263 F. Supp. 3d 947
E.D. Cal.2017Background
- On Jan. 25, 2014 Lodi officers Bratton and Lockie responded to a 9‑1‑1 family‑disturbance call reporting an off‑medication, possibly violent, mentally ill subject (Parminder Shergill). Officers were not told the reported assault had not occurred.
- Officers located Parminder near a park, followed him toward his home, ordered him to stop, and radioed that he had a knife; officers drew firearms and later fired multiple shots, killing Parminder (14 gunshot wounds). A knife recovered at the scene contained Parminder’s DNA.
- Eyewitness testimony from nearby residents conflicts with officers’ account: some witnesses state Parminder had not fully turned or charged and that they could not see a knife in his hand; one witness heard “don’t shoot.”
- Plaintiffs assert federal claims (Fourth Amendment excessive force; provocation; Fourteenth and First Amendment familial‑association; Section 1983 municipal claims) and state negligence/ wrongful death claims; defendants moved for summary judgment/adjudication.
- The court found genuine disputes of material fact on the central use‑of‑force facts (e.g., whether Parminder was armed, charging, or had paused/said “don’t shoot”), denied summary judgment on most federal and state claims against the officers, granted some defenses: provocation claim dismissed (Mendez), negligent infliction claim dismissed, limited rulings as to municipal and supervisory liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force (Fourth Amendment) | Parminder was not armed or charging; a jury could find officers shot a non‑dangerous, possibly mentally ill misdemeanor suspect who said “don’t shoot.” | Use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Parminder armed himself with a knife and charged the officers. | Denied as to officers: material factual disputes preclude summary judgment; qualified immunity denied on these facts. |
| Provocation rule (Fourth Amendment) | N/A (claim asserted) | Officers sought dismissal under existing precedent. | Granted for defendants: provocation claim fails as matter of law post‑Mendez. |
| Substantive due process – familial association (Fourteenth & First Amend.) | Plaintiffs’ parental/familial association rights were violated by conscience‑shocking conduct; First Amendment claim parallels Fourteenth Amendment standard. | Officers argue higher "purpose to harm" standard or that conduct did not meet standard; municipal defendants challenge scope. | Denied for officers on both Fourteenth and First Amendment familial claims; court applies Ninth Circuit standards and finds issues for jury; qualified immunity not available. |
| ADA Title II (reasonable accommodation) | Officers failed to reasonably accommodate Parminder’s mental disability during encounter, causing greater injury; a reasonable accommodation existed. | City argues officers acted reasonably, no feasible accommodation proved, and alcohol explains behavior; Chief Helms entitled to qualified immunity. | Denied as to City: triable issues exist on reasonable accommodation and causation; Title II not subject to qualified immunity in individual capacity and Helms not a defendant on ADA claim. |
| Monell/municipal liability (failure to train/policy/ratification) | City’s policies/training deficient re: encounters with mentally ill persons; single‑incident or pattern could show deliberate indifference; ratification by policymakers via accepting officers’ version. | City argues inadequate proof of custom/pattern; training met state requirements; ratification requires approval of unconstitutional basis and causation. | Failure‑to‑train claim survives summary judgment except as to Chief Helms in his individual capacity (granted); ratification claim dismissed for lack of proof of conscious approval and causation. |
| State tort claims (negligence, wrongful death, NIED, interference with civil rights) | Plaintiffs pursue survival/wrongful death and other state claims tied to the shooting. | Defendants seek dismissal where federal claims fail or where elements lacking. | Majority survive: negligence (survival and wrongful death) and interference claims remain; negligent infliction of emotional distress dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (governs objective‑reasonableness excessive‑force standard)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly‑force standard to prevent escape; probable‑cause-to‑believe‑threat principle)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) (at summary judgment courts must view disputed facts in light most favorable to nonmovant)
- Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Graham factors and caution about split‑second judgments)
- Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying summary judgment where officers shot emotionally disturbed person holding knife; instructive on mentally ill suspects)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires official policy, custom, or ratification)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (discusses deliberate indifference and training; pattern typically required but single‑incident theory survives in limited circumstances)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑prong analysis)