Kay Ansley v. Marion Warren, 861 F.3d 512

Background

In response to court decisions allowing same-sex marriages, North Carolina enacted S.B. 2 permitting magistrates and registers of deeds to recuse themselves from performing marriages for sincerely held religious objections, with administrative procedures (six‑month recusal, cross‑county coverage, minimum availability, and a one‑time retirement credit for rehired magistrates).
Plaintiffs are three couples (two same‑sex, one interracial) who concede they are able to marry or already married; they sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging S.B. 2 violates the Establishment Clause by authorizing public expenditures to accommodate recusals.
Plaintiffs challenge two types of expenditures: (1) NCAOC travel costs to bring magistrates from other counties to perform marriages and swap duties between counties; and (2) one‑time retirement system payments for reappointed magistrates.
The district court dismissed for lack of standing, holding plaintiffs could not meet the narrow Flast taxpayer‑standing exception because the expenditures are incidental to a regulatory scheme, not specific legislative appropriations to religious entities.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding plaintiffs lacked Article III standing as state taxpayers and that S.B. 2’s expenditures are too attenuated from the taxing‑and‑spending decisions and do not constitute the paradigmatic Establishment Clause spending injury.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do state taxpayers have Article III standing to challenge S.B. 2 under Flast?	Taxpayer status gives standing because S.B. 2 authorizes state expenditures to accommodate religious objections (travel and retirement payments).	Plaintiffs lack standing: expenditures are incidental admin costs funded by lump‑sum appropriations, not specific taxing‑and‑spending appropriations to religious entities.	No standing; Flast exception not met.
Is there a ‘‘logical link’’ to legislative taxing and spending?	S.B. 2’s recusal scheme compels NCAOC spending to implement accommodations, creating a logical link.	Link is missing: S.B. 2 is regulatory, not a spending program; challenged costs come from general lump‑sum judicial appropriations.	No logical link; expenditures are incidental to regulation.
Does the alleged spending support the requisite nexus to an Establishment Clause injury?	Travel and retirement payments advance religion by subsidizing magistrates’ religious refusals.	No direct subsidy to religious institutions; funds remain within government and do not implicate the classic sectarian subsidy Flast addressed.	No; not the paradigmatic Flast injury (no direct subsidy to sectarian entities).
Is the relief plaintiffs seek redressable by an injunction against the expenditures?	Injunctive relief stopping expenditures would redress taxpayer injury.	Even if expenditures were enjoined, that would not address the accommodation and could harm access to marriage; remedy mismatch undermines standing.	Redressability weak; Flast remedies would not substantively resolve plaintiffs’ broader grievance.

Key Cases Cited

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (establishes narrow taxpayer‑standing exception for Establishment Clause claims involving congressional appropriations to religious entities)
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer interest in public treasury is too generalized to confer Article III standing)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements: injury‑in‑fact, causation, redressability)
Winn v. Arizona Christian School Tuition Org., 563 U.S. 125 (2011) (limits Flast; no taxpayer standing for state tax credit claims that do not directly subsidize religious institutions)
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (narrowing of Flast; executive actions and general appropriations do not confer taxpayer standing)
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (no taxpayer standing where alleged injury stems from executive action rather than congressional taxing‑and‑spending)
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upheld taxpayer standing where statute was at heart a congressional disbursement program to external organizations)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (reiterates limits on taxpayer standing and federalism concerns for state taxpayer suits)
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (taxpayer suits may not be used to litigate general religious policy grievances)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing doctrines preserve the limited, judicial role in democracy)