495 P.3d 550
N.M. Ct. App.2019Background
- Kaywal, Inc. owns Waller Ranch in Torrance County adjacent to state trust land leased to Defendants (Avangrid, Blattner, El Cabo) for the El Cabo wind farm; a Property Line Agreement (PLA) between Kaywal and the Commissioner fixes the northern boundary.
- Defendants obtained a state Right of Entry (ROE 2978) and a wind lease, then accessed the leased parcel via a northern dirt road and the western fence area; Kaywal alleges repeated trespasses, property damage, installation of grounding on its fence, nuisance (dangerous induced voltages), and unjust enrichment.
- Kaywal sued in Chaves County (its principal place of business) for compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief prohibiting further trespasses and nuisances.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue, arguing the suit’s object is land/interests in land (requiring venue in Torrance County), and separately moved to dismiss for failure to join the Commissioner of Public Lands and Torrance County as indispensable parties.
- The district court denied both motions, concluding trespass/nuisance claims (even seeking injunctions) are transitory and may be venued where the plaintiff resides, and that neither the Commissioner nor the County was necessary or indispensable.
- Defendants sought interlocutory review; this Court affirms the district court on both venue and joinder issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venue — whether the suit’s object is "lands or any interest in lands" (§ 38-3-1(D)(1)) so venue must be in Torrance County | Kaywal: claims are for trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment; suit is transitory and venue proper where plaintiff resides (Chaves County) under § 38-3-1(A)/(E) | Defendants: requested injunctions and disputed ownership/boundary mean the suit seeks to affect land interests and must be venued where the land lies (Torrance County), per Jemez Land Co. | Held: Affirmed Chaves County venue — trespass/nuisance (even with injunctive relief) are in personam/transitory unless complaint seeks to create/transfer/revoke land interests; injunctions to prevent future trespass do not convert the action into one whose object is land. |
| Joinder — whether the Commissioner of Public Lands is a necessary/indispensable party under Rule 1-019 | Kaywal: suit protects Kaywal’s possessory rights under PLA; relief does not challenge validity of state lease or transfer state title, so Commissioner not necessary | Defendants: resolution may affect rights under wind lease/ROE; Commissioner as trustee of state lands is necessary and indispensable (King, Tackett) | Held: No abuse of discretion — Commissioner not necessary or indispensable because the complaint does not seek to divest state title or invalidate the lease/easement; ROE/lease do not purport to convey rights over private land and PLA is prima facie evidence of boundary. |
| Joinder — whether Torrance County is a necessary/indispensable party | Kaywal: road has not been accepted as a public road by the County; relief will not impose maintenance obligations on County | Defendants: if a public prescriptive easement is declared, County would be obligated to maintain the road under § 67-2-2 and therefore must be joined | Held: No abuse of discretion — County is not necessary/indispensable because (i) the northern road has not been accepted as a public road, and (ii) McGarry requires formal county acceptance before imposing maintenance obligations, so a prescriptive easement cannot be used as a sword against the County absent formal acceptance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jemez Land Co. v. Garcia, 15 N.M. 316 (1910) (injunction that would perpetually restrain a defendant from asserting title makes an interest in land the object of the suit)
- Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 132 N.M. 382 (2002) (distinguishes actions seeking damages for trespass/nuisance from actions to affect title; trespass is generally transitory)
- Team Bank v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 118 N.M. 147 (1994) (the object of the suit — not incidental ties to land — determines whether an interest in real property mandates venue where the land lies)
- McGarry v. Scott, 134 N.M. 32 (2003) (formal county acceptance required before a county’s statutory road maintenance obligations are triggered by prescriptive or implied dedication)
- Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (classic exposition distinguishing in rem actions that directly dispose of property from in personam actions)
- Kalosha v. Novick, 84 N.M. 502 (1973) (New Mexico venue statute is not jurisdictional)