Kay v. Barnes Bullets
2021 UT 64
| Utah | 2021Background
- Layne Kay worked at Barnes Bullets and, between late 2012 and mid-2013, melted an unusually large volume of scrap lead at the plant without respirators being provided; Barnes generally melted lead only intermittently and supplied respirators only after 2013 safety tests.
- Kay developed severe, permanent lead poisoning (respiratory, neurological, and cognitive impairments) and resigned in January 2016.
- Kay pursued and settled a workers’ compensation claim before the Utah Labor Commission, receiving $337,500, then sued Barnes in tort under the WCA’s intentional-injury exception alleging Barnes intentionally caused his poisoning by forcing lead-melting without respirators.
- Barnes moved for summary judgment arguing the WCA’s exclusivity bars the suit because Kay cannot show supervisors acted with the requisite intent (knowledge that harm was virtually certain); the district court denied summary judgment.
- The Utah Supreme Court granted interlocutory review, vacated the denial, and remanded for the district court to determine first whether Kay’s condition is governed by the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) rather than the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and, if it is an ODA claim, whether the intentional-injury exception should extend to ODA claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the WCA intentional-injury exception permit Kay’s tort suit? | Kay: supervisors intentionally caused poisoning by requiring melting without respirators. | Barnes: insufficient evidence that supervisors acted with intent or that harm was virtually certain. | Court did not decide on the merits; remanded for district court to address after resolving which statute governs. |
| Is Kay’s lead poisoning an occupational disease (ODA) or an accidental injury (WCA)? | Kay (and parties): treated as WCA accidental injury. | Barnes: also treated as WCA in briefing; challenged sufficiency of intent evidence. | Court: significant question exists; remand to district court to classify disease vs. injury. |
| Does the intentional-injury exception apply to ODA claims? | Kay: seeks to use the exception to sue employer. | Barnes: argues exception has been applied only under WCA and should not apply here. | Court: has not extended the exception to ODA and will not do so without full briefing; district court should decide if extension is warranted. |
| What deference, if any, is owed to the Labor Commission’s prior adjudication treating the claim as an accidental injury? | Kay: Labor Commission previously adjudicated the claim as an accidental injury. | Barnes: may argue Commission’s ruling affects classification or precludes relitigation. | Court: remand instructs district court to determine what deference the Commission’s determination merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. Salt Lake City, 90 P.2d 174 (Utah 1939) (recognized lead poisoning as an occupational disease rather than an accidental injury)
- Bryan v. Utah Int’l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) (articulated intentional-injury exception under WCA)
- Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) (applied intentional-injury exception in a WCA context)
- Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Helf I), 203 P.3d 962 (Utah 2009) (discussed standards for intentional-injury exception)
- Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Helf II), 361 P.3d 63 (Utah 2015) (clarified intentional-injury exception and interaction with workers’ compensation recovery)
- Rueda v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 423 P.3d 1175 (Utah 2017) (demonstrated complexity of classifying workplace ailment as occupational disease vs. accidental injury)
- Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 218 P.3d 580 (Utah 2009) (procedural context on workers’ compensation exclusivity)
- Paxman v. King, 448 P.3d 1199 (Utah 2019) (advised trial courts to address first-impression questions directly)