Kawashima v. Holder
132 S. Ct. 1166
SCOTUS2012Background
- Kawashimas, Japanese nationals and U.S. lawful permanent residents since 1984, were convicted under 26 U.S.C. §7206(1) and §7206(2) and faced deportation as convicted of aggravated felonies.
- INA §1101(a)(43)(M) defines aggravated felonies with two clauses: (i) involving fraud or deceit with >$10,000 loss to victims, and (ii) tax evasion under §7201 with >$10,000 revenue loss to the Government.
- The Government charged the Kawashimas with aggravated felonies under Clause (i) for their §7206 offenses; the Ninth Circuit agreed, letting the Board determine the amount of loss for Mrs. Kawashima.
- The Court applies a categorical approach: it looks to the elements of the crimes rather than the underlying facts to determine if they involve fraud or deceit.
- The majority holds that §7206(1) and §7206(2) necessarily involve deceit, and thus qualify as aggravated felonies under Clause (i) when the Government’s loss threshold is met; the decision affirms the Ninth Circuit.
- A dissent would limit Clause (i) to non-tax fraud and would leave Clause (ii) as the sole driver for tax offenses; the majority rejects this view.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §7206(1) and §7206(2) fall within INA §1101(a)(43)(M)(i). | Kawashima contends tax crimes do not involve fraud or deceit. | Government argues the offenses involve deceit due to willful false statements. | Yes, they involve deceit and qualify under Clause (i). |
| Whether Clause (ii) excludes tax offenses from Clause (i). | Kawashima argues Clauses (i) and (ii) are mutually exclusive. | Government argues Clause (ii) clarifies tax evasion but does not void Clause (i). | No, Clause (i) covers tax offenses; Clause (ii) confirms tax evasion qualifies, not redundant. |
| Whether interpreting Clause (i) to include tax crimes would render Clause (ii) superfluous. | Kawashima argues superfluity should favor limiting Clause (i). | Government maintains Clause (ii) independently ensures tax evasion qualifies. | Rejected; Clause (ii) remains meaningful and Congress intended both. |
| Whether the Court should apply the rule of lenity in interpreting §1101(a)(43)(M). | No lenity invoked; statute unambiguous enough to apply to these offenses. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (categorical approach to criminal statutes (look at elements))
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach foundational to inquiry)
- Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965) (tax evasion elements; willfulness and evasion involve fraud)
- Schar ton, 285 U.S. 518 (1932) (statute-of-limitations discussion; fraud implied in evasion context)
- Gray v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1983) (criminal tax evasion conviction establishes fraud in civil fraud actions)