any private attorney aware of other in the dispose can easily Supremacy we of their ” District of Columbia who would.... Clause IDEA is na argument. Because challenges argue, The mounted two tional legislation, families families it Relying Supremacy Supremacy 130. preempts section Clause Constitution, legislation impedes VI of state or that Clause Article local they argued section they accomplishment, that section such as 130—which preempted support, referred to as a “local the families cite Brown law”—is States, They IDEA. also argued sin- United (en (D.C.Cir.1984) banc), residing out children in the where we stated gling disabled This court has twice considered legisla- enacts frequently “Congress only comprise District and.... a sus to the claims D.C. residents applicable contrary congressional case, States v. pect evidence class. first United [a]bsent intent, should be treated (D.C.Cir.1971), such enactments 452 F.2d 1333 Thompson, federal law as interacting with as local application a district concerned court’s states.” the laws the several would provisions deny appellant bail bail D.C. ap- Supremacy Clause assuming Even conviction for appeal following his pending it for the legislates when plies to Appellant federal narcotics laws. violating I, 8 of the under Article section provisions ap argued that the D.C. bail we for which proposition Constitution—a (ones local contained plied offenses persuasive support—the found no have D.C.Code) he in the and that because had from a fatal argument suffers families’ (one offense been convicted a national believe that requires it us to weakness: U.S.Code), appli in the his bail contained pur- for the enacted section 130 judged by cation should have been preempt- having instantaneously pose of applicable criteria to national more lenient a decade by a statute enacted over ed jurisdictions. id. offenses other See Cipollone Liggett, earlier. See stating This agreed, 1337-38. 504, 516, 120 L.Ed.2d provisions application of D.C. bail (1992) (“[T]he purpose offenses would violate Due U.S.Code pre-emption analy ultimate touchstone of by treating Process Clause U.S. code viola omitted). (internal sis.”) quotation marks differently tions in D.C. from such viola protection equal turn to the We families’ jurisdictions. id. tions in all other challenge. They argue opinion language 1340-41. contains ability obtain counsel limiting supports position: the families’ to enforce leaving “powerless them protect can them- usually Minorities rights,” IDEA them different treats politi- by playing their role selves non-D.C. families with disabled ly from process forming cal coalitions with children, equal protec in violation of the groups majority. other a But secure of Fifth Amendment’s guarantee tion it is senseless remit District residents Bolling v. Due Process Clause. See political process, to the since for them Sharpe, 347 U.S. 74 S.Ct. political no In process.... there is this equal protec (applying L.Ed. 884 context, arguments ... the normal for of principles to the District Columbia judicial restraint no more become than through the Due Process Clause grotesquely hollow shibboleths detached Amendment). claim, this Fifth To assess supported the logic which once appropriate determine we must first Therefore, discriminatory them.... will scrutiny. level of Most laws survive affecting (cid:127)classifications resi- protection they if equal challenge bear a subjected dents must strictest relationship legitimate gov a rational review. possible Quill, purpose. v. ernmental See Vacco 793, 799, 521 U.S. 117 S.Ct. (internal omitted). Id. at 1341 citation searching L.Ed.2d More scru suspect court next This considered tiny is for that either bur reserved laws class status of residents in United D.C. suspect impinge den a a class Cohen, (D.C.Cir. v. F.2d 128 States fundamental interest. See id. The families (en banc). 1984) banc, en Sitting urge apply heightened scrutiny us to for departed reasoning Thompson from the them two reasons: residents of D.C. are uphold class, applied rational basis review to suspect selves a and section 130 requiring burdens the a statute civil commitment for opportunities educational a i.e., disadvantaged group; guilty children with defendants found not reason D.C. insanity. why Explaining disabilities. See id. class, suspect a residents statute did not burden D.C. was not critical to its group holding already first noted that the affected court had recognized Cohen —the residents, just persons consisted not of District but tried within the District need reside “principally analysis of those who commit crimes not there —its evolved from District, a class within considerable debate within the which within the court. A many portion ... opinion responds residents of other states the court’s to a ” likely concurring opinion’s are to be included.... Id. at 135. effort a devise Then, language govern- relied on framework which differential treatment case, would, following: ment this Cohen said the of D.C. residents in certain circum- raise, stances, special equal protection con- accepts if one [E]ven thesis cerns. See id. at 132 n. n. in question class is residents of the Dis- (Mikva, J., responding to id. at 141-50 Columbia, trict of the mere lack of the reasons, concurring). For all of these political power- ballot does not establish panel of this court depart now lessness, or, does, if political power- from the en banc court’s conclusion that enough “suspect lessness alone is not for comprise D.C. residents do not a suspect Minors, example, class” status. are equal protection class for purposes. is, event, suspect not a class. It “politically power- fanciful to consider as In support-' of their second argu city less” a whose residents include a heightened scrutiny ment-for —that high proportion of the officers of all opportunities 130 burdens the educational govern- three branches of the federal a disadvantaged group families — the ment, and their staffs. Doe, 202, 223-24, rely Plyler (internal omitted). Id. citation (1982), 72 L.Ed.2d 786 families, According applied to the language heightened scrutiny . this which to inval interpreted denying public is dicta because the court idate a Texas statute edu .classifying civil commitment statute as not cation to legally children not admitted to cases, on the basis of residence. The families In subsequent the United States. however, urge Thompson Supreme us to follow apply Plyl Court' limited heightened scrutiny to section 130. We er to its facts. Kadrmas Dickinson Schools, are not so free. Whatever force Public Thomp- Court claim reasoning charging son’s about the status of D.C. that some students a fee for carried, once it has not transportation triggered height residents survived to school n with,. begin by pointing scrutiny Plyler, saying Cohen. To out ened under “we . [PlylePs] that the civil commitment statute at issue have not holding extended be applies anyone yond unique pro in to tried in the Cohen circumstances that District, residents, just unique of theories and to District Co- voked its confluence 459, 450, implicitly Thompson, hen undermined for 487 108 rationales.” U.S. S.Ct. (1988) (internal 2481, notwithstanding apparent Thompson’s L.Ed.2d 399 cita omitted). suspect are a marks holding quotation D.C. residents tions class, provisions apply “unique the D.C. bail to circumstances” are not also Those District, persons regard- present tried within the Plyler, here. doors Moreover, residency. public completely less of Cohen ex- schools were closed to pressly repudiates Thompson’s equal pro- children of undocumented aliens. See at.205, ... reasoning. disapprove Plyler, tection “We 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct. 2382. expressed ... [Thompson] Although the rationale section 130 make less legislative likely treatment of the children will receive an distinctive disabled ‘particularly suspect’ District is and thus education that conforms to requires sup- open, more than a rational basis to doors to the schoolhouse remain as port Although Supreme did And the they it.” Id. 136 n. Co- .in Kadrmas. that a statute bur- suspect hen’s discussion of the class status Court has made clear then, section government, to the According opportunities of educational dening purpose legitimate governmental by that 130’s does not children disadvantaged allo- in D.C. scrutiny. children disabled heightened to assist trigger alone fact special primary Dist. funds to additional Independent cating School Antonio See San 1278, ration- statute is 1, The 93 S.Ct. services. 411 U.S. education Rodriguez, left to (1973) objective, we are (applying basis to that ally rational related L.Ed.2d 16 to attor- property infer, limiting payments use of Texas’s uphold because review to for even available school districts more funds neys local will leave to finance taxes system resulted funding services. though direct poor for opportunities fewer educational reasons to raise several families districts than students for students yield the bene- section 130 will doubt bases). tax richer As the government. fits claimed equal families’ review the thusWe out, DCPS nothing requires point families ba rational challenge protection special savings section 130 to reallocate is a ask whether “there standard. sis We services, the record nor does education disparity relationship between rational have so real- that such funds been indicate govern legitimate some of treatment claim, Rather, families located. Doe, Heller purpose.” mental simply has budget annual been District’s 2637, L.Ed.2d of fees saved. by the amount reduced review, ... “On rational-basis Moreover, limits section 130 bearing strong to us statute comes sources paid when other fees even attack validity, and those presumption the statute budget; while than DCPS’s classifi rationality legislative proceed- caps both administrative fees for every negative burden cation have the for the payments ings litigation, support it.” might which basis conceivable Corporation Coun- from the latter come Inc., Communications, FCC v. Beach fund. Fi- Judgment sel’s Settlement L.Ed.2d ask, if section 130 nally, the families even (internal quotation citations and available actually made more funds omitted). marks education, any improvements special would article, Washington expenditures Post from such Pointing might flow to “evidence of brief refers 130’sharmful effects? outweigh the District’s legal in the services by attorneys abuse about section Whatever doubts

process,” presumably implying -though— equal protec “rational-basis review stating directly never so —that'section for courts to analysis is not a license unjusti- curb excessive or designed was fairness, wisdom, logic lawyers judge the The families and their fied fees. n Heller, 509 U.S. at choices.” argu- legislative charges, and oral resist such (internal quotation conceded the District ment counsel for omitted). pre attorney Constitution marks “The city no evidence has moreover, that, District, reason to infer absent some sumes misconduct. brief, improvident decisions will antipathy, even which “adopts” the States’ United by the democratic eventually from rectified 130 stemmed that section argues not is abuse, judicial intervention process and that but attorney evidence unwarranted no matter how un generally meet manifest to inability view DCPS’s IDEA, political think a branch has we wisely obligations under its Communications, 508 Beach U.S. that “it acted.” have concluded rationally could Moreover, “courts the District to at S.Ct. important for was more under review sys- compelled are rational-basis remedying spend these its funds generalizations accept legislature’s ser- to providing primary temic defects and imperfect fit be- is an even when there litigation fees.” upon vices rather than

Q Heller, tween means and ends.” tained this Act may be made available to 321, 113 S.Ct. 2637. pay the fees of an attorney represents who party prevails who in an action Applying highly these deferential brought against [DCPS] [IDEA]” principles, we cannot conclude that Con $1,300 excess of per hour or $50 total. gress acted irrationally. Assisting dis Note nothing in section 130 restricts abled legitimate children is a governmental court authority to award fees under sec- purpose. conceivable, It is at least more 1415(i)(3)(B) IDEA; the rider con- over, capping produce fees will addi cerns District authority pay to fees tional resources for direct educational ser from FY appropriations. As the dis- vices, that, despite limiting parents’ observed, trict court section 130 and IDEA ability to use litigation as a means of en regulate different government authorities: forcing will yield a net attorney’s “The IDEA provision pro- benefit disabled children. Notwith vides courts with discretion ... standing the doubts of the families and the award attorneys’ reasonable fees. By con- President, 8-9, supra at possibili trast, section 130 governs the District of ty suffices for the statute to survive ration Columbia’s appropriations right pay al basis review. those fees.” sure, To be restricting federal court au- III. thority to might award fees have been one In its cross-appeal, the District way for Congress help DCPS address argues that only prohibits section 130 not special problems. education It is not from paying attorneys’ fees function, however, our to determine wheth- greater than prescribed amounts, but er such a limitation would “accor[d] with prohibits also courts awarding such common public sense and the weal. Our claim, fees. In resolving this we guid are Constitution responsibilities vests such ed principle well-settled political branches.” Valley Tennessee appropriation “[w]hile acts are ‘Acts of Hill, Authority 153, 195, Congress’ which can substantively change (1978) (internal 57 L.Ed.2d 117 law, existing very there is a strong pre quotation omitted); marks but Op. see sumption they do not.” Building & J., (Ginsburg, dissenting) (arguing that Dept., Construction Trades AFL-CIO v. “common sense tells us” that section Martin, (D.C.Cir.1992). 961 F.2d “a limitation court’s district au- As observed, we have elsewhere “the es fees”). thority to award that, tablished rule appropria [is] when In view of the “very strong presump- tions measures arguably conflict that appropriation tion” acts do not amend underlying authorizing legislation, their ef substantive we face a straightforward fect must be narrowly. construed Such of statutory question construction: has measures have the specific limited and Congress unambiguously expressed an in- purpose of providing funds for authorized tent limit court authority to award fees programs.” Donovan v. Carolina Stalite under IDEA? When wants Co., (D.C.Cir.1984) use an act to limit court (internal citation and quotation marks authority, it precisely knows how to do so. omitted). Applying principle, this we example, For section 311 of the Ap- 2000 agree with the district court that section propriations says, Act “section 5 of the 130 only limits authority District pay to Act ... Y2K. is amended” to state that fees from FY 1999 appropriations, not “punitive damages in a Y2K may action authority to award fees under IDEA. against not be awarded an institution of must, We begin, as we section higher 130’s education.” Section Consoli- plain language: “None of the Act, 2000, funds con- Appropriations dated Pub.L.

10 (Nov. depart-

106-113, duty judicial of the province 1537 and 113 Stat. 1999). is, no similar lim- say equally— 130 contains to the law Section ment what it is iting language. province emphatically—the exclusive leg- of the not to formulate argues that even if The District policies programs islative and mandate expressly not does amend section 130 but to their relative projects, also establish neverthe appropriations rider the at 98 priority for the Nation.” Id. represents implied limit on court less (internal quotation citation and Otherwise, fees. the to award omitted). Supreme as marks Just the claims, might increase section 130 the left it to resolve Court to liability by en eventual fee the District’s for a incongruity appropriating of funds to in ex recover fees couraging litigation we prohibited, that another statute dam Repeals by caps. 130’s cess section however, to the of the leave resolution implication, are disfavored—a incongruity in this case. policy “applies greater with even force that Acting As the when the claimed the critical habitat ry potential incongruity not courts’. In TVA however, reconciling inharmonious statuto- Circuit halted completed cies and IDEA Court ernmental entities. ted). No to some affirmative earlier and able.” Id. since, Like the district repeal, directives is Act, paying during faced as repeal pursuant Supreme 16 U.S.C. we irreconcilable the TVA (internal quotation marks omit are a situation similar to this case. later statutes are irreconcil have only permissible Act.” construction of a directed at different dam in Congress’ implication repeal showing of an intention pointed Court has made court, prohibits “[I]n TVA, conflict exists here Hill, order Endangered rests same fiscal snail darter. See courts’ we et out, the absence seq., responsibility, recognize is when 437 U.S. at solely on an justification the District section the Sixth awarding Supreme preserve nearly clear, year. Spe- gov were their AFL-CIO vailing percent. rate’ raises rider, however, pay Government 92 Stat. ernment in an amount which for the fiscal provided tive statute. 659 pay require one-half adjustments tions rider section 130 “modified (D.C.Cir.1980), can Federation Government The cases relied on (Ginsburg, act].” limited alleged rights rate, salary a percent 1979 of between seven and employees different Because containing statute been Pub.L. No. employees year “[n]o ... under J., we Campbell, five raise] pay F.2d at dissenting). held result. ^[1979] ... of the appropriations would have received pro increases that exceeds language funds as that an any the dissent do “sued to enforce given 95-429, tanto” a substan wage [the 161. The a result of individual Had the half appropriated [a Employees, effect, be used Op. ‘prevailing appropria similar to increases five and percent. Ameri 614(a), twelve at 13- rider year gov pre ... to rate solely prevailing based on the TVA, 168-70, 98 S.Ct. 2279. Campbell, statute.” 659 F.2d at 159. We Court, argued In the Supreme TVA claim, concluding Congress, funds for by appropriating com- act, ceil including a new pletion after learning the dam increases, “by express wage placed snail darter had been on the endan- statute, effectively reference the earlier list, gered species had implicitly amended gave modified Id. at 161. thusWe Species [it].” allow Endangered Act to con- that its act effect struction to continue. See id. in express required—limiting pay terms Disagreeing, S.Ct. 2279. the Court ex- plained emphatically creases for FY 1979. “[w]hile Observing regulations section 130 re- expressly establishing personnel new pol schedule, to IDEA fers and includes fee icies for employees. federal Dissatisfied dissenting colleague our relies on Camp- with policies, the new Congress passed an bell for the in- conclusion appropriations rider providing that “[n]one modify tended to Op. IDEA. See at 14-15 of the appropriated funds under this Act J., (Ginsburg, dissenting). We think [funding OPM] shall be obligated or ex Campbell this case are different. As pended implement, promulgate, admin Campbell, we given have rider the ister, or regulations].” [the enforce OPM plain effect that requires limiting text — Devine, 733 F.2d 116. The Director of payment District’s for FY interpreted OPM the rider to mean that presents 1999—-but this case an additional “each federal agency would simply have to question, one not raised in Campbell: in administer and enforce regulations intent, legislative absence clear evi- assistance_” without OPM’s Id. at 116. either through language denced statutory We this'interpretation of the rid or legislative history, to amend substantive er, resting our decision on two factors. an appropriations funding does act First, because “the express terms of the entity one governmental restrict sub- regulations require[d] play OPM to a criti authority stantive separate entity, of a in- cal and continuing role in implemen separate deed a government? branch of tation, administration, enforcement,” “very strong Given the presumption” that id. at we doubted regula whether the appropriation acts do not'amend substan- ' tions could . .. “sensibly be effectuated statutes, tive neither section 130’s refer- without participation.” OPM’s continued ence to IDEA nor its fee war- schedule Indeed, Id. at 120. we viewed Di rants an inference that an interpretation rector’s of the rider as “ab rider directed at the District of Columbia dicating central responsibility [OPM’s] restricts of the federal executing, administering, and enforcing Indeed, Congress hardly courts. could civil service regulations.” rules and Id. at have identified the class of af- payments (internal omitted). quotation marks by section mentioning fected 130 without Second, examining after legisla rider’s IDEA. Nor could have limited history, tive we found “clear indications of payments the District’s FY 1999 without Congress’ intent” to significant foreclose specifying the amounts those limits. changes personnel policies. management If, claims, as the dissent section 130’s Id. át '120. payments ceiling and reference to modify IDEA,

IDEA sufficed to the exist- Neither factor present is this .case. ing presumption would be with, begin reversed To plays because the District replaced with a presumption appropri- fees, no role in a awarding court’s sec- ation riders do amend substantive law. prevent tion 130 implementa- does theory, Under the dissent’s Congress could tion of provision IDEA’S fee in the same payments limit the par- District’s fee manner as the rider in Treasury National ticular without restrict- also Employees Devine impeded im- Union authority to only by award fees plementation Nor, regulations. OPM’s adding express statement substan- reason, for the same pro- does section 130 tive law remains intact. That is not the duce responsi- “abdication” of District law of this circuit. Moreover, bility. legislative section 130’s history congression- demonstrates no clear Treasury Employees National Union Devine, (D.C.Cir.1984), al Although intent amend IDEA. equally distinguishable. House Op. Committee at 17 wrote J., (Ginsburg, dissenting). case con- an earlier That version of 130 that cerned fees,” Office of Personnel Management attorney would limit “the award of

12 (IDEA), 20 (1998), Act Disabilities Education 105-670, see at 50 H.R.Rep. No. § 1415. J., dissent- U.S.C. (Ginsburg, 14-15 Op. at also Report accompanying ing), the Conference Backgi’ound I. “placing] only of speaks bill

the final attorneys.” of fees payment limit on the § of the reenacted 615 Congress 105-825, at No. Rep. H.R. Conf. in 1997. with considerable revisions IDEA ob- (1998). has Supreme Court theAs Disabilities Education Individuals with may served, materials be “legislative 1997, No. Pub.L. Act Amendments value, contradictory, or probative without (1997). 105-17, § Stat. cases will and in such ambiguous, or following provi- Section includes customary to control permitted not be attorneys’ sion for fees: ” United, States of words.... meaning un- brought proceeding action or Dickerson, court, section, in the [district] der this (1940). 1034,84 L.Ed. 1356 discretion, reasonable at- may award narrowly we must up, To sum because the costs to the torneys’ fees as part Donovan, 130,- see disability construe section with a who is parents of a child accomplish interpret it to we F.2d at party. prevailing plain than its text less more nor neither 20 U.S.C. Id. codified express terms restrict The rider’s states. 1415(i)(3)(B). § from FY IDEA fees payment subject revisited giveWe appropriations. years cases two attorneys’ fees in IDEA If wishes precisely that effect. of Colum- passed when it the District later fees authority to award to restrict court of 1999. See Omni- bia Act District, may do so either against the Supple- Emergency bus Consolidated bill or through the D.C. 1999, Pub.L. Appropriations Act of mental leg- of substantive through the enactment 105-277, 101(c), 112 Stat. 2681 No. But until Con- IDEA. amending islation Ap- of the 1999 D.C. Section 130 modify intent to clear gress demonstrates propriations provides: Act through statutory either substantive in this contained Act None of funds history, legislative persuasive language pay the fees of may made be available .pre- circuit with presume we accordance party who attorney represents who 130 to it did not use section cedent that action, including an ad- prevails in. courts to award power limit of federal against proceeding, brought ministrative IDEA. Public the District of Columbia Schools the district court is af- The decision under the Individuals Disabilities firmed. (20 seq.) et Education U.S.C. Act So ordered. if (1) compensation hourly rate GINSBURG, dissenting Judge, Circuit hourly rate of attorney exceeds part: ll-2604(a), compensation under section [i.e., per $50 District of. Columbia Code opinion I and II of the I concur in Parts hour], or judgment in the No.

for the Court compen- amount of the maximum families’ constitu- rejecting attorney the maxi- III of the exceeds I from Part sation dissent challenges. tional sec- compensation under mum amount of judgment from the opinion 2604(b)(1),District of Columbia I that for FY believe No. 99-5216 because 11— total], [i.e., $1,300 com- except that modified the Code 1999 the in excess pensation reimbursement to award of the district court approved for of such maximum the Individuals with fees under 615 of (except in in representation range this 7%-12% insofar as complex or extended ll-2604(c), they may “public Dis- have found the interest” with section accordance required point Code. less—a hot relevant trict of Columbia here). Campbell employing or Before the upon § some Obviously, 130 has effect any agencies actually wage had ordered the IDEA. The attorneys’ fees under increase, however, passed Congress the an § what effect: Is 130 before us is question appropriations rider that provided: upon the court’s limitation for FY 1999 pre-existing authority in excess of §in 615 to $50 per award hour year No ... ^[1979] funds . . . n appropriated used the fiscal pay the $1,300 per merely case? Or does it salary pay ... individual in an “prohibit[ paying during the District from ] amount which exceeds 5.5% as [a raise] year” any fiscal fee the district the same any adjustments a result of which take caps, in excess those might award during year such under ... effect fiscal leaving the Dis- Maj. Op. thereby ... if section 5343 Title 5 such the end of trict liable for such awards after adjustment granted pursuant to a court, Today citing the year? that fiscal survey.... wage de- interpretive presumption and then 95-429, 614(a), § Pub.L. No. 92 Stat. by evidence offered clining to address the (1978). 1018 The Civil Service Commis- presumption, the District overcome interpreted sion prohibiting the rider as give I would the gives the latter answer. employing agencies from'granting any the § the 130 limits the former: 5.5%, pay greater increase than and the under IDEA 615 because district court ordered agencies therefore raises of “by implica- clear Congress 130 the that percentage. Campbell, See 659 F.2d tion, statement, pro if express modified at 159. previous substantive law.” tanto the plaintiffs argued to this court Federation Government Em- American modify prevailing the rider did not the rate Campbell, 659 F.2d ployees statute, employing agen- the and therefore (D.C.Cir.1980). required by pay

cies were still to order law Analysis II. range raises in the 7%-12% recommended at 160. agencies. the lead id. We See ap- court held that an Campbell this argument concluded that this in text propriations strikingly rider similar year for the fiscal the rider pro §to modified tanto and structure statute, limit- prevailing modified the rate statute to which it prior the substantive plaintiffs’ salary increase below There, plaintiffs were feder- referred. called for amount that would have been employees wages were deter- al whose this con- under that statute. We reached statute,” rate “prevailing mined under the exclusively upon two ele- clusion based (1976 Supp. §§ Ill 5 U.S.C. 5341-5349 & rider, in the text of the which we ments 1979). required wages That statute accepted clearly unequivocally dem- as adjusted from time to time be “fixed meant to and onstrating rates,” prevailing in accordance with modify preexisting did statute. surveys by wage of the as determined private sector to be conducted “lead First, expressly rider (a)(3). 5343(a), agencfies].” Id. rate statute. It prevailing referred to the basis, that we dis- upon precisely their was this agencies The lead had conducted Valley Authority Tennessee surveys wage tinguished increases and recommended Hill, 2279, 57 plaintiffs. 437 U.S. of between 7% and 12% for the (1978), Thus, which the court Campbell, 659 F.2d at 159. L.Ed.2d See as States v. today, relies as well United employing agencies required were 389, 21 Ct.Cl. pay Langston, raises prevailing rate statute order obli- (1886), govern the substantive framework which is to 1185, L.Ed. 164 S.Ct. was F.2d at gation indicates Campbell, like effect. framework, statutory importance modifying prior 160-61 & n. Mitchell, see, stat- preexisting States v. e.g., United reference express 146, 149-50, Members of it ensures Ct.Cl. is that ute legisla- new aware con- were Therefore we 27 L.Ed. 887 operation affect “Congress specifi- tion would the because cluded that States v. See United increases, statute. preexisting ceiling wage on cally set a (D.C.Cir. 940, Hansen, 944-45 F.2d 772 prevailing the rate directly referred to previously 1985). Supreme Court had statutes one of substantive statute as of such a refer- importance recognized bill,” the appropriations by the affected thereof) itself, (or A Hill in TV v. lack ence “contains words that appropriations rider 2279, 189, and two at 98 S.Ct. see 437 U.S. implication, express if not state- by clear so, have since done circuits of our sister ment, previous sub- pro tanto the modified 947 oya-Martinez, v. J see States United F.2d at 161 Campbell, law.” 659 stantive (4th Cir.1991); 1141, Republic 1144 F.2d & n. Airlines, Dep’t States Inc. v. United § two textual we see the same 130 (10th 1315, 1322 Cir. F.2d Transp., 849 dispositive Camp- that were in elements 1988). Co. compare Firebaugh Canal But refers to “the fees of expressly bell. It 568, States, n. 4 F.3d 576 203 v. United pre- represents party a who attorney who Cir.2000) (9th [] reference “not (express in an action under the Individuals vails J., (Trott, at 579 id. meaningful”), with (20 Education Act U.S.C. with Disabilities crucial). reference (express dissenting) lays compre- seq.),” § and it out a 1400 et Second, Campbell we noted in determining framework for hensive new a ceiling on “specifically had set element, textual fees. to the second As rid- appropriations in the increases” wage stronger one than this even case a er, the rider from which differentiated appropriations rider Campbell: Where funds.” 659 appropriate failure to “mere cap wage a on Campbell simply set distinguished New n. 10. We F.2d at 161 increases, caps § at- only 130 not sets States, 177 Inc. V: United Airways, York a de- torneys’ incorporates fees but also (Ct.Cl.1966), 800, upon F.2d 743 Ct.Cl. 369 may, a procedure by which tailed Supreme Court had Again, this basis. conditions, cap. waive a under specified the same distinction: already drawn 130 thus “contains words Section funds, see TVA appropriating mere act of statement, implication, express if not clear 190, 2279, Hill, 98 S.Ct. or v. 437 atU.S. previous substan- modifiy] pro tanto the so, Langston, 118 U.S. to do see failing 161.* Campbell, tive law.” 659 F.2d at 1185, says little about the 6 S.Ct. directly This drawn in- conclusion obligation; but underlying substantive legis- § in the new text of 130 is also reflected of a in an act clusion inquiry end the court's into con- expressly, § limits sufficient *That 130 intent). fees raises attorneys' gressional of IDEA "pay[ment]” indeed, the court possibility as the notes, —and Supreme and this court Both the Court presumption —that have riders found payment only the and not the to affect meant prohibit only pay- terms limit or express Supreme Court has fees. The of such award long underlying ment nonetheless alter however, held, "payment” use obligation just pay- and not its appropriations act substantive similar term in an a Will, inquiry congres- v. 449 U.S. into ment. 205-08, 223-24, United States not end a court's does Dickerson, intent. See United States 66 L.Ed.2d sional 101 554, 561-62, 6; 84 L.Ed. (1980); Campbell, F.2d 159 n. 659 (1940) [pro- ("deny[ing] Adams, words such City Angeles v. 556 F.2d Los hibiting during particular fis- only payment a (D.C.Cir.1977); Kjaer, Tayloe see also year] appropriation bill cal used in an when (D.C.Cir. 1948). meaning” are words of art or have settled provision. pay The Dis- late while them re- history of lative House suspense. trict notes that the mains in Committee, only report in the discuss today point any The court does not detail, § “lim- stated that thinking really reason for the Congress attorney special the award it[s] (Nor, peculiar intended such result. H.R.Rep. No. cases.” education they since chose not to file a in the brief (discuss- supplied) (emphasis at 50 cross-appeal, cross-appel- District’s do the identical predecessor version of ing reason; suggest any lee families such nor version). respects to enacted in relevant court.) are, did the district There to be both when he agreed, President Clinton sure, cases which a court has held that signed 130 into see Statement Congress delayed only payment Sign- J. Clinton President William underlying and not the incurrence of an 4,328, Comp. Pres. Weekly H.R. see, (Nov. 1998) (“the e.g., Langston, at 2, obligation, 118 U.S. 2108, Act Docs. 394, 1185; these involve mere cap would the S.Ct. but language also includes attorneys’ appropriate in plaintiffs’ of fees failures to a sufficient sum award cases”), and when he vetoed a bill [IDEA] where there is no other indication the Con- rider the containing essentially the same gress intended that the Government not following year, see District Columbia liabilities, id., incur new see or there is Act, Message, 2000—Veto specific history demonstrating legislative 28, H8941, (Sept. Cong. Rec. H8942 Congress the understood was not alter- 1999) (“[FY in provision identical rel- ing liability, the underlying Government’s § part cap evant would the award 130] Airways, see New York 369 F.2d at 751. plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in [IDEA] Where, hand, Congress on the other the cases”) (emphases supplied). merely more than fail to appro- has done that the in- Finally, argues the District a priate sum sufficient to cover an accumu- plainly unintended results congruous and lating obligation, Supreme Court has ensuing interpretation court’s from the held that “it is not to be believed that upon § 130 is a limitation suggest Congress appropriating was simply n authority district court’s to award attor- part of that which it knew was due.” fees; neys’ common sense tells us the Dis- States, 588, v. United 150 U.S. Belknap Otherwise, one would have right. trict is 557, 14 37 L.Ed. 29 Ct.Cl. S.Ct. to believe intended Will, (1893); see also 449 U.S. caps attorneys’ awards of fees above the to re- (“Congress intended IOUs, at the payable accumulate as end [Adjustment entirely, raises not Act] scind year appropriations the fiscal when the limbo simply consign them to the fiscal course, operative. longer rider is no Of payable”); of an account due but not cf. does, infrequently, de- Treasury Employees Union National appropriate money for an under- cline (D.C.Cir.1984) Devine, prior authorized under law. taking interpretation (rejecting prior merely cases where the statute au- resolution that would have resulted however, undertaking, no obli- thorizes pro- of unreviewed “steady accumulation gation lawfully can be incurred until funds posals”). appropriated, see 31 have been U.S.C. brief, points in its As the District out 1341(a); the effect in such a case is to interpretation § 130 result of the court’s any steps postpone until a later date just peculiar than ac- is fact more actually to incur an cause Government —it complishes opposite the exact of what the entirely case is different: obligation. This '§ through to achieve Congress sought interpretation the court’s Under with the Dis- complaints IDEA filed incur Most the District will continue to addition- pro- in an administrative liabilities, continue to accumu- trict are resolved al which will District, it to increase system, against managed school the D.C. ceeding before is, court. liability to the district fee well as the resort District’s without —as enacted, the had expenditures legal Before 130 was for its own District’s which, as re- adopted guidelines representation by requiring enabling — IDEA, it would award and by the quired go families to to district court to obtain a attorneys’ in such fees pay reasonable I think higher award. do not that was proper of a fee cases the submission legislature what the meant to do or did. District, thus in FY 1998 application; York, New See Clinton v. involvement, approved any court without 430, 118 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 $10,400,000 attorneys’ IDEA paid interpretation of statute that (rejecting dur- proceedings; fees administrative absurd ... which produce “would result paid only year the District same intended”). not have could $664,000 the court. fees awarded today contrary The court reaches the however, effective, §When 130 became way presumption that conclusion guidelines, in con- the District revised its act does not alter sub- therewith, formity preclude ap- fee 9, 9-10,11. Maj. Op. stantive law. plication sought fees above clear, however, words, Supreme Court has made caps. In other the District limiting presumption interpret that a used to interpreted 130 as pay attorneys’ “just presumption statute that —a to award as well as to FY inter- caps during may by contrary above the 1999—an be overcome” evi- [which] today necessarily ac- pretation provides the court dence that a “reliable indicator of way it cepts as correct in the tries to congressional intent.” Block v. Communi- Campbell, Maj. Op. Inst., 349, at 11. distinguish 340, ty Nutrition 467 U.S. 2450, S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d 270 In District without Limiting awards the keeping teaching, with this both the Su- district court would limiting awards the preme Court and this court have found fee actually liability, increase the District’s appropriations acts to have modified prevails A in an family however. preexisting light substantive law the proceeding administrative but is denied text, Campbell, evidence from the see attorneys’ the District a “reasonable” fee 160-61, legislative history, F.2d at from caps may the amount the because exceeds see, Will, 224, e.g., 449 U.S. at 101 S.Ct. simply repair to the district court for an see, act, or from the structure of the award than what the Dis greater of fees Mitchell, e.g., 109 U.S. at 3 S.Ct. award, trict can see Moore v. District 151; and, yes, light in the of common (D.C.Cir.1990) (en Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 well, see, e.g., Belknap, sense as banc); moreover, the district court 183; Devine, at 733 F.2d at uncapped include in its award reasonable 120. The District has sought to overcome attorneys’ litigation, fees see for the fee presumption the all Columbia, evidence from of Moore v. District sources; (D.D.C.1987) today, these but the court scarce- F.Supp. (awarding $29,357 ly acknowledging even the argu- District’s representation IDEA for ments, $19,117 upon relies “bare representation subsequent statements] for law” evaluating the instead of the evidence to litigation fee before district court). interpretation present the court’s of determine whether “the facts Under 130, therefore, picture Congress congressional the not a different intent.” effectively cap Campbell, failed at 160.* the awarded * example, Supreme Congress likely by § Maj. For the court most meant 130. misreads barring Op. portion Court’s TVAv. us at 9-10. The of TVA decision in Hill as v. Hill court, however, considering quoted by Maj. Op. the District's extensive and at regarding incongruous merely uncontested that after a deter- evidence states court has outcomes in mined in the order to determine what what the commanded appropria- that an can ever show court is evidence problem for the greatest entity funding governmental it one analyzes how tions act. no matter undoubted the substantive author- As for the meant to restrict Campbell. is runs into appro- finding- entity. pair that an As a of cases ity of another presumption against demonstrates, a substantive modifi- the answer act effects from this court priations we concluded Campbell if dis-r yes, that is what cation act act to unequivocally cernably meant the rate stat- prevailing repealed pro tanto do.

ute, presumption was overcome and the Devine, the Office of In 733 F.2d textual elements upon only the two based new had issued Personnel Management §in 130. As for present that are likewise month less than a personnel regulations implica- repeal by rule the undoubted appropria- enacted an before the even, disfavored, if 130 as we treat tion is of the funds stating “[n]one rider tions I not believe repealer do implied —and [funding this Act appropriated under Campbell or involves that either this case expended obligated shall be OPM] exemplified by the repealer as implied administer, or en- implement, promulgate, in TVA v. urged upon Court argument regulations].” 733 force the OPM [new provide textual Hill —the same two factors precise F.2d at 116. Based of an intent showing the “affirmative rider, the took the wording of the OPM Hill, 437 under TVA v. repeal” required prevent position that the rider “does imple- than OPM from any agency other attempt today The court makes one administering enforcing menting, from this case: distinguish Campbell Id. at regulations’ agency.” within that both employing agency Campbell argument 116-17. We increase, paid any wage granted reasons, expressly upon both based two in this case the district whereas first, legislature: the intent of the pays them. fees while the District awards personnel regula- did not intend Congress factoid, That the court Maj. Op. at 11. with- applied by agencies to be other tions claims, in this case poses question second, involvement; out OPM’s Campbell: “in the ab- present not was regula- assuming arguendo that “even intent to legislative of clear sence workably with- implemented tions could be appropria- does an substantive amend OPM, it is by the participation out further entity funding governmental act one tions prevent intended to Congress evident sep- authority of a the substantive restrict this.” Id. at 119-20. separate branch of entity, indeed a arate Donovan, at the re- 734 F.2d Assuming Maj. Op. 11. government?” mine does, cited for a who had been spondent, counterfactually, question as the violation, intent, appropria- that an safety argued the an- legislative of clear absence case, Safety the Mine prohibiting rider be no. In this tions would of course swer (MSHA) from ex- however, Health Administration same evidence of we have the “enforce appropriated funds to pending that we held sufficient legislative intent standard, rule, un- regulation or order meant to Campbell Congress to show the the Govern- precluded ... Act” der the law. The real issue modify substantive adminis- an adverse appealing from question, ment in the court’s rhetorical lurking safety mine violation. ruling on the then, congres- trative whether evidence is not argu- rejected that F.2d at 1557. We such 734 required intent is but whether sional certain- statute, Congress.” Id. at 194. This rule remedial discre- it should not use its authorize, by require, this nullify command effectively ly to let alone does upon withholding remedy based its own arguments about ignore the District’s unwisdom of "appraisal of the wisdom or place. in the first means what statute by consciously particular selected course [the] well, raent, that the the same here noting Office Solicitor as based Labor, appeal, incongruities § was text of which conducted and the appropriation. contrary interpreta will not funded the MSHA result from the observation, tion, stop at that how- I We did not think the clear answer is that the ever; inquire § into Congress modify pro we went on to what the did intend 130 to accomplish through Congress intended tanto 615 of the IDEA.* by the the rider —as evidenced untoward ap- ensue if consequences would Summary III. and Conclusion

propriations interpreted rider were preexisting ap- substantive law amend the §of The text 130 makes clear that the plicable entity: to another Congress modified for FY 1999 the author- ity of the district court award was the be- [The rider] fees under 615 of the 20 U.S.C. of an effort some members of

ginning analyzed §if 1415. Even 130 is mining] opera- [certain to shift implied repealer, the rubric of an the same jurisdiction. tions from MSHA OSHA provides text the clear and “affir- manifest ultimately That effort did not succeed mative showing [modify]” intention to wholly and we think it would be unrea- Hill, required under TVA v. suppose that in- sonable to I 98 S.Ct. 2279. therefore dissent temporary suspension tended a to wreak opinion Part III of the for the Court procedural ongoing ap- havoc judgment and from the in No. 99-5216. peals [petitioner] urges. We inter- pret to indicate [the rider] Con-

gress’ intent that initiate MSHA no new litigation.

enforcement Thus,

Id. at the court did not inter-

pret doing anything rider as than more

limiting new enforcement actions there

MSHA because was no indication had the un- seemingly already

reasonable intent to affect actions

in the hands of the Solicitor.

Although the results Devine and Don- directions, they

ovan look in different are Quite not in the contrary, conflict. America, Appellee UNITED STATES of precisely each case asked same question: Did the intend act that expressly places MATHIS, Appellant Eddie J. upon only governmental entity

limits one authority to limit govern- of another America, Appellee United States of mental entity? Devine the court said yes, (acting while Donovan the court through two later two of weeks the same

judges) Lee, question Appellant said no. The Maurice T. should * "distinguishable" legislative The court Devine history finds on in order for us so to con- ground legislative history that the was appropriate rely clude. I think it more Maj. Op. more clear in that case. In at 11—12. primarily upon the textual to which elements words, dispute other the court does not Campbell confidently directs us—all the more Congress may limit the brought view of the absurd results statute; entity specifically named in the contrary interpretation only second- —and think, however, it seems to the court arily upon legislative history. must find statement to that effect in the

Case Details

Case Name: Calloway v. District of Columbia

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Date Published: Jun 30, 2000

Citation: 216 F.3d 1

Docket Number: 99-5215, 99-5216

Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.