*1 mаy Only dant be convicted. a trial carries jeopardy of a conviction the trier of
fact; therefore, only at a trial does Utah's
statutory jeopardy protection double attach. that, Accordingly, we hold be brought charges
cause the different State information,
against Cahoon the amended Oppenheimer
neither nor the doctrine of col estoppel applies
lateral Fur this case.
ther, protections Cahoon's jeopardy double
do not bar the counts in the amended infor jeopardy pri-
mation because does not attach
or to trial.
CONCLUSION
' appeals' 18 We reverse the court of deci-
sion and remand this case to the district proceedings
court for further consistent with opinion. jeopardy Because we hold pretrial
had not attached at the time of the
dismissal, question we do not reach the jeopardy on dismissal double
grounds acquittal function as an after
jeopardy has attached. Reversed. DURHAM,
' 19 Chief Justice Justice
WILKINS, PARRISH, Justice and Justice concur in
NEHRING Associate Chief Justice opinion.
DURRANT'S
Jenna R. Plaintiff
v. U.S.A., INC.,
CHEVRON a Delaware cor
poration; Continental Petroleum Ser
vices, liability company; a Utah limited
Skip individual; Ferguson, Ondeo Company, corpora
Nalco a Delaware
tion; I-X, Ap and Does Defendant
pellee.
No. 20061170.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. *3 process re-initiating the neutralization acci- injury was that her
such negligent. We reaffirm dental or distin- as the test for City, Moriarity, Lake Salt P. Edward negligent guishing between intentional Ramos, Badaruddin, Jacque M. Shandar S. injuries, but we caution courts or accidental MT, Missoula, appellant. for intent and the distinction between to retain Waldron, R. Su- Savage, Stephen E. Seott test. applying when probability motive or Baird, City, appellee. Lake E. Salt san BACKGROUND PARRISH, Justice: grant of a reviewing 13 When INTRODUCTION *4 12(b)(6) dismiss, accept "we the motion to ("Helf") Chevron sued T1 Hеlf Jenna complaint as true allegations in the factual ("Chevron"), U.S.A., injuries she sus- Inc. and all reasonable infer and consider them City Lake working at the Salt tained while light in a most to be drawn from them ences (the "Refinery"). complaint Helfs Refinery the plaintiff,." the We recite favorable to by a injuries caused her were alleges that accordingly. facts when her that occurred reaction chemical refining process, toxic Chev- part her to neutralize of the supervisors directed As in an a chemical reaction sludge through in tanks on caustic that is stored ron uses a alleges Refinery. that anoth- further of the Once open-air pit. premises She used, "spent an identical it employee initiated has been becomes er Chevron caustic just pit, caustic," hours from the open-air in the same which must be removed reaction large purplе The injury, creating a be cleaned. and the tanks must prior to her tanks drift, "spent toxic product is called resulting it chemical alarms as that set off cloud Refinery. As a result ultrabhazardous substance sludge," across the ed safely reaction, home it can workers were sent before several must be neutralized spent nei- supervisors But Helfs to neutralize disposed illness. of. order due to add- highly reactive acids are sludge, caustic incident the earlier warned her about ther spe- ed, causing that she would need and violent reactions nor instructed her intense vapors of her known to protection. creating Because respiratory cial ultrahazardous hu- gases, now suffers permanent the toxic exposure to cause serious disorder. Helf permanent seizure who breathe them. mans that her damages, arguing Chevron for sued stan- injury, Chevron's T5 Beforе Helfs injury ex- injuries fall within the neutralizing removing and method of dard Act. Compensation ception to the Workers' sludge was to remove spent caustic her complaint is that gravamen The of Helfs from the contents and their hazardous tanks a chemi- her to initiate supervisors directed carefully Refinery to clean them under knew, substantial process that with cal Using conditions. and restricted controlled danger- certainty, would result the same method, employees were Chevron day that occurred earlier ous conditions sludge or the va- the hazardous exposed to initiated the chem- injure whoever and would process. cleaning during the pors created ical reaction. this method was problem with dismissed T2 The district court $40,000per tank. approximately cost leave to against Chevron without complaint to the prior occasion at leаst one T6 On 12(b)(6) of the Utah pursuant to rule amend case, at- Chevron giving rise to this events reverse of Civil Procedure. We Rules containing spent a tank tempted to clean com- because Helfs dismissal district court's using a by premises sludge on caustic successfully alleged facts demonstrat- plaint However, resulting chem- vacuum truck. expected result ing her was the omitted). (internal 1997) quotation marks (Utah Galetka, v. 1. Alvarez endangered ical everyone evening reaction change involved after a shift and under cover by releasing night. vapors. intense heat and noxious T9 When Helf arrived to work for the January T7 In Chevron officials shift, evening her directed her to "pushed" particular to clean a tank contain- go open-air pit to the and start the neutrali- ing spent sludge. caustic deciding Before process. zation She was not told about the what sludge, to do with thе ran a Chevron reaction, earlier nor was she told about the laboratory it. test on The results indicated hazardous conditions plant indicated basic, sludge very that the was pH with a alarms or employees about that were 14.0, and that its sulfidic character was too sent exposure home due to illness from to the high to measure. following Rather than its gases created the reaction. She was also practice sending sludge away not instructed that respirato- she need environment, for treatment in a controlled ry protection job, for this despite the fact try neutralizing Chevron decided to that her knew that sludge "open-air in an pit" Refinery on the substantially certain if to occur she initiated premises. process pumping involves the chemical reaction respiratory without spent sludge pit, caustic adding into sulfo- protection. ric acid order to neutralize the basic char- 1 10 Helf given followed the instructions sludge, acter of rolling" and "air supervisor. her her The neutralization *5 compressed mixture with air to induce a process produced predictable the same and complete more and intense chemical reaction. violent reaction that occurred earlier experienced Several supervisors Chevron ex- day-the purple release of a containing cloud pressed open-air reservations about the neu- gases. gases noxious The caused Helf to method; nevertheless, tralization Helfs su- pass vomit and eventually out When she pervisor proceed ordered her to neutralizing to, came stopped process she and re- sludge open-air pit. caustic Helf building, turned to the suffering severe ef- alleges that initiating beforе process, all exposure feets of high hydro- levels of parties in supervisory positions knew or acid, chloric mereaptans, free and other toxic process should have known that gases. provided any She was not with treat- noxious, dangerous, create and harmful va- ment or information about the chemicals to pors. alleges She further process exposed. which she had Oceupa- been The
violated several state and federal rules and Safety tional Health and Division of the Utah regulations. Labor eventually Commission cited Chevron for these events. process T8 The neutralization was first {11 open-air initiated in the The Utah Labor pit during day Commission conclud- that, incident, ed a January shift on as result of this Helf 1999. When the neu- developed the following medical process tralization conditions: began, the sulfuric acid partial sеizures, headaches, complex eye irri- reacted spent with the sludge caustic and tation, twitching eyelid, nausea and vomit- purple released noxious containing cloud ing, lethargy extremities, and weakness of sulfide, hydrogen concentrated mercaptan disorientation, and mucous membrane irrita- gases, and other toxic compounds. chemical $7,880.37 tion. Helf received tempo- for her process The stopped neutralization im- rary, disability total during the time that she mediately purple after the toxic ap- cloud injuries. was unable to work due to her peared. The cloud drifted across the Refin- Labor Commission also ordered that Chev- ery, setting off causing alarms and several pay expenses ron medical for her treatment. employees, Chevron some of whom were yards hundreds of open-air pit, from the above, 12 Basеd on the facts recited Helf fall ill and aftermath, be sent home. In the complaint filed a with the district court re- any measures, Chevron did not take safety questing damages permanent for the and locking such as out the sulfuric acid pump- life-altering injuries she sustained due to her ing open-air Instead, out pit. Chevron exposure to gases. the noxious In the com- decided to process (and resume the plaint, later she accused Chevron four other that, when successfully pled facts plaint of willful appeal) to this not relevant parties her, favorable light most in the nonfeasance, viewed negli- misconduct, intentional part injure on the an intent distress, in- demonstrate of emotional infliction gent who, of their regardless of her distress. of emotional infliction tentional that she would motivations, knew or to dismiss a motion filed Chevron neutrali- she re-initiated injured when 12(b)(6) of the rule pursuant claims Helf's process. zation Procedure, arguing that Civil Rules of Utah of the Work remedy provision the exclusive claim. COMPENSATION her Act2 barred I. THE WORKERS Compensation
ers' THE INTENTIONAL AND ACT rationale, the district any offering Without EXCEPTION INJURY dis motion granted Chevron's court with against Chevron claims missed (the Act Compensation Workers' Helf to amend. leave and without prejudice "Act") law any common employers of relieves remaining against her claims pursued employ by an injuries sustained Hability for court's Following the district defendants. injury or any accident account ee "on the remain regarding a final order entry of "contracted, sustained, aggra that is death" dismiss claims, Chevron's appealed ing in the vated, or incurred to Utah pursuant jurisdiction have al. We arising out of or of or because course (2008). 78A-8-102(8)(j) section Code com place employment." employee's remedies, аn admin Act creates law mon REVIEW OF STANDARD provide a seeks scheme istrative remedy for speedy" adequate, "simple, 12(b)(6) to dis motion 114 "A rule pro also job,7 while injured on the workers complaint in the alleged the facts admits miss or vexa "disruptive tecting employers right relief plaintiff's challenges the negligence8 We alleged lawsuits" tious *6 of a propriety those facts."3 on based aas remedial scheme Act's term the often Acc 12(b)(6) of law."4 question ais dismissal are able "employees quo" in which "quid pro ruling no the trial court's give "we ordingly, injuries without job-related for to recover a correctness it under and review deference protect are employers ... and showing fault 5 standard." by virtue by employees from tort suits ed 9 remedy provision." exclusive the Act's ANALYSIS objective" of workers' "primary to remove industrial "has been compensation dismissed court the distriсt T15 When concept forms, in all its negligence, prejudice with against Chevron claim Helfs 0 end, Act this To law of tort."1 of the amend, con- impliedly leave and without remedy provision, allege an exclusive be unable includes Helf would cluded that relief, 1949, as that reads This since entitling her to largely unaltered facts any set follows: Helfs com- erroneous conclusion Bryan, at 893. (2005). P.2d 533 §Ann. 34A-2-105 Code
2. Utah
UT
Albertsons,
Inc., 2004
v.
Vill. LLC
3. Oakwood
94,
Corp.,
UT
2000
v. Snowbird
9. Shattuck-Owen
(internal
101, 18,
quotation
1226
P.3d
104
(citation
(alteration
original)
¶19,
in
16 P.3d
omitted).
marks
omitted); see also
quotation marks
internal
(Utah
987,
Galetka,
("The
of the
P.2d
whole thrust
at 893
Bryan,
v.
Alvarez
omitted).
1997) (internal quotation marks
provide a
system] was to
compensation
[workers'
injured in an industrial
employee,
remedy
for
5,
omitted).
(internal quotation marks
protecting the
accident,
time
at the same
while
lawsuits,
disruptive
vexatious
employer from
34A-2-105(1)
(2005); see
§
Ann.
6. Utah Code
negligenсe.").
alleged
employer's
because of
(Utah
892, 893
Int'l, 533 P.2d
v. Utah
also Bryan
1975).
P.2d at 893.
10. Bryan,
Comm'n,
Co. v. Indus.
Mines
Utah Consol.
7. Park
(1934).
36 P.2d
84 Utah
injury'16 Using
definition,
right
compensation
this
to recover
pursu
Chevron
chapter
injuries
ant to this
for
argues
sustained
that an
only
intentional act is
action
employee,
resulting
in
able if it is accompanied by an additional
not,
death or
shall
remedy
be the exclusive
injure.
malicious desire to
against
... and the liabilities
1 20
parties
Both
misunderstand the intent
imposed by
chapter
requirement.
probability
Helf conflates
with
place
any
shall be in
and all
civil
other
intent and Chevron conflates motive or de-
whatsoever,
liability
at common law or oth
sire
clarify
with
To
these misunder-
erwise,
employee
to the
... on account of
standings, we will first review
existing
any
death,
injury
accident or
any way
case
applies
law that defines and
the inten-
contracted,
sustained, aggravated, or in
injury
Second,
tional
exception.
we will af-
employee
curred
in the course of or
firm
standard from
arising
because of or
employee's
out of the
explain
Lantz and
distinguish-
how it aids in
employment, and no
at
action
law
ing between intentional
inju-
and accidental
against
maintained
an employer
... based
ries. We will
distinguish
also
intent from
accident,
upon any
injury, or death of an
both motivation
probability.
Finally, we
employee.11
apply
injure
will
the intent
standard to
Bryan
International,
118 In
v. Utah
case,
concluding that
complaint
her
recognized that
remedy provi
exclusive
satisfies the "intent to
standard.
prohibit
sion did not
an employee from main
taining an action
damages
for
due to an
Existing
A.
Applying
Case Law
intentional tort.12 Accordingly, we allowed
Injury
Intentional
Exception
bring
against
a tort claim
his
1 21 We first turn to
existing
our
case law.
injuries
sustained whеn the
This court first articulated the intentional
supervisor intentionally
large
caused a
cable
injury exception Bryan.
Recognizing that
to hit
employee's body."13
This is known
the Act is
designed
as the
remedial and
imple
exception.
ment a
policy,
social
we noted that
legis
scope
T19 The
"personal
lature had
injury, by
defined
acci
exception is at issue in
Specifical
this case.
dent,
[to] include
caused
the willful
ly,
parties
disagree regarding the level of
act of a
person"
third
and that "willful" im
necessary
intent
to trigger
plied "something in
negligence."
addition to mere
injury exception.
urges
adopt
us to
concluded, however,
We
that an
17
standard in
injure
which intent
would be
*7
act,
intentional act differed
a
from willful
imputed
where an
"substantially
that
the word
"when used to
certain" to occur. She attributes this defini
wrongful
describe a
act ...
[means] that the
case,
bаttery
State,
tion to a
Wagner v.
in
only
act
was
done knowingly, but with
which we relied on the Second Restatement
knowledge
that
it
wrongful
to do
of Torts to define the intent standard for
8 Thus,
it."1
followingBryan, the exclusive
battery.14
hand,
On the other
urges
Chevron
remedy provision
barred
suits for
adopt
us to
injure" standard,
the "intent
injuries
acts,
negligent
caused
or willful
which it
case,
a
appeals
attributes to
court of
but not
intentionally
injurious-ie.,
for
Lantz v. National
Corp.15
Semiconductor
wrongful-acts.
Under this
Chevron would not be
liable absent a "'conscious and
deliberate
years later,
122 Sixteen
in Mounteer v.
intent directed to the purpose
inflicting
Co.,
of
Light
Utah Power &
again applied
we
34A-2-105(1).
§
11. UtahCodeAnn.
(quoting
16.
Id. at
Whirlpool
Hildebrandt v.
Corp.,
(Minn.1985)).
364 N.W.2d
Bryan,
12.
533P.2dat894.
13. Id.at 892.
Bryan,
17.
14. 2005UT 122P.3d599. 18. Id. (Utah Ct.App.1989). 775P.2d937 that appeals concluded Instead, of Mounteer, the court exception.19 intentional only applied injury exception employ his against brought suit plaintiff, by 'a conscious characterized "in situations L"), ("UP & Co. Light er, & Power Utah purpose to the intent directed and deliberate called co-employee his when injuries caused re This standard injury'28 inflicting of and ac loudspeaker over a that his injured employee to show quires "an drugs.20 We being on of Mounteer cused employee manifested or fellow remedy provision the exclusive stated This injure him.29 intent deliberate against action law "any common barred majority of adopted standard the same or direct intended or she unless he have states although twelve jurisdictions,30 In co-worker." injurious act ed "intention of definition recognized a broader UP rule, analyzed whether we this applying employers subject some in order to al" broadcast, not ana did & L ordered negligence.31 gross liability for L ordered UP & lyze the dis upheld injurious.22 We be broadcast majority states of join the 124 We had not he suit of Mounteer's missal injure" standard "intent adopting the or L directed UP & evidence provided inju intentional distinguish between order to fact, only In broadcast. intended fall within ries that alle was an by Mounteer provided evidence inju accidental negligent or exception and I's UP & violated broadcast that the gation rem by the exclusive ries, are covered which in of only piece this With policy. company the Act. edy provision of no inference formation, reasoned L directed UP & Intentional Distinguishing made that Between B. could the broadcast.23 Regardless intended Injuries, Accidental Motivation the Actor's Bryan between interim During the apply decided Mownteer, appeals attempting the court of In injuries Lants, employee's the mark parties miss Lants.24 reject Lantz's defi adopt us to by urging spill that oc tо a chemical exposure a rhetori only allegedly exac Lantz offers area were nition of in his work curred Lantz ar as a "con delayed evacuation.25 "intent" cally cireular definition erbated intent directed and deliberate scious an evacuation to issue the failure gued that read injury."32 After inflicting purpose tort because constituted order remains, definition, question ing result this "substantially certain" injury was it mean that Does mean? "intent" Relying almost what does to fumes. exposure from his inflict action would that his knew treatise, the actor The Law Larson's entirely on mo the actor's require that ("Larson's"), injury? Does Compensation,26 Workmen's if injury? What inflict towas rejected argument.27 tive or desire appeals court of at 940. 1991). (Utah $23 Lantz, P.2d 1055 Id. at 1056. Hildebrandt, 364 N.W.2d (quoting at 939 *8 396). at Id. at 1058. 21. 22. Id. 29. Id. at 940. Id.
23.
("[The
§ 103.03
26,
note
Larson's,
supra
30.
cannot,
employer
liability of the
common-law
the actor
likely
knows that his action is
injure"
the "intent
standard.
For exam
injury,
inflict
sincerely
hopes
ple,
that no
introducing
when
injure"
the "intent
injury
questions
will result?
suggest
standard,
These
explains
Larson's
legal
that
that
justification
actor's motive or desire
injury
the intentional
excep
tion is the "nonaccidental character of the
irrelevant
to the
legal
existence of
4
injury."3
reason,
For this
liability
"the
of
126
defining
Rather
than
and de
employer
cannot ... be stretched to
intent,
termining
injure"
the "intent to
analy
include
injuries
accidental
caused
sis focuses on whether the actor knew оr
gross, wanton, willful, deliberate,
expected
injury
would occur as a conse
reckless, culpable or
negligence,
malicious
quence
actions,
of his
thereby distinguishing
statute,
breach of
or other misconduct of the
between intentional and unintentional work
5
employer...."3 Perhaps the most obvious
place injuries under
the Act. In clarifying
example demonstrating how
concept
applying
we draw on the
an accident
integrally
is
related to the "intent
concept of an accident because it is the an
standard is this statement
in Lar
tithesis of an intentional act. The "intent
son's:
being
"[What
tested here is not the
injure" standard
necessary
because an ac
degree
gravity
depravity
employ
of the
injury
cidental
may result from an intention
conduct,
er's
but rather
the narrow issue of
act,
al
such
as when an
intentional
quality
versus the accidental
ly pushеs a
accidentally
barrel
hits an
precise
producing injury."3
event
employee.
say
We would not
the em
$28 Using
concept
ployer
of an
intentionally injured
accident
employee
to distinguish between
though
even
intentional and unin
he intentionally pushed the bar
injuries
tentional
supports
also
hand,
underly
rel.
On the other
say
we would
ing policy of
"primary objective"
the Act. The
intentionally injured the em
compensation
workers'
ployee
is "to
if he
remove in
intentionally pushed
barrel,
negligence,
forms,
dustrial
in all
knowing
its
expecting
that the
concept of the law of tort."
The Act's
standing
Thus,
on
the other side.
passage
was motivated
the "inevitable
distinguishes
between in
increase
industrial accidents
tentional
born of the
resulting
acts
in unknown or unex
industrial revolution."
Michigan
As the
pected injuries,
which are covered under the
Supreme
stated,
Court
byAct
"Accidеnts are an
compensation,
workers'
and intention
part
inevitable
production;
of industrial
al
in
resulting
acts
expected inju
known or
tentional
ries,
by employers
torts
are
which fall
not.39
within the
injury
exception.
body
129 Our
of case law distin
concept
of an accident is central
guishing between accidents and intentional
to the
analysis. According
injuries in the context of insurance claims is
Dictionary,
Black's Law
helpful
accident is an
because it
clarifies that an
injurious
is not an accident.40 In N.M. v. Dan
"unintended and unforeseen
occurr
ence."3
concept
of an accident is also tel
E.,
we held that to determine whether an
throughout
woven
Larson's
articulation
accidental,
is intentional or
we consid
(8th ed.2004)
(em-
Law
Black's
Dictionary
v. Dow Chemical Co., 427 Mich.
Beauchamp
added).
phasis
(1986)
1, 398
(superseded
N.W.2d
statute,
Comp.
(1987)).
§
Mich.
Laws
418.131
Larson's,
supra
§
note
(emphasis
103.03
added).
eg.,
40. See,
Richards
v. Standard Accident
Ins.
(1921)
("An
Co.,
971 himself would evacuate or ex Lantz assuming that intended was result "the er whether dangerous. Us- too became the if the conditions focusing on whether than rather pected," standard, Un the court injure" intentional.41 injury was "intent to causing the ing the act to trans- "may effort rejected act Lantz's appeals intentional an approach, der this intentional unex into an result was claim negligence if the form a accident in an result 2 corollary unanticipated.4 to "intent the pectеd [and] Under injury claim. only not accidental be liable act is standard, supervisor that an would holding is the to this anticipated, injury and would expected that expected was result or if the if he knew inju that hoped subjectively and he evacuate actor to if the his failure even from result By fo- Thus, motor speeding not to evacuate. a intentionally chose occur. ry not would subjective is still the vehicle on another attention with cusing the court's collides ist who "while the actor, "accident" in an the involved expectation knowledge or limit, speed the to exceed intend did motorist aids in distin- injure" standard to "intent a collision.43 cause to not intend did injury be and intentional an between guishing "not attaches intent Under an in- arises that an accidental could possibly what recognition of aon based decision. tentional rather, probably what but happen, Lantz, in the decisions contrast to 44 131 In law, a Thus, case our under happen." indisputably addressed Mounteer Bryan and intentional successfully plead an plaintiff Ac negligent, acts. intentional, than rather either was that the showing injury by apply the necessary to not cordingly, was expected. intended to determine injure" test "intent in the clearly articulated Although not 30 negligence or product injury was the "intent to cases, purpose intentional Bryon, In between distinguishing as a tool Bryan's to hit cable large steel ly caused inju unexpected and accidental intentional allegation that no was body.46 There compare step back and if we apparent ries is the su Bryan or that accidentally hit cable in Lantz Mounteer. Bryan and Lantz foolish intentional an made pervisor There spill. chemical an accidental volved cable to causing the choiсe, unintentionally spill was the chemical that allegation was no Similarly, in body. Bryan's swing into Instead, Lantz al or intentional. Mounteer, allegation no there was "substantially cer it was leged that because was ac loudspeaker over announcement by the chemi injured he would tain" that Thus, Bryan in or inadvertent.47 cidental evacuation fumes, issue an the refusal cal activities Mounteer, injury-producing facts injury. The an intentional was order Lantz, in while clearly were factory where however, revealed, chemical activity-the injury-producing allowing workers policy had worked Lantz only why This accident. spill-was they if felt themselves evacuate injure" standard "intent applied Lantz co Lantz's many of danger, in were unin distinguish between Thus, Lantz's did so.45 workers injuries. tentional allegation to an down claim boiled evacuate, permission Lantz asked when "intent note that also 132 We supervi Lantz's who was supervisor, adopted is have that we injure" standard failing to ascertain sor, negligent for injury stan that oc with spill consistent chemical by the posed danger Bryan, Bryon. articulated dard factory and for part of in a distant curred Id. 115. 1, 11, ¶ 44. 566. 175 P.3d 2008 UT 41. original)(inter- (emphasis and alteration
42.
Lantz,
at
P.2d
omitted);
Kellogg v.
see also
quotation marks
nal
567,
Co.,
Utah
Ins.
W. States
Cal.
Life
Bryan,
at 892.
533 P.2d
unexpect-
(1949) ("[Ilf
death is
P.2d
considered
it is to be
act
of an intended
ed result
accidental.").
at 1056.
Mounteer, 823
¶1,
N.M.,
P.3d 566.
n.
UT
*10
held that the
remedy
exclusive
clause did not
134 The distinction between intent and
insulate an employer
liability
for a motive is particularly important
in applying
"wrongful act" that was
knowingly
injure"
"done
to
standard because an
[and] with the knowledge
injury
that it
wrong
may
arise in instances
ful to do it."4
Obviously,
directing
an em
where the
intentionally placed
ployee
perform
way,
in
act that
harms
employer's
the
the
motive was to
expects
profits-not
knows or
increase
will result
in
inflict
is a
injury. A tragic
wrongful
case from
act that is
New Mexico
knowingly
done
illus-
and with
danger
trates the
ignoring
of
knowledge
distinction.
wrongful.
is
The "intent
injure"
simply
a narrower
Delgado
Chino,
v. Phelps Dodge
Bryan
version of the
standard that
apply
Inc.,
plaintiffemployee
worked in a
to determine
was the
smelting plant that
copper
distilled
ore from
product of
negligence.
intent or
In applying
rock
superheating
unprocessed
rock
standard, however,
we eaution courts to
degrees
over 2000
Fahrenheit.50 On the
traps
avoid two
produce
could
an erro
night
injury,
of
Delgado's
his
crew was short
application
neous
the "intent to
handed
pressured
and was
supervi
standard.
sors to work harder in order
compensate
for
plant
losses that
during
sustained
ten-day
recent
shut down.51 An emеrgency
1. Maintaining the Distinction Between In-
situation arose when the processing system
tent and Motive or Desire
malfunctioned,
threatening
an overflow of
138 We first
molten rock.
caution
The situation
courts to main
could have been
safely
tain
shutting
distinction
resolved
between
down
motive and
furnace.
Instead,
legal concept
Delgado,
directed
Distinguishing be
who had
tween
never
concepts
type
these
addressed this
is difficult
of emer-
because in
situation,
geney
motive,
go
tent and
into a
as
tunnel
used in our
below the
everyday
stop
furnace and
the flow
of molten
rock.52
language,
are
synonymous.
often
For exam
Delgado entered
ple,
state,
the tunnel
when we
and saw that
"John
intentionally in
molten rock
jured Sheila,"
was overflowing its container.
we assume that John's motiva
He
supervisor
radioed his
injure
help, explain
for
tion was to
Sheila.
legаl
concept
ing that he was
intent,
qualified
neither
however,
nor able to
is broader than motive or
address the
situation. His
desire.
insist
legal
Under the
intent,
definition of
ed that
proceed
he
alone. "Shortly after
say
we would
that John intentionally injured
Delgado
tunnel,
entered
lights
short
Sheila if he took an action that he knew or
ed out and black
poured
smoke
from the
expected would
Sheila,
result
mouth Delgado's
the tunnel.
co-workers
even if his motive
acting
injure
was not to
emerged
watched as he
from the smoke-filled
Sheila.
example,
For
if
intentionally
John
tunnel, fully engulfed in flames." Delgado
gun
shot a
direction,
inju
Sheila's
Sheila's
died three weeks later.
ry
would be
even if John's moti
joke
vation was to
injure.49
rather than to
136 The New
Supreme
Mexico
Court re-
Thus,
legal
definition of
jected
intent encom
"intent
par-
passes
simply
more than
motive.
tially based on its cоnclusion that the "intent
Bryan,
48.
CONCLUSION exception to the Work- Compensation However, ers' Act. in a case {50 summary, In we retain the "intent such as the one before us where the claim- injure" standard aas test for differentiating ant-employee pursue has elected to the bene- injuries injuries between intentional fits afforded under Compensa- the Workers' product are accidental or the negligence. Act, tion I doing believe so is an election of satisfy order remedy by prohibits the claimant fur- plaintiff must inju- show that her against ther suit any under ry resulted from an act that the actor knew exelusion from the Simply put, Act. either a injury. cause This stan- Act, claim falls within the or it does not as a dard require injure, does not a motive to *14 result of exception some applica- the Act's it cannot by merely be satisfied demonstrat- bility. It cannot be both. If ing that high probability there was a inju- injured job on the pursue elects to the bene- ry. complaint successfully alleges an Act, fits of the that decision brings with it pled sug- she facts too, the burdens of namely the Act the exelu- gesting that when her directed remedy provisions sive applicable to the em- her to re-initiate the neutralization process, ployer. result, As a although agree I knew or that she would be district got court wrong, the law I believe it injurеd by resulting gases. noxious got right. the result I would affirm on that Therefore, exception to basis. applies. Act 151 This pur rule is consistent with the
pose policy protects of the Act. It employees, recognizing policy "[the
our always law has injured been to allow one
through another, the intentional act of
seek redress from the
intending
one
harm"
"policy
and that
salutary
this
has the
effect
mand for proceedings further consistent with opinion. Durham, 58 Chief Justice Associate Chief Durrant,
Justice Nehring Justice concur
in Justice
opinion.
Parrish's
Int'l,
892,
Bryan
(Utah
v. Utah
533 P.2d
Wagner Castings
69. Collier v.
Co.,